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Abstract
Different countries have varying levels of globalization. Many features, such as size, play a
part in determining the level of globalization in countries. I argue that globalization is influenced by
veto players in systematically different ways. To understand these different relationships,
globalization must be broken apart into three dimensions (political, economic, and social). Political
globalization is negatively affected by veto players. Economic globalization is not affected by veto
players directly but is influenced by related phenomena. Social globalization is positively affected by
veto players. To test my arguments, I employ a Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) method to analyze
a dataset covering 33 countries from 1970 to 2015. I find that as expected, each dimension of
globalization has a fundamentally different relationship with veto players. My findings contribute to
the growing understanding that globalization is more complex than previously thought. I link my
findings to disagreements in the existing literature on globalization and show that some of this
disagreement may have been due to failure to take the complexity of globalization into account.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Globalization is a complex issue, partly because economic globalization is only one part of it. Globalization is greater
global closeness, and that is cultural, social, political, as well as economic.”
- Amartya Sen

In this dissertation, I explore globalization and its relationship to institutions, specifically
how veto players impact the level of globalization in OECD countries. The veto players framework
aids in understanding how institutional constraints effect policy outcomes (Tsebelis 2002). Veto
player arguments have wide implications, including effects on legislative output, budgets, civil war,
and globalization (Tsebelis 1999; Tsebelis and Chang 2004; David 2006; Crepaz 2001a; Crepaz and
Moser 2004; Ha 2008). I explore how veto players effect globalization. Until recently globalization
research faced serious theoretical and empirical roadblocks (discussed shortly). I address these
roadblocks by being among the first to utilize new advancements to overcome these obstacles. This
allows a more accurate empirical examination of the direct relationship between veto players and
globalization.
Building on past theoretical research in this area (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002;
Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) I start from the premise that globalization is best understood as a
multidimensional phenomenon. There are three main aspects of globalization; political, economic,
and social (Dreher 2006a). This starting point enables me to examine how domestic political
characteristics, such as veto players, impact the three different dimensions of globalization. I posit
that a unique relationship between veto players and each dimension exists. As a veto player problem
becomes more pronounced, each dimension behaves differently. This insight furthers our current
understanding of globalization as a concept and how it relates to institutions.
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Examining the three dimensions of globalization separately, as opposed to aggregated
together, is critical. Previous work, which claimed to study globalization, was actually studying a single
indicator of a single dimension of globalization, and often not using the same indicator or dimension
(Crepaz 2001a; Ha 2008; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Instead of claiming to study the entire
phenomenon that is globalization, it is more appropriate to make a more conservative claim. If one
studies capital account restrictions, it is more reasonable to argue that economic globalization is
being examined. By the same token, if the size of the welfare state is examined, it is more
appropriate to claim that welfare spending gets at political globalization instead of the entire
concept. By treating globalization as complex and multidimensional, it becomes easier to understand
its effects, not less. This insight is critical and provides a new perspective on globalization research. I
intend to showcase this insights validity by showcasing that each dimension has a different
relationship with institutions.
To test my argument regarding veto players and globalization’s dimensions, I employ new
data from the Swiss Economic Institute. These data operationalize globalization’s dimensions
(political, economic, and social) for the first time (Dreher 2006a; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018).
These data contain individual composite measures of each dimension and are generated using the
most advanced techniques available (principal component analysis, spatial controls, etc.). This
enables falsification of previously untested theoretical claims about globalization, specifically its
multidimensionality. In addition, I use both operationalizations of veto players (ideological range
and count) (Tsebelis 2002) to test the relationship between veto players and globalization’s
dimensions. This allows for the isolation of institutional effects, which previous work did not.1 Thus
my argument can be subjected to rigorous empirical testing.

1

I discuss this in more detail in the Data and Methods Chapter.

2

As previous work argues (Held and McGrew 1993; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008), and my
own findings suggest, there is merit to treating globalization as multidimensional. The relationship
between veto players and the three dimensions of globalization are very different. Veto players and
political globalization are negatively related to each other. Veto players and economic globalization
have a complex situational relationship that ensures continued economic globalization with other
institutional domains effecting the pace of change. And, veto players and social globalization are
positively related to each other, but other institutional domains also contribute to its growth. These
results, taken together, showcase that globalization should be treated as multidimensional.
Otherwise, these critical differences would not have been identified. This much is clear, each
dimension has a different relationship with domestic legislative institutions.
My findings are particularly important given the state of the globalization literature in
political science. Plagued by divergent findings and theoretical ambiguity, the examination of
institutional effects on globalization has not matured to directly examining causal mechanisms. Only
by acknowledging its complexity can globalization be further understood. For example, when treated
as a simple concept, previous work is plagued by two sets of effects. One group of scholars argues
that globalization has positive effects on the size of the welfare state (Rodrik 1998; Swank 2002).
While others argue that globalization has a negative effect on the size of the welfare state (Rodrik
1997; Garrett and Mitchell 2001). I seek to take a step back and return to how globalization was
originally conceptualized; complex and multidimensional (Held and McGrew 1993). Using this
insight, I fill a key theoretical gap that could explain why globalization has multiple effects.
Additionally, no work, as of this writing, has yet to use the Swiss Economic Institute’s globalization
data in political science circles. This is despite it being considered the gold standard in economics
due to faithful theoretical underpinnings (Dreher 2006a; Dreher et al. 2010; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm
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2018). Thus, I challenge globalization scholars to reopen the theoretical and empirical toolbox to
increase our understanding of globalization.
This chapter begins my investigation and introduces the concept of globalization. I adopt a
definition of globalization that is consistent with the previously untested theoretical work. I then
employ this definition to clearly separate globalization from related concepts. I then limit the scope
of my research, by focusing primarily on two institutional effects on globalization; legislative and
executive effects. I then lay down a road map for the remainder of my dissertation. Lastly, I
conclude by returning to my definition and briefly point to the contents of the next chapter, which
builds upon my definition.

What is Globalization?
Despite the term ‘globalization’ being used by journalists, academics, and in popular culture,
many definitions exist. In fact, entire books have been dedicated to defining globalization (U. Beck
2018). In scholarly circles, the main bone of contention is how complex globalization is. Some argue
that globalization should be defined in a highly complex way (Held and McGrew 1993). Others
argue for a limited definition (Keohane 2002; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005) to facilitate applied
research. I argue that both points are well taken. A definition that captures both aspects of the
debate is needed to address critical weaknesses in current work. A more flexible definition of
globalization is needed. This would allow, for the first time, rigorous applied research that considers
the complexity of globalization. This would help resolve conflicting arguments in the literature
(Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002 are but two examples) by providing a clearer road map to
researchers.

4

Before defining globalization, it is important to make one point. No one definition of
globalization is perfect. I do not claim to have a complete definition of globalization. What I do argue is
that previous theoretical and empirical work has given scholars additional leverage to create and
employ a more complete definition of globalization. This opens fascinating new lines of inquiry.
Allowing for rigorous hypothesis testing of conceptual linkages while also allowing for globalization
to retain its complexity. In this way, my definition brings together theoretical and empirical insights
not previously combined.
Globalization connects all countries in the international system (Held and McGrew 1993).
Globalization is also dynamic. Globalization fluctuates based on long-term trends like embedded
liberalism and short-term political changes (Ruggie 1982; Garrett 1998). Globalization is
multidimensional, as it involves many types of connections, even illicit (Eichengreen and Leblang
2008; Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011). Lastly, globalization operates simultaneously across
a variety of institutional domains (domestic and international). Given these facts, I define
globalization as; a complex multidimensional dynamic process of global interconnectedness, operating simultaneously
across several institutional domains.2 By defining globalization like this, I both acknowledge its complex
multidimensionality while still being able to examine it empirically. Two parts of my definition are
key. First, by acknowledging globalizations multidimensionality, isolating and studying the
dimensions of globalization separately is possible. And second, noting its multiple institutional
effects, it is possible to examine the impact of each institutional domain on globalization. Thus, my
definition allows for clearly articulated linkages between empirical concepts, such as veto players and
globalization, while also allowing globalization to be considered as a divisible whole. Thus, my

For the purposes of this work, institutions are defined as formal rules that shape human behavior. For a more detailed
discussion of what is or is not an institution, works by Douglas North (1990) and John Duffield (2007), among others,
(Lipson 1991; Carey 2000) are recommended.
2
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definition allows for parsimony to be considered in two ways. On the dimensional side, or on its
relationship to institutions.
I have elected to preserve, as much as possible, the multidimensionality of globalization.
This is because of the sage warning by Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang (2008). To not retain
globalizations multidimensionality will bias my results. Therefore, I limit the scope of my work by
focusing primarily on domestic legislative institutions. I also incorporate executive institutions where
appropriate. This closely related institutional domain cannot be overlooked, as to do so would
compromise my research. By limiting my scope to two institutional domains, I allow globalization to
retain its multidimensionality while focusing on specific institutional effects. This is possible thanks
to a dataset that allows for globalization to be operationalized as multidimensional (Dreher 2006a;
Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). This allows parsimonious empirical examinations of how
globalization, and it’s dimensions, are affected by institutions.

What Globalization is Not
A major problem in globalization research, is disentangling it from other concepts. I contend
that globalization is both distinct and separate. Therefore, I want to clearly outline what
globalization is not. This is to ensure clarity, which is often not found in globalization research. For
example, globalization can be mistaken for both regionalism and interdependence. However,
globalization is not regionalism or interdependence. Conflating these concepts is problematic for
globalization research, as regionalism and interdependence are central to a lasting theoretical debate
in International Relations (IR). This injects theoretical ambiguity into globalization research, due to
conceptual overlap. I seek to remedy this by articulating what globalization is not.
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Luckily, regionalism and interdependence are different from globalization in key areas. This
gives crude instructions on how to pull globalization from the conceptual rat’s nest and isolate it.3
To that end, I highlight the differences between regionalism, interdependence, and globalization. I
begin with the differences between regionalism and globalization before discussing the differences
between interdependence and globalization.
According to David Held and Anthony McGrew, regionalism is connections between
countries in a similar geographic region (1993). Regionalism is therefore defined as follows; “… the
intensification of patterns of interconnectedness between geographically contiguous states which define
the contours of a regional subsystem [emphasis added] (1993, 263).4 Based on this definition,
regionalism is not a global phenomenon. Therefore, globalization is not regionalism due to its global
character. In fact, most globalization research distinguishes between regionalism and globalization
for this reason (examples include; Vujakovic 2009; Dreher et al. 2010; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm
2018).
For those who coined the term interdependence, it is broader than regionalism. Drawing
upon early regionalism work, they created a broader concept (Bergsten, Keohane, and Nye 1975;
Keohane and Nye 1977). However, interdependence is not globalization. Robert Keohane argues
that interdependence is a static state, much like a photograph (2002). But globalization is not static.
Previous work describes globalization as dynamic, varying significantly over time. Several examples
illustrate globalizations dynamic nature. During the Inter-War period (1918-1939), globalization
decreased rapidly (Hays 2009). After WWII, globalization slowly began to increase in the era of
globalizing markets (1960-1989). And more recently, globalization has increased rapidly in the era of

This similarity is also problematic when measuring globalization (Lockwood 2001; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). This
topic will be taken up in the Data and Methods Chapter.
4
A regional subsystem might include the following; Europe, North America, Asia, Africa, etc.
3
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global markets (1990-Present) (Garrett 1998). Given this shifting trend, to argue that globalization is
static across time is vastly incorrect. Therefore, globalization is not interdependence as it fluctuates
dynamically across time.
What globalization is, is a complex, global, multidimensional, dynamic process. It has far
reaching implications, such as those on the size of the welfare state (Crepaz 2001a), the fate of
democracy (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008), and patterns of international cooperation (Mansfield,
Milner, and Pevehouse 2007) to name just a few. I add to this body of work by exploring the direct
effect of legislative and executive institutions on each dimension of globalization. By doing this, I
return to the theoretical roots and emphasize the multidimensionality of globalization. While also
systematically exploring how institutions impact each dimension differently.

Globalization and Institutions
Given my definition of globalization, the question remains which institutions impact it. The
first two institutional domains that spring to mind are international and domestic institutions. To be
fair, the sage wisdom of Robert Putnam (1988) is applicable here, both effect globalization
sometimes. The more important question is how do these institutional domains impact globalization.
While international institutions do impact globalization, I focus here on domestic institutions,
specifically legislative and executive ones. This is because previous work points to significant
domestic institutional effects on globalization (Garrett 1998). This can be traced back to early work
on embedded liberalism, corporatism, and veto players.
With the reinjection of embedded liberalism into the literature (Ruggie 1982), scholarly
attention was directed toward domestic economic intervention. Specifically, efforts to mitigate the
negative effects of trade openness (a component of globalization). This culminated with the
8

realization that corporatism, an electoral alliance between organized labor and the ideological left, is
a key determinate of domestic economic intervention to mitigate the negative effects of trade
(Katzenstein 1985). This soon mushroomed into a typology including; corporatism, market
liberalism, and incoherent countries. The key differences being that each varied on the strength of
organized labor, levels of openness, and commitment to economic intervention. This led scholars to
eventually explore the impact of these differences on globalization. This line of reasoning is still
actively employed by scholars (Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Hays 2009 are two examples).
The differing relationships of corporatism, market liberalism, and incoherent countries with
globalization have proven that domestic politics matter.
However, the components of corporatism, an alliance between the ideological left and
organized labor, led to other work examining if domestic political changes affect globalization
(Garrett 1998). It was found that short-term changes in partisan politics effect globalization. In sum,
the presence of the ideological left in government effects globalization. This finding showcased that
domestic partisan politics trickle up and have profound implications. This brought into the
globalization literature the insights of other areas of political science, specifically work on political
parties (Laver and Hunt 1992 is an example). This led to the conclusion that electoral institutions
can both shepherd in the dawn of a new era of globalization, but also its rapid retreat (Hays 2009).
The ‘how’ is conspicuously left out in these arguments, however.
At the same time, Veto Player Theory, used to compare across electoral systems (Tsebelis
2002), was also being applied to globalization. This line of research sought to determine how welfare
state shrinkage or expansion (a consequence of globalization) was connected to veto players (Crepaz
2001a; Crepaz and Moser 2004; Ha 2008). Much like previous work on globalization, these scholars
assume that domestic institutions are a key variable in the globalization story. Globalization might
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increase/decrease the size of the welfare state, as do veto players. I draw much inspiration from this
line of thinking. The veto player framework brings a defined answer to how domestic political
changes affect globalization. I make the direct relationship between veto players and globalization
the center of my analysis.
Drawing from both streams of the globalization literature, the next logical step is to take
both lines of reasoning and combine them together. On the one hand, a relationship between
political parties and organized labor does impact how globalized a country is. On the other hand, the
veto players framework can explain domestic politics and institutional effects. This begs the
question, do veto players, derived from partisan competition, have a systematic effect on
globalization in the OECD? And, if so, is this relationship the same across each dimension of
globalization? This is a key gap in our understanding of both veto players and globalization. It is this
gap in our understanding that I fill with this dissertation.

Dissertation Overview
Immediately following this introduction is the Theory Chapter. In this chapter, I argue that
globalization can be divided into three primary dimensions; political, economic, and social (Dreher
2006a). I also contend that by disaggregating globalization into its dimensions, it becomes possible
to understand why previous work suffers from divergent findings (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank
2002 are examples). Previous work was accidentally examining different dimensions and expecting
similar results. Which is unlikely when the dependent variable is vastly different across analyses.
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I then turn to an overview of Tsebelian Veto Player Theory (1995; 2002).5 This theory
provides analytical leverage to explain the effects of domestic institutions on globalization. Thus,
Veto Player Theory is perfectly suited to examine the effect of legislative and executive institutions
on globalization’s dimensions. As it allows for comparison across varying institutional structures.
This enables a generalizable argument to be constructed regarding how institutions impact
globalizations dimensions across the OECD. I then turn to each dimension of globalization
(political, economic, and social) and posit a relationship between it and veto players. This results in
three different predicted relationships. First, veto players cause political globalization to decrease.
Second, veto players do not affect economic globalization. And veto players increase social
globalization. For executive institutions, only economic and social globalization are affected.
Executives exaggerate the growth of economic globalization. While they increase social globalization
in conjunction with veto players. With each dimension of globalization having a different
relationship with veto players and executives, thinking about globalization as an aggregate concept is
problematic.
After the Theory Chapter, is the Data and Methods Chapter. This chapter expands upon the
theoretical, by examining multidimensional globalization data. I discuss the Swiss Economic
Institute’s Globalization Index, as it has been found to be the best available data (Gygli, Haelg, and
Sturm 2018). This is due to it containing individual measures of all three primary dimensions of
globalization (political, economic, and social). Additionally, it is the most advanced composite
globalization data that is currently available. This captures globalizations complexity with a high
degree of accuracy.

This is not to be confused with veto points scholarship such as work by Markus Crepaz (2001a), which is very different
from Veto Player Theory. The differences between the two theories will be outlined in detail in the next chapter.
5
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I then turn to my dependent variables, starting with veto players. Of the two
operationalization’s of veto players (ideological range and count), I argue that ideological range is the
most appropriate, due to a lack of measurement error. However, I will still employ the count
measure as a robustness check throughout my analyses. This is to showcase that variable selection
does not drive my results. I also derive a number of control variables that are common across all
three of globalizations dimensions (political, economic, and social).6 Examples include; the era of
globalizing markets (1960-1989) (Garrett 1998), corporatism (Katzenstein 1985), and others.
Variables specific to certain dimensions are discussed in the relevant chapters.
I also discuss the common statistical estimators for Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) data;
Ordinary Least Squares, Feasible Generalized Least Squares, and Panel Corrected Standard Error
regression (Stimson 1985; N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). Of the three estimators, Panel
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) regression emerges as the most appropriate. This is due to its
ability to produce unbiased standard errors. However, when employing PCSE, certain model
specifications are necessary to deal with any autocorrelation in the data. I discuss the two primary
methods of doing this; including a lagged dependent variable and assuming an autoregressive one
(AR1) process in the data. With these two model specifications in place, PCSE produces the most
accurate model estimates.
After the Data and Methods Chapter, I move to the first of three empirical chapters, one for
each dimension of globalization, beginning first with political globalization. The Political
Globalization Chapter tests my theoretical argument about veto players and political globalization,
where I theorize a negative relationship. I briefly recap my argument but focus more on the
relationship between ideological range and political globalization. I argue that as the ideological

6

I will discuss all dimension specific dependent variables in the relevant chapter.
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range of the veto players increases, political globalization decreases. The variables employed in the
model are overviewed, paying special attention to variables specific to the political dimension. This
includes a year specific effect for 1991 not found in other dimensions. I find evidence to support my
hypothesis, veto players and political globalization do have a negative relationship. I then use my
findings to explain variation in political globalization between OECD members.
The second empirical chapter examines veto players and economic globalization. This
chapter reviews my argument that all veto players favor increased economic globalization. I contend
that the electoral incentive, present in all democratic systems, causes at least one veto player to favor
economic globalization. This results in any proposed changed to economic globalization being
vetoed. Additionally, when a liberal executive is present, economic globalization increases at a faster
rate than normal. The variables employed in the economic globalization model are discussed, noting
dimension specific ones, such as ‘peak oil.’ I find that economic globalization tends to increase over
time, but more rapidly when a liberal executive is present. My results allow for key differences
between countries to be attributed to liberal executives.
The third empirical chapter examines the effect of veto players on social globalization. I
contend that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, social globalization tends to
increase. This is because only a unified veto player can slow normative change. In addition, I argue
that liberal executives, due to their ideology and institutional position also increase social
globalization. I then derive hypotheses to test for these relationships. The variables employed in the
social globalization model are reviewed, as is the PCSE estimator. From my results, patterns of
social globalization can be marginally attributed to veto players. Liberal executives also increase
social globalization.
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Lastly, I pull the threads of my argument together in the Conclusion Chapter. I return to my
theoretical argument and how it fared against the evidence. I found support for my predictions
regarding political and economic globalization, and marginal support for my predictions about social
globalization. All in all, my theoretical argument fared well against the evidence. These findings,
taken together, form a cohesive picture that expands the current understanding of globalization.
First, the different directional relationships of each dimension with veto players supports the notion
that globalization is multidimensional. As does the performance of dimension specific independent
variables. I also find that increased globalization, for most dimensions, tends to be a preference of a
liberal actor. In most cases, the preference of a liberal executive. In addition, certain dimensions are
affected by other factors in different directions. For example, EU membership has different effects
on economic and social globalization. I then look to avenues for future work on globalization and its
dimensions, based on my findings. Specifically, what effects other institutional domains, such as
domestic judicial institutions and international institutions, may have on globalization’s three
dimensions.

Conclusion
In this dissertation I examine globalization’s relationship to legislative and executive
institutions. The current chapter has introduced the concept of globalization and developed a
working definition consistent with prior work (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002;
Eichengreen and Leblang 2008 and others). I contend that globalization is complex,
multidimensional, dynamic, and operates across several institutional domains simultaneously. It is
also not to be confused with regionalism or interdependence, as these concepts do not exhibit
certain traits of globalization. Regionalism is bound to geographically contiguous countries, which
14

globalization is not. Interdependence is static, while globalization is dynamic across time. Thus,
globalization is not to be confused with either concept. With this established, it is clear what is
globalization, and what is not.
Given what globalization is, I narrow the focus of my work. I have chosen to explore the
impact of two institutions, the legislature and the executive, on globalization. This is a novel
addition, as previous work often lumped together institutions and estimated this impact on
globalization (Crepaz and Moser 2004 is an example). Instead, I propose to use Veto Player Theory
to isolate two institutional effects (legislative and executive). However, dimension specific factors
determine which institutional effect is more relevant. For example, the primacy of the executive in
two areas; economic decisions and the marketplace of ideas. These two items indicate that economic
and social globalization may have executive institutional effects (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999;
Kernell 2006; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Ballentine and Snyder 1996)
I then laid down a road map for how this dissertation will be structured. In the Theory
chapter, I present my detailed account of why globalization is multidimensional and has three
different relationships with veto players. In the Data and Methods chapter, I discuss the
globalization and veto data selected to test my theory. In the political, economic, and social empirical
chapters I test precise directional hypotheses regarding veto players and each dimension of
globalization. In the Conclusion, I tie my three sets of findings together.
The next chapter will lay out my theoretical argument in detail. I argue that previous
scholarship has merit, and that globalization should be disaggregated into three primary dimensions
(political, economic, and social). I then argue that each of these three primary dimensions can be
explained by Veto Player Theory. This results in three different directional predictions. This sets the
stage for later empirical examinations.
15

Chapter 2: Theory

From the previous chapter’s discussion, it is apparent that theoretical scholarship poses
several unanswered questions regarding globalization’s complex relationship with domestic
institutions. This chapter begins to unpack these theoretical questions, by first delineating the
primary dimensions of globalization. Using this framework, can globalization be better understood if
treated as multidimensional (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) and operating across several
institutional domains (Held and McGrew 1993)? This chapter seeks to answer this question by
arguing that yes, it can. I then define the three primary dimensions of globalization (political,
economic, and social) according to previous work (Dreher 2006a; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018).
Filling in key conceptual gaps to promote clarity.
In addition, to support my argument that each dimension of globalization is related to
legislative veto players, I briefly review Tsebelian Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002). This allows
me to clearly delineate this particular theory from other veto perspectives (Lijphart 1999; O’Reilly
2005). This step is critical, as it informs many later decisions on variable selection in the coming
chapters. Veto Player Theory data is vastly different from veto points data (W. J. Henisz 2000;
2002). This distinction is critical given my definition of globalization, as veto points scholarship
precludes the isolation of institutional domains.
I also argue that Veto Player Theory has defined analytical leverage to explain each
dimension of globalization. This assertation is based on previous work that showcased Veto Player
Theory’s relevance in general (c.f. Tsebelis 2002; Ha 2008) as well as the definition of the three
primary dimension of globalization (political, economic, and social) (Dreher 2006a). I draw
conceptual linkages between each dimension and veto players, arguing that that each dimension has
16

a unique relationship with legislative institutions. This results with three different predicted
relationships between veto players and globalization’s dimensions.

Why Globalization Should Be Disaggregated
Globalization is a complex phenomenon. Globalization involves political connections,
market integration, and social norms. It also involves individuals, institutions, and the connections
between them (Held and McGrew 1993). Globalization is more than a one-dimensional concept that
only effects economic relations. Theoretical and empirical scholars that study globalization instead
think of it as multidimensional (Held and McGrew 1993; Lockwood 2001; Keohane 2002; T. M.
Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Heshmati 2003; Vujakovic 2009; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018).
Given my definition of globalization, established in the previous chapter, I also embrace the notion
that globalization is multidimensional. The wider literature tends to ignore these arguments, as
scholars cannot agree on the number of dimensions globalization is composed of.7 Some argue that
globalization is composed of two dimensions (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005) while others say it can
be as many as five or more (Held and McGrew 1993). The main problem is that this lack of
agreement between scholars, as Robert Keohane argues, borders on the nonsensical (2002). This
causes the valuable insight that globalization is multidimensional to be written off, despite its rich
possibilities.
Empirical globalization scholars tend to focus on the economic dimension of globalization
(Schmukler and Vesperoni 2006 is an example). This focus on a single dimension is problematic, as
scholars ignore the theoretical consensus that globalization is multidimensional. This leads to overly

This debate is not only a disagreement within the discipline of political science, but it is also a point of contention
between economists as well (Tobin 2000; Quinn, Schindler, and Toyoda 2011).
7
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narrow empirical work on globalization. Scholars tend to assume globalization is strictly an
economic phenomenon and limit their research questions. This leaves an untapped well of
knowledge about globalization left unattended by scholars. The flow of policies and social norms,
which make up a critical part of globalization, go unstudied.
Additionally, with the theoretical work so bogged down in the minutia, applied empirical
scholars tend to engage in lax theorizing. For example, some empirical scholars create new
dimensions (environmental globalization) off hand, and never fully define them theoretically
(Martens and Raza 2009). This leaves empirical findings nearly as convoluted as the theoretical
arguments. The need for a middle ground regarding the number of globalization’s dimensions is of
paramount theoretical and empirical importance to further understand globalization. Especially
given the consensus that globalization is multidimensional. The implication of ambiguity over the
exact number of globalizations dimensions, divides the theoretical work from the empirical work.
On one hand, the theoretical work argues over which dimensions are most relevant, (Held and
McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005). While, on the other hand, the applied
empirical scholarship ignores the issue of dimensionality and studies the implications of globalization
instead of direct causal links. These include welfare state expansion (Ha 2008), capital flows (Hays
2009), and others. This balkanization of globalization scholarship prevents new knowledge from
being generated.
Additionally, empirical scholars often poorly operationalize globalization in their models.
Many follow the tradition laid down by Geoffrey Garrett (1998) and equate trade openness with
globalization. But, globalization is far more than trade openness, and to equate the two concepts is
to dangerously oversimplify (T. M. Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Ha 2008; Eichengreen and
Leblang 2008; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). For example, trade openness is biased due to regional
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trade openness often being inseparable from global trade openness (Vujakovic 2009). This
oversimplification leads to conflating globalization with regionalization when operationalizing
globalization via trade openness. Even more sophisticated operationalizations, which often combine
trade openness and capital account restrictions (such as Ha 2008), do not solve the problem entirely.
In their examination of this very problem, Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang state that,
“Without acknowledging that globalization has multiple dimensions… it is impossible to determine
whether a study’s findings are a figment of the particular aspect of globalization on which the
investigators focus…” (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008, 319). I wholeheartedly agree and would go a
step further. Globalization scholars are often forced to use a multidimensional framework, due to
variable selection, but have no idea that they are doing so. Thus, the questions posed about
globalization and the answers returned by quantitative models are answers to different questions
than were asked. This breeds conflicting results, and leaves questions of how each dimension of
globalization is affected by other concepts unanswered.
Recent work in economics, heeding the argument that globalization is, “…driven by a set of
discrete but intersecting logics.” (Held and McGrew 1993, 263), has attempted to address this
theoretical ambiguity, by defining globalization as composed of three primary dimensions; political,
economic, and social (Dreher 2006a).8 Each of these three dimensions of globalization capture a
critical element of previous work. Political globalization captures the argument made by Liberals
(Held and McGrew 1993) and Neoliberals (Keohane 2002), that politics is a critical part of
globalization. Economic globalization captures arguments made by Embedded Liberalism scholars
(Ruggie 1982; 2003; Hays 2009) that economic relations are also a key part of globalization. While

I do not argue that political, economic, and social globalization are the only three dimensions of globalization. I do
argue that all other dimensions of globalization are segments of the three primary dimensions originally articulated by
Robert Keohane (2002) and Axel Dreher (2006a). This is evident based on research by the Swiss Economic Institute
(Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018).
8
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social globalization captures the arguments of Constructivists (Adler 1997; Wendt 1999) that norms
matter. For the first time, scholars of globalization can close the theoretical gap, and treat
globalization as a divisible multidimensional concept. This allows for new and fascinating lines of
inquiry regarding how each dimension of globalization might be related to other concepts. The three
dimensions of globalization, as defined by Axel Dreher (2006a), are summarized below in Table 1.

Table 1. The Dimensions of Globalization
Dimension of Globalization

Description

Political Globalization

The diffusion of government policies among states

Economic Globalization

Long distance flows of goods, services, and capital,
and the information and perceptions that
accompany market exchange

Social Globalization

The spread of ideas, information, images, and
people

Source: Dreher 2006

I argue that each of the three dimensions of globalization are fundamentally different from
each other, and that this difference can explain divergent findings on globalization. Previous work
has established, via overlap statistics, that each dimension is different statistically (Gygli, Haelg, and
Sturm 2018). However, some overlap still exists. This is both a theoretically relevant point (Held and
McGrew 1993), and a statistical reality. Political and economic globalization are correlated at .457.
Political globalization is correlated with social globalization at .5, and economic and social
globalization are correlated at .814.9 However, it would be strange if the dimensions of globalization
did not overlap, as they are part of a divisible whole. I argue that each dimension of globalization is,
“best understood as being driven by discrete but intersecting logics [specific to each dimension]”
9

All correlations are statistically significant at the .05 level.
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(Held and McGrew 1993, 263). There is also solid statistical evidence to support the disaggregation
of globalization into its component dimensions. These tests are discussed in a Swiss Economic
Institute working paper (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018), and clearly show that Held and McGrew’s
argument is correct. Globalization is composed of three separate dimensions.
Previous work has also hinted that each dimension of globalization to a unique causal
process. However, this has yet to be exploited to theorize different relationships between political,
economic, and social globalization and other concepts. According to Table 1, political globalization
involves the diffusion of policy, which is intimately related to the policy diffusion process (Walker
1969; Swan 1973; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993; Strang and Meyer 1993; Simmons and Elkins
2004; 2005; Shipan and Volden 2008; Solingen 2012). Economic globalization, on the other hand,
involves market exchange, and is therefore related to economic performance (Krugman 1991;
Krugman and Venables 1995; Dreher and Gaston 2008a; Bergh and Nilsson 2010a). While social
globalization involves the exchange of ideas and norms which is related to the market place of ideas
(Ballentine and Snyder 1996).
Assuming a multidimensional framework provides answers as to why the globalization
literature is plagued by two different directional relationships (one positive the other negative) in two
different sub-literatures. Given that globalization is a complex and multidimensional concept, it is
possible that different causal relationships are because different dimensions have different
relationships with the same variables. Thus, when different dimensions are inadvertently employed
in statistical models, the likely result is divergent findings in the literature. Two examples are
illustrative.
First, in the globalization/welfare literature, one set of scholars argue that globalization
causes the welfare state to expand, while another set of scholars argue that globalization causes the
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welfare state to shrink. The expansion argument assumes that as globalization increases and the
world approaches neoliberal convergence, the voters on the wrong side of efficiency demand more
welfare benefits. This results in increased welfare spending (Garrett 1998; Rodrik 1998; Swank
2002; Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005). The shrinkage argument assumes much the
opposite. As globalization increases, the gains of trade are spread across the globe more evenly. This
diffuse benefit causes welfare recipients to no longer need it. This results in reduced welfare
spending across the globe (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Rodrik 1997).
The divergent findings in the globalization/welfare literature are due to not treating
globalization as a complex multidimensional concept. In this literature, it is common to equate
globalization with two distinctly economic phenomena; trade openness and capital account
restrictions (c.f. Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Ha 2008). Thus, only the economic dimension of
globalization is inadvertently included. Additionally, welfare is often equated with the redistributive
capacity of the state (public spending, % below the median household income, social security
transfers, etc.) (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Crepaz 2001a; Ha 2008). Given evidence that welfare is
political (Hacker 2004; Young 2007), welfare is likely related to the political dimension of
globalization. I contend that to compare apples (trade openness) to oranges (welfare) like this is
dicey at best, and at worst, completely incorrect. The only way to ensure appropriate cross result
comparison is to employ a multidimensional framework when studying globalization. No amount of
theoretical handwaving can make this fundamental disconnect disappear.
Second, the globalization/electoral politics sub-literature is plagued by another set of
divergent findings. For example, Geoffrey Garrett (1998) argues that electoral politics cause shortterm fluctuations in globalization. Different electoral coalitions have different policy positions on
globalization and act according to those preferences. This can either positively or negatively affect
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how globalized a country is. Thus, globalization may encounter a hostile/agreeable government at
various intervals. On the other hand, Jude Hays (2009), argues that electoral politics do not cause
short-term fluctuations in globalization. Hays argues that liberalism is so embedded in democratic
systems, that no fluctuation occurs because all actors agree that more liberal reforms are better.
Globalization then encounters mostly pro-globalization governments across time and space. The
divergent findings in the globalization/electoral politics sub-literature is also due to not treating
globalization as multidimensional. Taking both Garrett (1998) and Hays’ (2009) arguments at face
value, it is entirely possible for certain countries to be consistent with both arguments. For example,
Switzerland and Japan have been controlled by a liberal/conservative political party for years
(Katzenstein 1980; Encamation and Mason 1990; Obinger 1998; G. W. Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies
1999; Doring and Manow 2019), and therefore embodies Hays’ argument. However, a great many
other countries do not experience this type of ideological consistency in government. Countries such
as Australia, often experience governments whose ideologies are vastly different, and their position
on globalization varies as well. Equating Australian Prime Minister’s John Howard, of the Liberal
Party and Kevin Rudd, of the Labor Party is to gloss over significant ideological differences. Even
when ‘liberal’ is defined as broadly as possible (Castles and Mair 1984; Benoit and Laver 2006), both
Prime Ministers cannot be considered the same ideologically. Thus, the Australian case is more
consistent with Garrett’s argument. But, if evidence exists that both Garrett and Hays are correct,
the question is, why? I argue it is because both authors employ a uni-dimensional globalization
framework. They accidentally capture some aspects of globalization and not others, leading to
different findings. Only by treating globalization as complex and multidimensional can these two
divergent findings be understood. Indeed, evidence of this already exists, as both authors dependent
variables were scrutinized in this way (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). The proposed cure was a
multidimensional globalization framework.
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Both sets of divergent findings in the globalization/welfare and the globalization/electoral
politics literature explain why it is so important to employ a multidimensional globalization
framework. Only by breaking globalization into its three primary dimensions (Dreher 2006a), can
these impasses be overcome. By conceptualizing globalization as composed of political, economic,
and social dimensions, we come closer to the true complex concept as outlined in the qualitative
literature (c.f. Held and McGrew 1993). And, by explicitly noting its dimensions and defining them,
it becomes possible to create composite measures of globalization (such as the KOF Globalization
index and others) (T. M. Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Heshmati 2003; Vujakovic 2009; Gygli,
Haelg, and Sturm 2018). This allows for dimension specific arguments to be made and tested. These
findings present the best possible way to reconcile divergent findings on globalization. And, with
each dimension related to a defined subset of concepts, it opens new research possibilities to
understand how each dimension is impacted by other concepts. This work seeks to be the first to
explore how institutions, by using Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002), impact each of the three
dimensions of globalization.10

What is Veto Player Theory?
With each dimension of globalization defined, the next step is to adopt a theoretical
perspective. This work employs Veto Player Theory to explain the relationship between institutions
and globalization (Tsebelis 2002). This begs the obvious question, what exactly is Veto Player
Theory? Veto Player Theory is a theoretical perspective derived from a strand of game theory

For the purposes of this work, I employ the version of Veto Player Theory described by George Tsebelis (1995; 2002).
This is not to be confused with veto point scholarship in the tradition of Lijphart (1999) and others (Crepaz 2001a;
Crepaz and Moser 2004).
10
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known as cooperative game theory.11 Using the principals of cooperative game theory (Tsebelis
1990; 1995; 2002), Veto Player Theory seeks to explain how formal rules, or institutions, shape the
behavior of various types of political actors.12 Veto Player Theory has been used to explain a wide
variety of subjects, including but not limited to; preferential trade agreements (Mansfield, Milner,
and Pevehouse 2007), regional integration (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2008), and civil war
duration (David 2006). I use Veto Player Theory to explain the dimensions of globalization.
According to Veto Player Theory, veto players are any, “individual or collective actors whose
agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo.” (Tsebelis 2002, 19). Each veto player has an
ideal policy that they want implemented on an issue (trade, welfare, etc.). When a new policy is
proposed, they compare the new policy to the status quo, selecting the policy that is closer to their
ideal point, and then vote for that policy (a vote for the status quo is a veto for the new policy).13
Veto players can be divided into two distinct types; institutional veto players and partisan
veto players (Tsebelis 2002). An institutional veto player is an official government post created by a
country’s constitution, who can block change.14 These constitutional posts might include the office of
the president, if it is endowed with the power of veto, or both houses of the legislature in bicameral
systems where agreement is required for policy implementation (Money and Tsebelis 1992). A
partisan veto player is a veto player generated by elections results, who can block change. Partisan
veto players often take the shape of political parties, regardless of whether the government is a

This is not to be confused with non-cooperative game theory, which employs the same logic, but reaches vastly
different conclusions. For a detailed discussion of non-cooperative game theory, I recommend the work of James
Morrow (1994).
12
For this work, institutions are defined as humanly defined constraints on behavior (North 1990). For more on what
constitutes an institution, please refer to the work of John Duffield (2007).
13
Any policy that is equidistant from the ideal point and the status quo, results in the veto player being indifferent
between them. For detailed proofs of the arguments laid out here, I suggest Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
(Tsebelis 2002).
14
As opposed to simply stall or modify legislation, as is common in veto points arguments, which are vastly different
from Veto Player Theory as discussed here (Lijphart 1999; Crepaz and Moser 2004; O’Reilly 2005).
11

25

coalition government. If all veto players (either institutional or partisan) do not agree on a policy
change, the outcome is the status quo, or the already implemented policy.
The distinction between institutional and partisan veto players can be blurry. For example, in
the case of the United States, the executive illustrates this point. The Office of the President, created
by the US Constitution,15 is an institutional veto player, as the office can block policy change.
However, the President, the individual who holds the office at any given time, can be a partisan veto
player, when either the Democratic, or Republican party (in modern times) controls neither
congressional chamber. Veto Player theorists, for simplicity, refer to the total number of relevant
veto players (institutional and/or partisan) as the effective number of veto players (Haggard and
McCubbins 2001).16 The effective number of veto players represents the total number of veto
players given the institutional and partisan context. The effective number of veto players can vary
within and across political systems. For example, in 2011, Belgium had six effective veto players,
while in 2014 that number was four (Doring and Manow 2019). At the same time, the United States
had one effective veto player in 2011, and two in 2014.
Countries with many effective veto players experience less change, while countries with few
veto players, especially one veto player, experience more change (Tsebelis 2002). The
number/ideological distance of the veto players determines the frequency, scope, and speed of
policy change. For example, a country with one veto player is more likely to pass a piece of
legislation than a country with two veto players, etc. Or, ideologically distant veto players may result
in gridlock, making change highly unlikely. When there are many veto players, or they are
ideologically distant, a veto player problem exists.

15
16

https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution
For simplicity, when I refer to veto players, I am referring to the effective veto players, unless otherwise specified.
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When a country has many or ideologically distant veto players the creation of new policy is
difficult. But, when a new policy is implemented, it is very hard to repeal. By contrast, when a
country has a small veto player problem, the veto players make the adoption of new policy
significantly easier. However, the new policy can be changed just as easily (Haggard and McCubbins
2001). This allows for the creation of predictions based on the size of the veto player problem in a
country. In the United States for example, under divided government, only policy that is bipartisan
can become law. If a policy is partisan, one of the veto players (President, Senate, or House) would
block final passage (Krehbiel 2010).
According to Tsebelis (1995), the main benefit of Veto Player Theory is to facilitate
comparison across political systems using a common criteria (veto players). This enables scholars to
compare across the various types of democracies, economic types, (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998),
etc. Regardless of different institutional structures, according to Veto Player Theory, one can still
form predictions based on the size of the veto player problem. This is regardless of the focus on the
research, whether it is examining the domestic level (Becher 2010), the international level (Hallerberg
2002) or both (Putnam 1988; Tsebelis 1990). In short, Veto Player Theory provides a parsimonious
explanation of state behavior, using a precise criterion.
Veto Player Theory is not to be confused with veto points17 scholarship. This dissertation
draws on veto players scholarship in the vein of George Tsebelis (2002) and is not related to
scholarship on veto points. I have elected to employ Veto Player Theory over veto points, as it is both
more parsimonious and enables more precise predictions regarding the effect of institutions on the
dimensions of globalization.

17

Veto points are sometimes also referred to as societal fragmentation (O’Reilly 2005).
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Veto Player Theory is more parsimonious, as it allows for the comparison of countries
across a single institutional domain (legislative), while veto points scholarship tends to cast a much
wider net and consider multiple institutional domains (legislative, executive, bureaucratic, and
judicial) (W. J. Henisz 2000; 2002). While veto points provide a more contextual understanding, the
inclusion of additional institutional domains prevents isolating the individual impact of each domain
on a specific dimension of globalization. By focusing on one institutional domain, it becomes
possible to form predictions regarding how legislative veto players uniquely impact political,
economic, and social globalization. Veto points measures consider the entire institutional fabric of
all OECD countries across time and space and prevent the isolation of specific institutional effects.
As my goal is to isolate specific institutional effects, Veto Player Theory was selected.
Veto Player Theory is also more precise in its predictions, as the role of veto players is clear,
they prevent change (Tsebelis 1999; Hug and Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and Yataganas 2002; Tsebelis
and Chang 2004; Tsebelis 2006), while the role of veto points varies (Crepaz and Moser 2004), and
includes; delaying, slowing, and blocking change. Veto Player Theory, due to its legislative focus, can
generate more precise predictions regarding how the size of the veto player problem impacts each
dimension of globalization. This allows for the formation of clear and directional hypotheses.
Veto points scholarship is also heavily context bound due to certain assumptions in their
theorizing. For example, veto points scholarship relies on U.S. context bound arguments regarding
legislative and bureaucratic relations (W. J. Henisz 2000; 2002; O’Reilly 2005), and neglect to
incorporate evidence that bureaucratic discretion varies. This is vividly evident in the page length of
legislation. In countries where the legislature can trust the bureaucracy to reflect their preferences,
policy will tend to be vague, resulting in few pages. But, in countries where the legislature cannot
trust the bureaucracy, more detailed legislation is needed to curtail bureaucratic discretion. This will

28

result in larger page counts (Bawn 1995; 1997; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001). The Clean Air Act
in both the United States and the United Kingdom illustrates this point, as the US law is 455 pages
(as of 2018) while the UK equivalent is 18 pages (as of 2019). The US law is 25 times longer than the
UK law. Veto point scholarship assumes that bureaucratic discretion does not vary and cannot
explain the UK case. Thus, the promise of a more contextually rich theory is fraught with issues.
Additionally, veto points measures are often assumed to be statistically interchangeable with
veto players measures (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2007; Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse
2008; T. M. Peterson and Thies 2010), they are not. Despite veto points measures (W. J. Henisz
2000; 2002) being inspired by and conceptual cousins to veto players measures (Tsebelis 2002),
statistical tests reveal this to not be the case. Both the count of the veto players and the ideological
range of the veto players are weakly correlated with the veto points measure, Political Constraints
(POLCON). The count of the veto players is correlated with POLCON at .458, while the
ideological range of the veto players is only correlated with POLCON at .329.18 This casts doubt on
whether the veto points measure is measuring what it purports to be. And, is evidence enough to
warrant serious reservations regarding veto points data, and its past results. Thus, it is more
appropriate to rely on Veto Player Theory as originally created by Tsebelis (1995; 2002).

Veto Player Theory and Globalization
Given Veto Player Theory, as outlined above, how can it help to explain the changes in the
dimensions of globalization across time and space? It is the purpose of this section to outline how

18

These correlations are significant at the .05 level.
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Veto Player Theory can explain the trends in all three primary dimensions of globalization, whether
it be political, economic, or social.
To be fair, my work is not the first to use Veto Player Theory to attempt to shed light on
globalization (Ha 2008). However, the application of Veto Player Theory to globalization is still in its
infancy.19 For example, the work of Eunyoung Ha, amongst the earliest work to use Veto Player
Theory to explain globalization, was published in the midst of a tectonic shift in globalization
scholarship, with the dimensions of globalization being formally defined and composite indicators
for each finally available to researchers (Dreher 2006a; Dreher and Gaston 2008a). Based on a
survey of the literature, what work there is, tends to focus on how veto players can explain the
expansion or shrinkage of the welfare state [a consequence of globalization] (Crepaz and Moser 2004;
Ha 2008). But no work examines the direct causal relationship between veto players and
globalization.
Another problem with Veto Player Theory scholarship on globalization, is that these
arguments fail to specify which dimension of globalization is at play (Dreher 2006a). Median
household income is likely to be primarily related to economic globalization, but political
globalization may also play a role (Crepaz 2001a). Public expenditures (Crepaz and Moser 2004), are
likely to be highly related to both economic and political globalization. Welfare spending (Ha 2008)
is linked to political globalization, in addition to possibly others (Hacker 2004; Young 2007). The
question then is, which dimension of globalization is each author capturing? Or is it several?
By thinking and looking at globalization as an aggregate concept, one can miss important
distinctions among the dimensions. This may account for the vastly different results found in the

In fact, the majority of scholars in the early days of veto/globalization research often relied on veto point theory
(Crepaz 2001; Crepaz and Moser 2004 are two examples of this).
19
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literature on globalization. Some contend that globalization causes one set of effects (Rodrik 1997;
Strange 1996; Garrett and Mitchell 2001, among others), while others contend the exact opposite
(Garrett 1998; Rodrik 1998; Katzenstein 1985; Swank 2002, and others). This work seeks to bridge
this divide in the literature by disaggregating globalization and testing if each dimension of
globalization might have a different relationship with veto players. This could begin to explain the
divergent findings in the globalization literature, as globalization’s multidimensionality (Eichengreen
and Leblang 2008) may be driving the lack of consensus.
This work takes a page from economics scholarship, pioneered by Axel Dreher (2006a;
Dreher, Sturm, and Ursprung 2008; Dreher and Gaston 2008a), and seeks to bring the most cuttingedge globalization research in economics and marry it with Veto Player Theory. By acknowledging
that globalization is multidimensional, it becomes possible to explain three unique stories of how
veto players affect each dimension of globalization. While each story will have some similarities with
the others, the differences among political, economic, and social globalization might be just the
theoretical insight needed to propel the debate in the globalization literature forward.
From a Veto Player Theory perspective, it seems quite logical to argue that veto players
would affect how a country responds to changes in each dimension of globalization over time. In
the face of a large veto player problem (number or distance) a country should expect difficulty
adjusting to increased political, economic, or social globalization. When faced with a small veto
player problem, a country would be more able to respond to the effects of increasing political,
economic, or social globalization more easily. The next three sections take Veto Player Theory and
globalization scholarship and posit a unique theoretical relationship between each dimension. The
first section discusses how veto players are related to political globalization, the second to economic
globalization, and the third to social globalization.
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Veto Players and Political Globalization
Man is by nature, a political animal.
Aristotle – The Politics

The first of the three dimensions of globalization is political globalization. According to
several scholars (Dreher 2006a; Dreher and Gaston 2008a; Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012;
Charron 2009; Fors 2014), political globalization is defined as; “…the diffusion of government
policies [among state actors]” (Dreher 2006a, 1092). This definition is broad and merits further
discussion.
First, exactly what policies constitute political globalization? This topic is generally glossed
over (c.f. Potrafke 2009), unless a specific policy is of interest (Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers
2012). Research indicates that political globalization includes various types of policy such as; welfare,
human rights, environmental, education, security, democratization, moral20, and others (Gershuny
1979; Meier 1999; Pevehouse 2002; Sandholtz and Gray 2003; Hacker 2004; Soss and Schram 2007;
Young 2007; Ha 2008; Seddon 2008; Capie 2008; Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011; Dreher,
Gassebner, and Siemers 2012; Poast and Urpelainen 2014; Zapp and Dahmen 2017; Arbolino et al.
2018; Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart 2018). The policy areas that are considered political globalization
are listed below in Table 2. This is not an exhaustive list.

20

Moral policy is sometimes referred to as deviant globalization (Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011).
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Table 2. The Policies of Political Globalization21
Policy Area

Description

Welfare

Wealth redistribution across income groups, etc.

Human Rights

Systemic discrimination, etc.

Environmental

Pollution regulations, carbon regulations, etc.

Education

Curriculum policy, funding policies, etc.

Security

Diplomatic contact, UN Security Council Missions,
etc.

Democratization

Policies of institutionalization, rule of law, etc.

Moral Policy

Abortion, drugs, prostitution, etc.

Other

Policies of political globalization not yet studied

A keen observer will notice the word ‘diffusion’ in the definition of political globalization.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the term diffusion represents the concept as outlined by Beth
Simmons, Zachary Elkins, and others (Simmons 2000; Simmons and Elkins 2004; 2005; Simmons,
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). Policy diffusion is defined as when a law, originating in one country,
crops up in another country. A successful instance of policy diffusion occurs when a country adopts
a new policy, or repeals an old one, for one of the four following reasons; 1) learning, 2) economic
competition, 3) imitation, and 4) coercion (Shipan and Volden 2008). Each of these mechanisms of
policy diffusion are summarized in Table 3, below.

This list is generated from a survey of the diffusion literature across three academic disciplines, political science,
economics, and sociology. For an introduction to this literature, I recommend work by Charles Shipan, Craig Volden,
and E.R. Graham that surveys this broad sub-field (Shipan and Volden 2008; Shipan and Volden 2012; E. R. Graham,
Shipan, and Volden 2014).
21
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Table 3. The Mechanisms of Diffusion
Mechanism of Diffusion

Description

Learning

State A learns of a new law in State B. It implements
the policy, but adapts it to fit its own political context

Economic Competition

State A adopts policy P. State B fearing an economic
loss, adopts policy P as well.

Imitation22

State B watches State A adopt policy P. Policy P
benefits State A, so State B adopts it to gain a similar
benefit.

Coercion

State A adopts policy P. State A demands that State B
also adopt policy P.

Source: (Shipan and Volden 2008)

Each mechanism, listed above, represents a way the policies of political globalization can be
diffused. Regardless of mechanism, a successful instance of political globalization diffusion occurs
when one country adopts the policy of another. However, the policies of political globalization are
subject to institutional constraints, which can prevent successful diffusion (Bunce and Wolchik
2006). The primary institutional constraint for the diffusion of political globalization policies is veto
players.
How can a veto player problem explain the diffusion patterns of political globalization
policy? For a new policy to be adopted in a country, the status quo policy must be defeated. And,
the likelihood of defeating the status quo, is dependent on the number and/or ideological distance
of the veto players in the country (Tsebelis 2002). If the veto player problem is large, then it
becomes increasingly difficult for political globalization to diffuse. When the veto player problem is

There exists a debate in the diffusion literature regarding how to distinguish between imitation and learning. This is
both a methodological and a theoretical question, that is still being actively explored in the literature (Swan 1973;
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993; Strang and Meyer 1993; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Boehmke 2009; Solingen 2012;
Butler et al. 2017).
22
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small, it is much easier for political globalization to diffuse. Thus, veto players affect the adoption of
the policies of political globalization in a country. Specifically, by altering the ease at which policy
diffusion occurs.
While veto players are an institutional constraint that can prevent the diffusion of political
globalization, the question is, how to veto players influence the direction political globalization is
moving? It is possible for veto players to slow the growth and decline of political globalization, as
they prevent policy change regardless of direction. According to previous scholars, aggregate
globalization is generally seen as increasing over time (Hays 2009), leading to eventual neoliberal
convergence (Crepaz and Moser 2004). I argue that this increasing trend is generalizable to political
globalization, and that this dimension is subject to fluctuations caused by veto players. The growth
trend for political globalization is borne out in my data, as Figure 1 showcases below.
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Figure 1. Political Globalization Trend

This trend in my data lends support to my argument that political globalization, like
aggregate globalization, tends to increase over time. However, this graph is silent on if this trend is
subject to institutional impediments. Previous work indicates that there are such effects for
aggregate globalization (Garrett 1998), but is silent on if these effects impact political globalization. I
argue that veto players negatively impact political globalization. As the size of the veto player
problem increases, the slope of this trend tends to flatten out. As the veto player problem changes in
size, the diffusion of political globalization will vary along with it. Based on the logic of veto player
theory, as the size of the veto player problem increases, political globalization is likely to decrease in
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each state. Conversely, as the veto player problem decreases in size, political globalization should
increase.

Veto Players and Economic Globalization
Economics is too important to leave to the economists.
Steve Keen, PhD. Economics

Unlike the literature on political globalization, economic globalization is more developed
theoretically (both in political science and economics). I define economic globalization as; “…the
long distance flows of goods, services, and capital, and the information and perceptions that
accompany market exchanges.” (Dreher 2006a, 1092). This definition is consistent with others in the
globalization literature (Keohane 2002; Bergh and Nilsson 2010 and others). The types of economic
phenomena that are considered economic globalization are summarized in Table 4, below. This is
not an exhaustive list.

Table 4. Components of Economic Globalization
Market Activities of Economic Globalization

Description

Exchange of Goods

Raw materials for manufactured goods, etc.

Exchange of Services

Currency for banking services, IT services, etc.

Capital Flows

FDI, FPI, any restrictions, etc.

Tariff Barriers to Trade

A tax levied on imports

Non-tariff barriers to Trade

A structural restriction on imports
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When studying economic globalization, most actors tend to embrace economic liberalism.
With various groups favoring a specified amount of government intervention in the economy
(Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Waltz 2001). According to survey results, a majority
of people tend to favor liberalism (Ruggie 2003; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005; Ehrlich 2010).23 Thus,
voters tend to support political parties that promise liberal economic policies wholeheartedly in the
case of market liberal countries, or bundled with others in the case of corporatist countries
(Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998). This creates an electoral incentive for strategic politicians as
macroeconomic performance is a significant predictor of reelection (Nordhaus 1975; Hibbs 1977;
Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992; Heckelman 2001). If the electoral incentive of politicians and the
views of voters are added together, it can be argued that liberalism tends to be embedded in
democracies (Milner and Kubota 2005; Rudra 2005; Mousseau 2002b).24 Thus, the acceptance level
of economic liberalism as an ideology has a significant impact on economic globalization.
How does Veto Player Theory fit into this narrative? One of the key features of all
democratic countries is the presence of domestic veto players (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). From a veto
player perspective then, at any given time, at least one (possibly more) veto player(s) favors increased
liberalization as a policy outcome. While other veto players may prefer a different level of
liberalization, any attempt to alter the status quo will be problematic, as the veto player who prefers
increased liberalization will veto that policy. Thus, democratic multi-veto player systems tend to be
fairly liberalized (Milner and Kubota 2005; Rudra 2005), with some slight variation in exactly how

The support for free trade and globalization in public opinion research shows that the classic findings of Philip
Converse (Converse 2006) also pertain. The public sees ‘free trade’ and ‘globalization’ as separate concepts, and rates
then differently. This finding also notes a difference among income groups (Ehrlich and Hearn 2014; Wolfe and
Mendelsohn 2005).
24 While not discussed in more detail here, due to the fact that such considerations are treated as exogenous in rational
choice scholarship (Downs 1957). There is a great deal of work that argues liberal values actually proceed democratic
values and have an influence on how individuals and countries form their views on the a variety of issues (Mousseau
2000; 2002a; 2002b; 2002c).
23
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much (Milner 1987; Garrett 1998). Thus, veto players ensure a certain degree of openness, by
preventing protectionism.25 Thus, liberalism is embedded, unless all veto players who prefer
increased liberalism are removed. Veto players, in this case, all agree that increased economic
globalization is good. However, veto players often lack proposal power for global economic policy.
This power is in the hands of the executive. With proposal authority frequently delegated to the
executive on global economic policy (Haggard and McCubbins 2001; Huber 1992; Borghetto 2018).
Veto players are unable to draft new policy that can increase economic globalization, they can only
veto policy that would decrease it. Thus, veto players cannot increase economic globalization by
themselves, they can only prevent its decrease.
This institutional configuration imbues the executive with agenda setting powers. This allows
the executive to select a policy that is optimal given their domestic game and the available
international partners (Tsebelis 1990). This provides executives with a defined institutional
advantage regarding economic globalization. Additionally, similar to veto players, economic
performance is the main predictor of an executive’s electoral fate (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini
1992; Hibbs 2000). Thus, there is a defined electoral incentive for executives to increase economic
globalization, and certainly not to decrease it. The agenda setting power of the executive (Tsebelis
and Aleman 2005; Tsebelis and Rizova 2007) thus aggravate the growth trend of economic
globalization.

25

In those rare cases where veto players do pass illiberal policy, it is typically for moral reasons (Gilman, GoldHammer,
and Weber 2011). However, these policies encounter a problem; demand for immoral services is constant (Meier 1999).
Policies that regulate or ban the flow of immoral market exchange, simply push these exchanges out of the formal
economy and into the black-market economy (Andreas 2004; Seddon 2008). Overall, these policies tend to be highly
ineffective (Gershuny 1979), as they often regulate behavior indirectly. Recent political experiments in legalization of
previously banned goods and services seem to indicate that states may have learned this very lesson, and are attempting
to slowly, thanks to veto players, bring some deviant exchange back into the formal economy (Simon and Chavez 2018;
NCSL 2018; Hughes and Howard 2019; Haak 2018).
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These facts, taken together, showcase that economic globalization is thus affected by two
institutional domains. Economic globalization is unmolested by domestic veto players, as they
preserve openness, unless all veto players with a preference for liberalism are removed. However,
the growth of economic globalization is conditioned on the actions of the executive. And, executives
tend to, given their electoral incentives, prefer increased economic globalization. This empowers the
executive and renders veto players impotent. Economic globalization then, is a case of intersecting
logics (Held and McGrew 1993). The status quo level of economic globalization is preserved by veto
players, while an executive employs his institutional advantage to ratchet up economic globalization.
This should result in a generally positive trend in economic globalization. Figure 2 showcases the
general trend of increasing economic globalization over time in my data.26

I differ from Embedded Liberalism scholarship, in that I contend that retreats of economic globalization towards
protectionism, are unlikely as these policies immediately encounter a veto player problem and a sticky status quo (Milner
1987; Tsebelis 2002).
26
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Figure 2. Economic Globalization Trend

Given the argument laid out above and the trend in my data, I argue that economic
globalization is generally unaffected by the size of the veto player problem. A veto player with a
preference for increased liberalism ensures a status quo of continued economic globalization, but
nothing more. While an executive, imbued with agenda powers, increases the growth rate of
economic globalization. Thus, economic globalization has a complex relationship with veto players
that depends executives for its increase.
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Veto Players and Social Globalization
According to Dreher (2006a) and others (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018; Fors 2014), social
globalization can be defined as, “…the spread of ideas, information, images and people” (Dreher
2006a, 1092). Unfortunately, this definition raises more questions than it answers. Ideas are the
express domain of Constructivist scholars (such as Wendt 1999), while information is linked to Veto
Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002). This leaves both theories with analytical leverage to explain social
globalization. Which perspective, Constructivism or Veto Player Theory, is more appropriate when
studying social globalization? I argue that the answer is not which theory, but how both can together
explain social globalization better together than they can apart.
The first problem my argument faces is that it is difficult to discern a consensus regarding
what Constructivism is. For simplicity sake, I subscribe to the famous classification attributed to
John Ruggie (1998). This divides Constructivists into three groups; Neo-classical Constructivists
(which Ruggie labels himself), post-modernist Constructivists (such as Ashley 1984), and naturalistic
Constructivists (such as Wendt 1999).27 Each group shares several common assumptions; norms are
key to understanding social reality (Wendt 1987; 1995; 1999) and norms are dynamic (Adler 1997;
Ruggie 1998; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007). Where they differ is on how these assumptions
are interpreted.
The most radical of these are the post-modernist Constructivists. Constructivists of this
stripe strictly interpret the assumption that norms and social reality is ever changing. This results in a
rejection of positivist social science (broadly defined) (V. S. Peterson 2002). Empirical truth cannot
be revealed, as even truth is socially constructed, and subject to the influence of normative forces
While imperfect, this classification is a useful starting point. For example, this classification scheme places
Functionalists in the neo-classical constructivist tradition (E. B. Haas 1961; P. M. Haas 1992). This would likely ruffle a
few scholarly feathers.
27
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(Campbell 1998). This precludes the ability to explain social globalization empirically, except that it is
socially constructed. As this is exactly what I am attempting to do, this perspective is altogether not
helpful. Therefore, I expressly reject post-modernist Constructivist explanations.
Neo-classical Constructivists employ the same theoretical insights as post-modernists, but
their interpretation is more pragmatic (Ruggie 1998). They acknowledge the shifting nature of social
reality (Adler 1992; 1997), but would argue that it is possible to use Constructivism to explain social
globalization. The explanation, however, would only provide context bound insight. Empirical truth
is knowable, but a moving target. Thus, the work of neo-classical Constructivist scholars, may not
always have empirical purchase, as context changes.
Naturalistic Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt (1999), are the newest branch of
Ruggie’s typology, and are less understood (1998). What is known, is that they more firmly embrace
positivism than either post-modernist or neo-classical’s. This stems from their laxer interpretation of
subjective reality, which is more stable and more knowable. For example, they often view themselves
as the compliment of other theories, rather than their bitter enemy (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek
2007; Checkel 2001).
Of the three, I embrace a fusion of neo-classical and naturalistic traditions. I do this, as
despite variation, the common assumptions of both groups are necessary to understand social
globalization. These include; norms are key to understanding social reality (Wendt 1987; 1995; 1999),
norms are dynamic (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007), and social reality is fluid (Adler 1997;
Ruggie 1998). However, it is important to define some key terms before diving into a
Constructivist/Veto Player Theory account of social globalization. Primarily, to define what a norm
is. This is critical, as it is a central concept of both neo-classical and naturalistic Constructivism.
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I adopt the definition used by Jonathan Jacob Ring, which defines norms as ideas that slowly
become institutionalized principals over time, with the power to shape actors understanding (2014).
According to this definition, norms alter how individuals interact with abstract ideas (Ruggie 1998),
and influence behavior (Wendt 1999). The problem, however, is that norms, which compose social
reality, depend upon human agreement to exist (Adler 1997; Ruggie 1998). If a person does not
accept a norm, then it does not shape their behavior. Thus, the level of agreement on a given norm
can fluctuate. This fluctuation means that the ability of norms to shape behavior varies, depending
on the individual’s acceptance of the norm in question.
Social reality, the normatively constructed cognitive schema which assigns importance, is
composed of norms. It also, by extension, fluctuates. Social reality is constantly being revised (Adler
1997) by individuals who interact with each other, both within and outside institutions. Small
normative changes, over time, slowly shift social reality, making previous contexts vastly different
from the current ones (Redmond 2005).28 For the analysis of social globalization across time and
space, these normative shifts are critical concerns.29 As how the ideas of social globalization fit
within social reality will likely impact its increase or decrease over time.
Given the above, it is quite possible to imagine social globalization being researched from a
Constructivist perspective. But, as the influence of norms varies, Constructivism is an imperfect
explanation of social globalization. A Constructivist perspective, while seeking a contextual
understanding, has a distinct lack of a priori assumptions, (Ruggie 1998) except that norms matter
(Wendt 1999). This leads to research devoid of any institutional considerations, as institutions are
simply a permeable membrane that norms pass through (Park 2005; 2006). This neglects the role of

28
29

Once such example is the Frankenstein Problem (Guzman 2013), where institutional goals shift over time.
However, they are not an excuse to reject a positivist perspective entirely, as some argue (Ashley 1984).
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institutions in effecting the spread of norms. This places defined limits on Constructivism’s
explanatory power over social globalization’s relationship to institutions.
Following in the footsteps of previous scholars (Bieler 2001; Checkel 2001; Van Kersbergen
and Verbeek 2007; Ring 2014), I contend that Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002), when combined
with Constructivism can provide vastly increased explanatory power regarding social globalization.
This is due to Constructivism explaining the ideational origin of preferences, which is beyond the
pale for Veto Player Theory. While Veto Player Theory can explain how normatively derived
preferences are mediated through the membrane of institutions. This provides a richer explanation
of social globalization’s relationship to institutions than either theory could alone.
On its face, my argument about combining Veto player Theory and Constructivism appears
to be highly controversial. Many would claim that Veto Player Theory and Constructivism cannot be
combined on ontological and epistemological grounds. Ontologically, the argument can be made
that Veto Player Theory emphasizes the agent over structure, while Constructivism emphasizes both
agents and structure equally (Wendt 1987). However, this is incorrect, as Veto Player Theory does
not fit this mold. Looking at Veto Player scholarship (Tsebelis 2002), both actors and structures are
emphasized equally. Strategic actors both create institutions and are also influenced by the very
institutions they create. Thus, to dismiss a synthesis of Veto Player Theory and Constructivism out
of hand solely on ontological grounds is incorrect.
A similar critique can be leveled at my argument on epistemological grounds, that asserts
Veto Player Theory and Constructivism cannot be combined due to epistemological differences. In
this case, the problem lies in a misunderstanding of the heterogeneity of Constructivism. Many
Constructivist scholars vary on their epistemological attachments (for example Ashley 1984; and
Wendt 1999 differ significantly). So, to reject the combination of Constructivism and Veto Player
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Theory on epistemological grounds is also incorrect, as I embrace a form of Constructivism that is
epistemological compatible with Veto Player Theory (a synthesis of Neo-classical and Naturalistic).
In fact, many Constructivists speak highly of rational choice theory, and by extension Veto Player
Theory. In that it is quite compatible with their own work (Wendt 1998; Adler 1997; Ruggie 1986;
Ruggie 1998). Given this, I content that Veto Player Theory and Constructivism are quite
compatible. Together, they explain the origin of preference and how preferences become behavior.
Once a norm emerges successfully from the market place of ideas (Ballentine and Snyder
1996), and is accepted via collective agreement (Adler 1997), it becomes incorporated into the
cognitive schema of social reality. It then can assign value to abstract concepts (Ruggie 1998). From
there, this value allows individuals to compare various alternatives, and select the one they prefer the
most. However, simply preferring one concept over another is not enough (Arrow 2012). Structure
is needed to prevent iritic outcomes. These institutions bring predictability to social life. Various
institutional features impact social globalization.
I argue that it is possible to use veto player logic to complete the empirical picture of social
globalization started by Constructivists. According to Veto Player Theory, when two veto players are
ideologically distant, change is unlikely (Tsebelis 2002). This hamstring’s the ability of a country to
act on a multitude of levels (Tsebelis 1999; Hallerberg 2002; David 2006). Assuming the implications
of a veto player problem extend into the marketplace of ideas (Ballentine and Snyder 1996), where
norms are revised by collective agreement, this has profound implications.
When veto players are distant, they are unable to promote the spread of norms they agree
with, and they are also unable to prevent the spread of norms that they find disagreeable. In the case
of a multiparty government, the inability to act results in minimal normative influence for all veto
players. This leaves the marketplace of ideas largely unregulated. This enables norms previously held
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constant by the government, to be altered. Thus, the spread of ideas and norms, a critical
component of social globalization, is likely to be influenced by the presence of a veto player
problem.
The same logic of normative influence also applies to other domestic actors as well. Thus,
social globalization, does not operate in an institutional vacuum. It “…operates simultaneously
across several institutional domains” (Held and McGrew 1993, 263–64). To ignore other domestic
institutional actors, when isolating the legislative, is highly problematic. Of specific interest is the
executive, a powerful normative agent, who can affect social globalization. Thus, for social
globalization, like its economic cousin, it is critical to incorporate a second institutional domain as
well. Previous work on the US executive often terms this ‘going public’ (Kernell 2006) and has
identified ideational effects of executives (D. Lewis 1997; Welch 2003). There is also related
evidence for similar executive influence outside the US context (Neto and Lobo 2009). I argue that
this executive normative influence impacts social globalization.
In the domestic context, when legislative institutions are hamstrung by ideologically
distant/many veto players, ideas and norms flow more freely, unaffected by institutional actors. This
in turn makes social reality more mailable, allowing it to change at a more rapid pace. This is likely to
result in the increase of social globalization, and certainly not its decrease. Therefore, when veto
players are ideologically distant, social globalization should increase. In addition, social globalization
will also increase when the executive uses his normative influence to alter social reality.

Conclusion
Based on the theoretical argument laid out above, each dimension of globalization, whether
it be political, economic, or social, has a unique relationship with veto players. Political globalization
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is clearly linked to veto players, as their assent is needed for any policy to be diffused. Thus, as the
veto player problem increases, political globalization should decrease. Economic globalization,
however, has a much different relationship with veto players. Veto players ensure openness of a
given country, as the preference for liberalism ensures they would rather retain the status quo of
economic globalization than attempt to alter it. This allows a liberal executive to use his institutional
advantage to increase the growth rate of economic globalization. Social globalization, on the other
hand, benefits from a veto player problem. When hamstrung by a veto player problem, the spread of
norms and ideas is unhindered. In addition, when an executive uses his normative influence, social
globalization also increases. The predicted relationships between veto players and each dimension of
globalization are summarized in Table 5, below.

Table 5. Predicted Relationships
Dimension of Globalization

Predicted Relationship with Veto Players

Political Globalization

As the veto player problem increases, political
globalization decreases

Economic Globalization

A veto player problem does not affect economic
globalization. An executive increases the growth rate
of economic globalization

Social Globalization

A veto player problem increases social globalization.
As does the influence of the executive

The theoretical work on globalization, discussed above, poses some fascinating questions
(Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Of interest here is how
the multidimensional concept operates across a single institutional domain; the legislative. This work
seeks to begin unpacking this puzzle by dividing globalization into its three dimensions; political,
economic, and social. Then, each dimension was related to a common feature of all types of
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legislatures; veto players. This resulted in three different predicted relationships between legislative
veto players and each dimension of globalization.
In the next chapter, the data brought to bear to test the three theoretical relationships,
outlined here, is discussed in detail. The operationalization of veto players, each dimension of
globalization, and a swath of other variables are discussed. In addition, the choice of statistical
estimator used to analyze these data will also be explained in detail. This will facilitate the testing of
empirical relationships between concepts in later chapters.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods
As of now, I have introduced the topic of globalization and adopted a working definition
consistent with prior work that emphasizes its multidimensionality (Held and McGrew 1993;
Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Next, I argued that globalization is composed of three primary
dimensions; political, economic, and social. I also argued that each dimension has a unique
relationship with veto players. The next step in analyzing the relationship between veto players and
the dimensions of globalization is to select data and a statistical estimator to test for these
relationships. That is the focus of this chapter.
This chapter discusses both the data and statistical method used in the subsequent empirical
investigations of veto players’ effect on each dimension of globalization (political, economic, and
social). The first section of this chapter discusses the Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) data
employed in this work. Focusing on the independent variables common to all three dimensions, and
why each was selected. The second section focuses on the statistical estimator needed to analyze
TSCS data. This section discusses the challenges inherent in TSCS data and the proposed fixes for
these challenges. Based on the nature of TSCS data and the severity of problems like
autocorrelation, a statistical estimator is chosen that best deals with these challenges and produces
the least biased results.

Data
To test my argument regarding the relationship between veto players and each dimension of
globalization (political, economic, and social) data is required. This section will discuss the data
employed in all three of the upcoming empirical chapters. This section provides a detailed discussion

50

of the variables in my data and why each variable was selected. Discussions of any dimension
specific variables are reserved for the relevant empirical chapter.
The dataset employed here30 is a TSCS dataset [also referred to as panel or stacked panel
data]. These data cover the years 1970 to 2015, for 33 OECD countries, excluding Mexico, Chile,
and South Korea. Mexico, Chile, and South Korea are excluded here for several reasons. First, this is
a rather routine practice (c.f. Dreher 2006c; Potrafke 2009). This is because what data that is
available on these countries results in unbalanced panels. For this reason, most scholars do not
include Mexico, Chile, and South Korea (or some combination thereof). However, I fundamentally
disagree with this practice, as to toss out data is not advisable (Baltagi and Song 2006). Instead, these
countries are excluded here primarily because the ParlGov data (Doring and Manow 2019) used to
construct my main independent variable, veto players, (discussed shortly) does not have data on
these countries. Thus, I was forced to drop these countries from my analyses. Additionally, data
sources that do have data on Mexico, Chile, and South Korea (“The Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems” 2020) have severely limited time series. For example, South Korea’s data is only available
from 2000 to 2012. This only includes four national elections for South Korea (2000, 2004, 2008,
and 2012). To make generalizable conclusions from such limited data is unwise, as previous work
clearly shows (Garrett 1998). Therefore, I dropped Mexico, Chile and South Korea from my
analysis.
Data sources that do have a sufficiently long time series for Mexico, Chile, and South Korea,
such as the political constraints variable (POLCON), are not theoretically compatible with my
analyses (W. J. Henisz 2000; 2002). These data lump together four institutional domains (legislative,
executive, judicial, and bureaucratic), which is contrary to the theoretical assumptions that motivates
The data discussed in this chapter is available from the author upon request. Please email:
brown181@unlv.nevada.edu. The Stata DO files necessary for replication will also be included.
30
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my research (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). This topic is
discussed shortly, in the Independent Variable section.
In addition, due to data limitations, the United States could only be included in models
employing the count operationalization of veto players. This is due to ideological position data for
the US being constructed using an entirely different process (Poole and Rosenthal 2001; McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2007; J. B. Lewis et al. 2019). No method of conversion currently exists to
translate US ideological position data into the more typical scale used in other subfields (c.f. Castles
and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Doring and Manow 2019). However, using the Data Base of
Political Institutions (DPI) data, which I employ for other purposes discussed shortly, I was able to
create count data for the United States for all years (T. Beck et al. 2000). I elected to include the
United States due to being able to code the entire time series, which was not possible for Mexico,
Chile, and South Korea. This made the US data less problematic. However, excluding the US does
not substantively change any of the model results.
My data includes both eras of globalization as defined by Geoffrey Garrett (1998). The era
of globalizing markets in my data is from 1970 to 1990, and the era of global markets from 1990 to
2015. The unit of analysis in my data is a country/year dyad (France/1970, etc.). Each dyad is
measured annually for all variables in the data. While annual measurement of TSCS data is
problematic, as events that occur between measurements are often lost (Stimson 1985), all variables
are measured annually as other dyadic forms are not available. Thus, due to data limitations, I am
prevented from using another unit of analysis (quarterly, monthly, daily, etc.). Each dyad is grouped
into panels representing an individual country (France from 1970 to 2015, etc.). There are some gaps
in some of my panels, resulting in unbalanced, non-randomly missing panels. While some scholars
attempt to make their TSCS data panels balanced (Potrafke 2009), I argue that this panel structure is
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inadvisable, as to toss out data is inefficient (Baltagi and Song 2006). Many of these gaps in my data
are caused by the lack of sovereignty for Soviet satellite states (James 1991). Other panels are shorter
as some countries had not come into existence yet (such as the Czech Republic). This prevented
data collection on the main independent variable of interest; veto players. I treat Finland as fully
sovereign for the entire dataset, as Finlandization is not an empirical reality, but more of a political
term from the Cold War Era (Maude 1982).31

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in my data operationalize each dimension of globalization; political,
economic, and social. Each dependent variable is drawn from the Konjunkturforschungsstelle
(KOF)32 Globalization Index. These data contain individual composite measures for each dimension
of globalization, and it is the only dataset currently available that disaggregates globalization into its
three primary dimensions.33 The KOF globalization index contains data on 209 states, over a 45-year
period (1970-2015). The KOF data employs dynamic, time varying Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) to weight each component of the three composite indexes for each dimension (Gygli, Haelg,
and Sturm 2018). KOF data also tests for the statistical merit of disaggregating globalization into
dimensions and finds solid evidence to support my three-dimensional framework.34 Thus, the KOF
data captures the dynamic and multidimensional nature of globalization, as noted in the previous

Table 20, in the appendix, summarizes the years that are included for each country.
Konjunkturforschungsstelle roughly translates to ‘economic institute’ in English. Translation courtesy of Dr. Christian
Jensen.
33
I do not contend that there are only three dimensions of globalization that are relevant. In fact, previous research has
identified several other dimensions that are unique in their own right via factor analysis (Tobin 2000; Gygli, Haelg, and
Sturm 2018). I simply argue that political, economic, and social globalization are the three dimensions that are primary,
in that they are more theoretically relevant as they allow for a multidimensional framework while also simultaneously
each dimension retains a certain degree of complexity (Held and McGrew 1993).
34
While overlap does exist between political, economic, and social globalization, there also exists solid statistical
evidence to merit disaggregation. Supra 9.
31
32

53

chapter. In addition, dynamic PCA avoids the pitfalls of ad hoc weights that previous measures of
globalization were criticized for (Lockwood 2001).
All globalization data faces the problem of distinguishing between global and regional
connections. The KOF globalization index deals with this by adjusting each of its 42 components to
only capture global connections by parsing out regionalism. For example, trade with regional
neighbors is weighted less than trade with a global trade partner (Dreher and Gaston 2008a; Gygli,
Haelg, and Sturm 2018). Thus, the KOF data captures global connections and not regional
connections. Due to its sophistication, the KOF data is referred to as the gold standard in the
economics globalization literature (Dreher et al. 2010). Each dependent variable, operationalizing a
different dimension of globalization, is taken from the KOF data. The KOF globalization index can
be downloaded from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute’s website and is publicly available.35 How
each dimension of globalization (political, economic, and social) is operationalized will be discussed
in turn. Beginning with political globalization, then economic globalization, and lastly social
globalization.
Political globalization is operationalized as a 1-100 index. One signifies a country that is not
politically globalized. A value of 100 signifies a country that is highly politically globalized. This
composite index is composed of 6 variables, which are summarized in Table 6, below (Gygli, Haelg,
and Sturm 2018).

The KOF data can be found at the following link: https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-andindicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html
35
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Table 6. Political Globalization Components
Embassies (Absolute number of embassies in a country)
UN Peace Keeping Missions (Personnel contributed to U.N. Security Council Missions per capita)
International Organizations (Number of International Organizations in which the country is a member)
NGO’s (Number of internationally oriented Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) with members in that
country)
International Treaties (International treaties signed between two or more states and ratified by the highest
legislative body for each country since 1945)
Number of distinct bilateral investment treaty partners for a state36
Source: (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018)

The KOF data’s political globalization variable is the only composite variable of political
globalization currently available to researchers. The KOF political globalization variable employs all
previously noted methodological innovations (dynamic time varying PCA to control for regionalism,
etc.). However, there are defined limitations to the KOF political globalization variable. Two of its
components (international agreements and investment agreements) precludes controlling for the
effect of cooperation on globalization, as the literature indicates (Lupu 2015; Davis and Pratt 2017).
Therefore, in the political globalization model, these control variables are omitted. They are however
included in the other models (economic and social). But, due to no available alternative, the KOF
political globalization variable is employed as the dependent variable in the relevant chapter.

Traditionally, investment treaties are often thought of as economic agreements. However, looking at the data, it
appears that investment treaties are significantly different, as Axel Dreher and others at the Swiss Economic Institute
argue (Dreher 2006a; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). For example, in the COIL dataset (Koremenos 2013), investment
treaties are almost always bilateral (there is only one instance of a multilateral investment agreement in the entire
dataset). In addition, the countries who sign them are almost always systematically related in some way, typically
reflecting deep diplomatic ties or a colonial relationship. I argue that since investment treaties are almost always bilateral
and involve deep diplomatic partners, that the main driver of investment treaties appears to be political and not
economic.
36
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My second dependent variable is the KOF economic globalization measure. This measure is
constructed like political globalization, as a 1-100 score representing how economically globalized a
country is. A value of 1 indicates low economic globalization, and 100 indicates high economic
globalization. The KOF composite index of economic globalization is composed of 14 components.
Each component is summarized in Table 7, below.

Table 7. Economic Globalization Components
Trade in Goods (Sum of exports and imports in goods as a share of GDP)
Trade in Services (Sum of exports and imports in services as share of GDP)
Trade partner diversification (Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index)
Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP)
Foreign Portfolio Investment (% of GDP)
International Debt (% of GDP)
International Reserves (% of GDP)37
International income payments (% of GDP)
Trade Regulations (Average of prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers and compliance costs of importing and
exporting)
Trade Taxes (income from taxes on international trade as % of revenue)
Tariffs (Unweighted mean of tariff rates)
Prevalence of foreign ownership and regulations to international capital flows
Chinn-Ito index of financial openness
Jahan-Wang index of openness of the capital account
Source: (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018)

There is evidence that international reserves are driven by political considerations (Helleiner 2008; Kirshner 2003;
Norrlof 2014). However, I would argue that the inclusion of international reserves here is correct. Under an embedded
liberalism framework (Ruggie 1982; Abdelal and Ruggie 2009; Hays 2009) most veto players tend to embrace one of the
cluster of ideologies that is economic liberalism. Thus, their preferences for policy (such as international reserves) is so
similar that any differences are more likely to be driven by purely economic considerations and not by political
calculations.
37
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Looking at Table 7, the benefits of the KOF measure of economic globalization are
apparent. Previous research on economic globalization (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009 for example) tends
to employ either trade openness or capital account restrictions as dependent variables.38 Both of
these variables are included as components in the KOF economic globalization variable.39 In
addition, the KOF economic globalization variable includes other components commonly employed
in the literature. These include measures of financial globalization (Foreign Direct Investment and
Foreign Portfolio Investment) and others (Tobin 2000; Polachek, Seiglie, and Xiang 2006;
Schmukler and Vesperoni 2006; Winchester 2009; Pelc 2013; Azzimonti, Francisco, and Quadrini
2014). KOF’s competitors, the Anderson and Herbertsston Index (AHI) (2003) and the New
Globalization Index (NGI) (2009) do not have the same level of methodological sophistication, and
they impose severe data limitations (fewer years and countries). Thus, the KOF measure of
economic globalization is far superior to either major alternative. However, the KOF economic
globalization measure comes with limitations. Looking at Table 7, several components of the
economic globalization measure are constructed using Gross Domestic Product (GDP). With GDP
functioning in the background, this precludes including GDP as a control.40 This is the primary
weakness of the KOF measure of economic globalization.
The third dependent variable is the KOF composite measure of social globalization. Like the
measures of political and economic globalization, it is operationalized as a 1-100 index representing

Other common dependent variables include measures of the size of the welfare state and survey data. However, these
variables are not clearly linked to economic globalization in the theoretical work (Crepaz 2001b; Crepaz and Moser 2004;
Ha 2008; Ehrlich 2010).
39 It is important to keep in mind, that the two variables listed in the above table, trade in goods and trade in services, are
equivalent to trade openness. Both indicators are constructed as trade over Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and when
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠
added together, become trade openness. This is simple addition with fractions, such that
+
38

𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠

𝐺𝐷𝑃

𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒

=
= 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 . This is because the denominator, GDP, is common across both
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐺𝐷𝑃
fractions and one simply adds together the numerators, then reduces the fraction to create a trade openness variable.
40 GDP is not included in the political or social models as it is not theoretically relevant.
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how socially globalized a country is. Again, 1 signifies a low value, and 100 a high value. This
composite measure is composed of 22 components, which are summarized in Table 8, below.

Table 8. Social Globalization Components
International voice traffic (Sum of landline and mobile telephone traffic in minutes per capita)
Transfers (Sum of gross inflows and outflows of goods, services, income or financial items without a quid pro
quo per capita)
International tourism (Sum of arrivals and departures of international tourists as a % of the population)
Migration (Number of foreign or foreign-born residents as a % of the population)
Patent Applications (Patent applications by non-residents as a % of the population)
International students (Sum of inbound and outbound tertiary students as a % of the population)
High Technology Exports (Exports of products with a high R&D intensity as a % of total merchandise
exports)
Trade in Cultural Goods (Sum of exports and imports of cultural goods defined by UNESCO)
Trademark Applications (% of applications for trademarks by non-residents as a share of total applications)
Trade in Personal Services (Sum of exports and imports in personal services)
McDonald’s Restaurants per Capita
IKEA stores per capita
Telephone subscriptions (landline and mobile telephone subscriptions as a % of the population)
Freedom to Visit (% of states for which a state requires a visa from foreign visitors)
International airports (Number of airports that offer 1 or more international flights, per capita)
Television (% of households with a television)
Internet Users (% of the population)
Press Freedom (Numerical score evaluating press freedom)
Internet Bandwidth (Total capacity of international internet bandwidth in bits per second per capita)
Gender Parity (Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary education, including private schools)
Expenditure on Education (Government expenditures on education per capita)
Civil Freedom (Quantification of freedom of expression, belief, association, organization, rule of law, personal
autonomy, and individual rights)
Source: (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018)
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There are no alternatives to the KOF measure of social globalization currently available. Due
to this fact, the KOF measure of social globalization was selected as the dependent variable for the
social globalization model.41

Independent Variables

My main independent variable of interest is veto players. In the literature there are two ways
that veto players are typically operationalized (Tsebelis 2002). First, as a count of the effective veto
players, and second, as the ideological range between the veto players. Each of these were briefly
noted in the previous chapter. But my prior discussion did not focus on the statistical problems that
each operationalization faces. These are critical, as the severity of these problems provides a guide as
to which is more appropriate for my analyses. Operationalizing veto players as a count, while
suggested by George Tsebelis, can in certain specified circumstances, incorrectly estimate the size of
the veto player problem. For example, in the case of Germany, the Social Democrats and Greens
have very similar positions on a range of issues. While the Social Democrats and Christian
Democrats diverge significantly. Ideally, a veto players measure should capture this difference
between the two governing coalitions. But, according to the count operationalization, a Social
Democratic/Green coalition and a Social Democratic/Christian Democrat coalition would both
have a count of 2, omitting the substantial variation between cases. In my data, cases such as this are
rather common. This is problematic, as it introduces measurement error into my statistical models.
Specifically, these types of cases cause problems for coefficient estimation (Salkind 2010). With veto

Other variables, while including components that are considered social globalization (AT Kearney 2002; 2003) cannot
be disaggregated. In addition, the process used to create these measures have been heavily criticized (Lockwood 2001;
Heshmati 2003).
41
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players being the main independent variable of interest, this is especially problematic, as it may bias
my results. Because of this, the count variable is employed only as a robustness check.
Instead, following Tsebelis (2002), I operationalization veto players as an ideological range.
To calculate this range, I employ the same procedure as previous work (Castles and Mair 1984;
Laver and Hunt 1992, etc.). Each party is assigned a value on a 1-10 scale of economic liberalism. A
value of 1 represents a political party that accepts state economic intervention, while a 10 represents
a party that does not accept state intervention in the economy.42 These ideological scores are the
current gold standard in the literature when comparing political parties within and across systems.43
Using these values, an ideological range of the parties in government can be calculated. Subtracting
the right most party’s score from the left most, results in an ideological range (right most – left most
= range). The resulting number represents the size of the veto problem, as an ideological range.
Larger values are associated with larger veto player problems and smaller values associated with the
opposite (Tsebelis 2002). I argue that this operationalization of veto players is superior, statistically,
to the count measure. When veto players are operationalized as an ideological range, the size of the
veto player problem varies more. This allows for the comparison of situations where the count is
identical, but the range is not. For example, in Finland in 2015 the count is 3, but the ideological
range is 1.44. In such cases, the ideological range is a more accurate estimate of the size of the veto
player problem than a count. Ideological range is therefore a more fine-grained measure and is more
sensitive to the true size of the veto player problem. This helps to prevent measurement error. It is
for this reason that ideological range has been selected over count.

Essentially, parties vary on their attachment to the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith 1776).
This continuum of intervention in the economy, while widely used, is not a perfect reflection of all types of political
parties. It has difficulty accurately predicting the location of fringe parties on this continuum. For example, Hitler’s 1933
Nazi cabinet is assigned the value of 8.7, despite favoring economic intervention against Jews (Halbrook 2009).
However, no measure is perfect, and this economic liberalism scale is the best that is currently available (Doring and
Manow 2019).
42
43
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The party scores (1-10) used to calculate the ideological range of the veto players is taken
from the ParlGov Cabinet dataset.44 This dataset contains the needed liberalism scores for the
OECD counties in my data.45 The scores assigned to each political party are an average computed
from multiple sources (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Bakker et al. 2015). This forces
the ParlGov data to hold each party’s score constant across time. This makes the measure less
precise than other alternatives, such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). But this sacrifice of
precision is necessary, in the globalization context, as other ideological position data suffers from
two critical problems. First, is the limited year coverage. No datasets, other than ParlGov, cover both
the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-2015) (Garrett 1998).
Extended year coverage is critical, as the pace of globalization is vastly different in both eras.
Second, ParlGov allows for the inclusion of non-European cases. This is especially important, as
these cases tend to be market liberal countries, which differ substantially from corporatist European
cases (Katzenstein 1985; Hays 2009). To not include the bulk of market liberal countries is to
systematically reduce the generalizability of my findings. Thus, I consciously sacrifice precision to
include more years and cases in my data. While this is not ideal, it is necessary given previous work.
For these reasons, the ParlGov Cabinet dataset was selected. The ParlGov Cabinet dataset is
publicly available on the internet.46
I also control for the bifurcated nature of globalization data. The era of globalizing markets
(1970-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-Present) are systematically different (Garrett 1998).

One issue with any data on cabinets is the issue of care-taker cabinets. The literature on this is sparse, but it does
indicate generally caretaker cabinets are a continuation of the previous status quo (Herman and Pope 1973; Mcdonnell
and Valbruzzi 2014). However, there is a tremendous amount of variation on the institutional rules that govern the
transition period of governments (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009), and the informal restrictions that shore up the lack
of formal rules can be bent in certain contexts (Hloušek and Kopeček 2014; Schleiter and Belu 2015). To deal with this
in my data, I have elected to treat care-taker cabinets as a continuation of the previous partisan cabinets ideological
scores.
45 The full list of countries in my data is noted in the appendix.
46 http://www.parlgov.org/data/table/view_cabinet/
44
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This shifting of eras in my data is significant, as it coincides with the end of the Cold War. The end
of the bi-polar world order (Gilpin 1983) significantly affected all dimensions of globalization
(political, economic, and social). Newly sovereign countries now had the ability to establish global
political, economic, and social connections. This necessitates a control variable for years that are in
the Cold War period/era of globalizing markets.47 However, to create this control variable, a
specified end date for the Cold War must be selected. This work designates the Cold War period as
1970 to 1989. I agree with the argument that 1989 was the ‘water shed’ moment when the Cold War
ended (Risse-Kappen 1994). In my data, 1970 to 1989 are coded as 1, all other years are coded as 0.
This Cold War indicator is included in all empirical analyses.
Some evidence suggests that other systemic shocks post-1989 are important (Rosendorff and
Sandler 2005). However, the summed residuals and residual variance ratios (Stimson 1985) for the
political, economic, and social globalization data indicate that only two systemic shocks meet the
threshold that merits a control. The first is a 1991 year specific effect found in the political
globalization data and a 2002 year specific effect found in the economic globalization data. These
two effects are driven by the reentry of Soviet satellites into the international system and the
economic impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks respectively. Each of these variables will be
discussed in more detail in the relevant chapters. Other events, such as the Asian Financial Crisis,
the Great Recession, etc. do not, in my data, rise to the level that necessitates a control variable. For
this reason, no other shocks to the international system are controlled for here.
I also control for the major regional institution in my data; the European Union (EU).48 The
majority of the countries in my data become members of the EU during the period analyzed (1970-

For simplicity, I refer to the era of globalizing markets as the Cold War period from here onward.
GATT/WTO membership is not controlled for here, as all states in my data are members of either the GATT/WTO
for the entire length of the time series (World Trade Organization 2019b; 2019a). This includes all former Soviet
satellites, as they all joined the GATT/WTO the same year they achieved full sovereignty (Keesing 1992b; Keesing
47
48
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2015). According to the EU literature, members are systematically different from non-members on a
variety of fronts (Hanson 1998; Young 2004; 2007). These membership benefits alter behavior
(Checkel 2001; Inglehart 2006; Perkins and Neumayer 2007) and include economic and social
effects. According to economic theory (Krugman 1991), the EU has the ability to promote and
hinder economic globalization. Findings show that the EU has unevenly promoted economic
globalization via neoliberal policies (Young 2004; 2007; Hermann 2007). For example, trade and
capital mobility has liberalized among EU members. This uneven liberalization will impact economic
globalization. This necessitates an EU control variable in the economic globalization model. EU
membership also alters how its members construct social reality. The EU plays a key role in identity
and norm formation (Checkel 2001; Inglehart 2006; Jenson 2007). In addition, the EU’s social trade
patterns (Young 2004; 2007), may also systematically affect how ideas and norms flow within and
outside the EU. These ideational, normative, and social trade effects are likely to impact how socially
globalized EU members are. These findings merit an EU control in the social globalization model.
Based on these arguments, it is necessary to control for EU membership in the economic and social
globalization models.49 To control for EU membership, I created a membership indicator variable.
This variable is coded 1 for each year a country is an EU member and a value of 0 otherwise. This
variable was coded based on the membership entry dates from the EU’s website.50
The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) literature, the globalization literature, and work on
international cooperation indicate that international agreements may impact globalization’s
dimensions (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2007; Ha 2008; Lupu 2015; Davis and Pratt 2017).

1992e; Keesing 1992c). The only exception to this is Hungary, who ascended in 1973. However, statistical tests reveal
that the years in question for Hungary are not statistically different from other years in the same panel. Thus, a
GATT/WTO membership control variable is not needed in these data.
49 I do not control for EU membership in the political globalization model. This is because to do so is likely to introduce
multicollinearity into the political globalization model, as EU membership (specifically EU ascension treaties) would be
on both sides of the regression equation.
50 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en#tab-0-1

63

This is because agreements impact how countries cooperate and with whom (Koremenos 2001), as
countries learn across agreements, via repeated interaction. However, disagreement surrounds which
subset of agreements might affect globalizations dimensions. Some argue that trade agreements are a
catalyst for later cooperation (Lupu 2015) and others security agreements. This is regardless of
whether later cooperation is political, economic, or social. If either argument is correct, this will
impact all dimensions of globalization. To control for both effects, two separate variables are
needed.
If a trade agreement makes later cooperation more likely, the increase/decrease of each
dimension of globalization fluctuates based on cooperation trends. In this case, trade agreements
will need to be controlled for in my models.51 To control for trade agreements, I created a number
of trade agreements variable. To construct the number of trade agreements variable, the needed data
is taken from the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) dataset (Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014).
But, to simply include the number of trade agreements signed by each country per year in my
models is problematic. An agreement does not immediately go into effect upon signature (Fearon
1998). A signature signifies the end of the negotiation phase, not the beginning of the compliance
phase (von Stein 2005). This necessitates that the number of trade agreements be lagged to reflect
this time ordering. In the DESTA dataset, the average amount of time it takes for a trade agreement
to enter into force is one year.52 Therefore, the number of trade agreements is lagged one year, to
capture the average amount of time between signature and entry into force.53 This variable is coded
Due to the nature of the KOF political globalization variable, any agreement centric control variables cannot be
included for methodological reasons. Alternatives were considered, primarily the inclusion of the other dimension of
globalization as independent variables. However, including these variables is also problematic for the same reason, as
they are significantly correlated with each (.5) other at the .05 level. Thus, alternatives introduce the same statistical
problem.
52 This year long period is the average amount of time between the final signature of the needed state, which ends the
negotiation phase (Fearon 1998), and the entry into force date, which begins the compliance phase (Von Stein 2005).
53 The entry into force date was considered for use here. However, for some agreements, there is not an entry into force
date for most signatories. The reason for this is unknown (United Nations 1971; The Montreal Protocol on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer 1990 among others, are examples of this). This possibly systematic missing data is not
51
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as the number for agreements signed by each country in a particular year (say three for example).
For each panel, the first year (1970) is coded as missing. This variable is included in the economic
and social empirical analyses. The DESTA data is publicly available on the internet.54
If security agreements effect later cooperation (Davis and Pratt 2017), a similar type variable
is needed for security agreements. This line of reasoning argues that security agreements effect later
cooperation, which could alter the patterns of global connections, effecting all dimensions of
globalization. This could cause some of the dimensions to increase/decrease more rapidly than
others. To control for this effect, a variable was constructed like the above variable, using instead
the number of security agreements signed each year. The data to construct this variable is drawn
from the Continent of International Law (COIL) dataset (Koremenos 2013).55 Unfortunately,
security agreements are much rarer than trade agreements, and fewer instances occur from 1970 to
2015. However, there is still significant variation in the data, which allowed for a control to be
created. And, given previous arguments, it is essential to control for the effect security agreements
on globalization’s dimensions. This variable is coded the same as the previous variable. The number
of security agreements is lagged by the average amount of time it takes for an agreement to enter
into force (again one year). With 1970 coded as missing in each panel. This control is included in the
economic and social globalization models.
Previous work on globalization, beginning with Peter Katzenstein’s work (1985), note the
role of corporatism. Corporatism has a significant impact on how countries behave when

found in the signature date. To not introduce any unpredictable variation into the data, the use of the entry into force
date was not used here. Further research is warranted to delve into this inconsistency regarding the entry into force date.
However, the need to control for the time ordering of agreement negotiation was paramount, as the effect of an
agreement cannot be felt until the agreement enters the compliance phase (Von Stein 2005). To do this, the length of
time between the signature date and the estimated entry into force date from both the DESTA and the COIL datasets
used (Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014; Koremenos 2013). This same coding procedure is applied to both the lagged number
of trade and security agreements variables.
54 https://www.designoftradeagreements.org/downloads/
55 The COIL dataset can be found at the following link: http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/coil/
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globalization increases. It is argued that corporatist countries are more able to respond, and
therefore counter, the negative effects of increasing globalization (such as job loss in inefficient
sectors of the economy). This is due to an electoral alliance among Leftist political parties and
organized labor, often referred to as embedded liberalism (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). Additionally, it
is argued that corporatist countries tend to be more globalized because of this electoral alliance.
However, who is considered corporatist is disputed. Some claim one list (Katzenstein 1985), while
others a different one (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). Typically, a union density variable is employed to
draw an arbitrary line between corporatist and not (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1998; Garrett 1998; Hays
2009). As this work is on the relationship between globalization and veto players, I am less
concerned with the contextual differences between the shades of corporatism. Instead, the approach
taken here is to cast as wide of a net as possible, and code all disputed countries are corporatist. This
is because the disputed countries are clearly not market liberal or incoherent. Thus, I have elected to
employ an indicator variable instead. The following countries are considered corporatist in my data;
Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland.56 Corporatist countries
are coded as 1, other countries are coded 0. In all empirical investigations, the corporatist indicator
variable is included.57
I also control for incoherent countries. These countries exhibit both corporatist and market
liberal tendencies (Garrett 1998), hence their name. These countries are slightly more globalized than
market liberal countries, but not as globalized as corporatist. This is due to the compromise of
embedded liberalism being supported, but not to the same degree as in corporatist countries. The

There is some disagreement on who is considered corporatist. The agreed upon corporatist states include; Austria,
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The disputed ones include; Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland (Katzenstein 1985;
Garrett 1998; Hays 2009).
57 Another indicator variable for market liberal countries is also included in the dataset. The following states are
considered market liberal states: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, and Ireland. The
following states are considered incoherent states: France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, and Spain. All other states in the
data are none of the above.
56
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following countries are considered incoherent in my data; France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal,
and Spain.58 I employ an indicator variable for incoherent countries. Incoherent countries are coded
as 1, all others are coded as 0. This variable is employed in all empirical analyses. A third type of
country, market liberal, is left out as the referent category. This is due to previous work that shows
they are the least globalized (Hays 2009).
A lagged political/economic/social globalization variable is also employed in the appropriate
model of the same name. This lagged globalization variable is coded the same as the dependent
variable (0-100), except that the first value of each panel (1970) is coded as missing. This variable is
lagged by one year. Therefore, I control for the previous year’s value in the current year. Thus, in the
political globalization model, the political globalization value in 1970 is controlled for in 1971, etc.
This lagged globalization variable is included to help deal with autocorrelation present in the data
(Stimson 1985; N. Beck and Katz 1995). This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. A
lagged political/economic/social globalization variable is included in all empirical models.59
Each of the dependent and independent variables discussed above are summarized in Table
9, below. This table contains summary statistics on all variables common across the three
dimensions of globalization. Other variables, specific to certain dimensions of globalization, are
discussed in the relevant empirical chapter.

Some scholars refer to a subset of these countries as statist (Katzenstein 1985 is an example).
Except for the rate of change model in the economic globalization chapter, as tests reveal autocorrelation is not
problematic for that model.
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Table 9. Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Variance

Minimum

Maximum

Political
Globalization

79.9825

14.42538

208.0915

25.22975

99.54428

Economic
Globalization

63.49044

15.26204

232.9298

24.04153

93.58852

Social
Globalization

70.52212

12.54093

157.2748

34.94569

90.73035

Ideological Range

1.783273

1.783266

3.180038

0

7.5

Cold War

.4347826

.4958782

.2458952

0

1

European Union
Membership

.3979469

.4896222

.2397299

0

1

Lagged # of Trade
Agreements

1.423457

2.681291

7.18932

0

31

Lagged # of
Security
Agreements

.0922559

.3408023

.1161462

0

4

Corporatism

.1944444

.395892

.1567304

0

1

Incoherent

.1672705

.37333

.1393753

0

1

Lagged Political
Globalization

79.76918

14.45947

209.0763

25.22975

99.54428

Lagged Economic
Globalization

63.22061

15.27933

233.458

24.04153

93.58852

Lagged Social
Globalization

70.25501

12.53564

157.1423

34.94569

90.73035

Methods
To analyze my data, a TSCS estimator is need. According to the literature there are three
options for such data; Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS),
and OLS w/Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) (N. Beck and Katz 1995).60 Each option

In the appendix I include PCSE, FGLS, and OLS models that employ the KOF aggregate globalization variable as a
dependent variable. These models are for reference only and should be interpreted with great care. As to compare across
my dimensional models and the aggregate models is problematic (Cohen 1983).
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presents its own unique challenges. Each are discussed in turn below. I argue here that PCSE is the
most appropriate given the weaknesses of the other estimators.
When beginning a statistical odyssey, the first stop is typically OLS. It allows for simple
testing of various problems in the data (heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, etc.) and is a critical first
stop for this reason (R. Anderson 2008). However, OLS is not appropriate here for two reasons,
both of which are common in TSCS data; heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. First, TSCS data is
plagued by heteroscedasticity. This is due to the units (N) in the data being of different sizes. This
introduces heteroscedasticity into the OLS model, which biases the estimator, by violating the
assumption of constant error variance (Kaufman 2013). This renders the OLS results problematic,
as the resulting standard errors are biased (Stimson 1985; N. Beck and Katz 1995). A full battery of
tests confirm that heteroscedasticity exists in my data.61 Thus, if OLS is employed, the standard
errors will be biased. The second problem is autocorrelation. In TSCS data, each observation’s error
term is correlated with the next (Stimson 1985; Berry 1993). This can cause problems for OLS, as it
assumes no autocorrelation. When this assumption is violated, OLS is no longer the Best Linear
Unbiased Estimate (BLUE). This again prevents accurate standard errors from being generated. The
Wooldridge test, used to test for autocorrelation in TSCS data, confirms this. The test shows that
the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation cannot be rejected. Given the results of the
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In the Political Globalization model, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test reports a chi squared value of 524.39,
with 7 degrees of freedom, and a p-value of 0.0000, the White test and the Cameron and Trivedi IM test reports similar
results for the same model. Similar results for all tests are found for the economic globalization model and the social
globalization models.
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Wooldridge test, OLS is not appropriate (Wooldridge 2001; Drukker 2003).62 For both of these
reasons (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation), OLS is not employed (N. Beck and Katz 1995).63
A second possible estimator for TSCS data is FGLS.64 FGLS can be appropriate in some
circumstances,65 particularly when heteroscedasticity is present. However, like OLS, FGLS also
estimates biased standard errors. FGLS returns overly small standard errors, which can vary from
50% to 300% smaller in some cases (N. Beck and Katz 1995). These biased standard errors cause
FGLS to be prone to false positives. This makes FGLS a liberal estimator. Other possible
estimators, even OLS, can be more conservative in some cases (N. Beck and Katz 1995). In fact,
FGLS standard errors exhibit this very problem in my data. When compared to other estimators,
FGLS standard errors vary significantly. This is found across all three models (political, economic,
and social).66 This results in several variables becoming significant in the FGLS model, while they are
not in other estimators. This is why the literature argues that FGLS is not an appropriate estimator
for TSCS data, despite its ability to deal with heteroscedasticity (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck
2001).67

The results of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data have an F value of 28.328, and a P value of 0.0000,
which results in rejecting the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation in my data.
63 However, the OLS model results are showcased in the appendix as a robustness check. These results are to be
interpreted with caution, however. In addition to the facts noted above, the nature of my panels (unbalanced) also biases
the OLS model results.
64 Generalized Least Squares (GLS) is not discussed here, as it’s downfalls are clearly outlined in Nathaniel Beck and
Jonathan Katz’s work (1995), as it’s assumptions are rarely met in applied research.
65 Specifically, when the number of time points is greater than the number of units (T > N), as is the case here.
However, the fact still remains that FGLS is an overly liberal estimator (N. Beck and Katz 1995).
66 The FGLS political, economic, and social models are included in the appendix.
67 The use of a fixed-effects model was considered here. However, initial tests (Stimson 1985) for country specific effects
showed nothing of concern. Despite this, is best, I chose to test formally if fixed-effects was indeed appropriate. I
performed the Hausman test for fixed-effects on each of the three globalization models (political, economic, and social).
The Hausman test for fixed effects for the political globalization model reports a Chi Squared test, with 7 degrees of
freedom = 27.24, and a P value of 0.0003. The economic globalization model reports a Chi Squared Test with 7 degrees
of freedom = 26.98 with a P value of 0.0003. The social globalization model reports a Chi Squared test with 7 degrees of
freedom = 46.61 and a P value of 0.0000. These results echo my initial test of the summed residuals and residual
variance ratios compared to the mean of the dependent variable (2 times the dependent variable mean is problematic)
(Stimson 1985). The results for all Hausman tests for fixed effects were not positive definite (which indicates that the
assumptions of the test may not have been met, and therefore the results of the test are suspect). Taking both tests at
face value, fixed-effects appears to be a misspecification (however, the literature is unsure of how reliable the Hausman
62
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A third possible estimator is PCSE regression. According to Monte Carlo Simulations, PCSE
produces more accurate standard errors than OLS68 and FGLS. This makes the standard errors of
PCSE the most accurate of the three TSCS data estimators. PCSE is even robust in the face of
extreme heteroscedasticity, which is the main argument for the use of FGLS over PCSE. The one
catch for PCSE is that autocorrelation is problematic. Autocorrelation, which is present in my data,
will need to be dealt with prior to using this estimator. Beck and Katz (1995) recommend the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to deal with autocorrelation in PCSE models. Additionally,
Beck and Katz also suggest that the model be specified to assume an autocorrelation factor of 1
(AR1) process. When these two specifications are used, PCSE outperforms both OLS and FGLS.
Evidence that supports the use of PCSE is found in my data. When a lagged dependent
variable is included in the model the rho value decreases significantly (which is a crude indicator of
autocorrelation). For example, in the political globalization model, the rho value is approximately .8,
if no lagged political globalization variable is included. This high value indicates high autocorrelation,
and is supported by the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 2001; Drukker 2003). After the lagged political
globalization variable is included, the rho value decreases to approximately .1. This result is common
across all three globalization models. This sharp decrease indicates that the inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable is necessary when estimating a PCSE model with my data. Therefore, the
inclusion of these variables is necessary on statistical grounds. When PCSE is also specified
assuming an AR1 process, autocorrelation is further dealt with. While not perfect, these model

test is) (Bell and Jones 2015; N. Beck and Katz 2004; Clark and Linzer 2012). Random-effects models, which is
estimated using Generalized Least Squares (GLS), has its own problems, as the assumptions of GLS are never met when
using TSCS data (N. Beck and Katz 1995). Given the evidence of both tests there is, on statistical grounds, enough
evidence to reject the use of a fixed-effects model.
68 Or their equivalent in certain specified circumstances (N. Beck and Katz 1995).
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specifications shore up PCSE’s weakness to autocorrelation. When specified this way, PCSE is more
effective than OLS and FGLS. (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001).
Therefore, PCSE is the most appropriate estimator for my data. It is not subject to the bias
that afflicts its possible alternatives, leading to false positives. In addition, PCSE can be specified in a
manner that makes it robust to autocorrelation. Using PCSE is common in the literature, as a
majority of the authors who use TSCS data, be it in the globalization literature (Crepaz and Moser
2004; Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005; Ha 2008; Bergh and Nilsson 2010b) or in other
literatures (Tsebelis and Chang 2004), employ PCSE. Therefore, I employ PCSE regression in all
subsequent empirical investigations. All PCSE models will also be specified as recommended and
include the relevant lagged dependent variable as an independent, while assuming an AR1 process.
With these specifications, PCSE is the ideal choice of estimator (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck
2001; Stata 2012).

Conclusion
As of now, this work has introduced the concept of globalization and put forth a more
complex definition of it. In addition, I argued that there is a need to disaggregate it into its three
primary dimensions (political, economic, and social). I then argued that each dimension has a unique
relationship with veto players. The current chapter has explored the data and methods needed to test
my argument quantitatively.
The first section of this chapter discussed my data. This chapter found that the KOF
globalization index is the only dataset to contain composite measures of each dimension of
globalization. Therefore, the KOF globalization index is the most appropriate operationalization of
each dimension of globalization (political, economic, and social). I also argued that ideological range
72

was the most appropriate operationalization of veto players. And, due to its expansive time series,
ParlGov was the most appropriate source of the ideological position data needed to construct the
ideological range of the veto players. In addition, a swath of other independent variables was taken
from the literature, including; corporatism, incoherentism, and others.
In the second section, the three statistical estimators that are commonly used to analyze
TSCS data were discussed (OLS, FGLS, and PCSE). Of the three, PCSE is the best choice, as its
standard errors are not biased and it can be specified to deal with autocorrelation (N. Beck and Katz
1995; N. Beck 2001). This makes PCSE less prone to false positives and more robust than
alternatives. For these reasons it was selected for use in later empirical analyses.
The next chapter will begin to employ the theory, data, and methods already discussed to
test for the three relationships outlined in the theory chapter. The data and methods discussed here
will be employed to accomplish this. The first relationship to be explored will be veto players and
political globalization. This chapter will specify a specific relationship between the ideological range
of the veto players and political globalization, form a hypothesis, then test this hypothesis using
PCSE.
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Chapter 4: Political Globalization
Previously, I argued that globalization is best described as multidimensional, in line with
previous work (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). That being
said, globalization is composed of three primary dimensions; political, economic, and social (Dreher
2006a). As I argued in the Theory Chapter, each dimension has a unique relationship with veto
players. In the Data and Methods Chapter, I discussed the data and statistical methods needed to
test for these theorized relationships. The next step is to employ my theoretical argument, the data,
and PCSE estimation to test my argument. I begin with political globalization, where my assumed
relationship between veto players and political globalization is negative.
In this chapter I review my theoretical argument about veto players and political
globalization. Arguing that a negative relationship exists between veto players and political
globalization. I then specify a hypothesis between ideological range and political globalization to
express this relationship. I argue that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, political
globalization tends to decrease. Based on my empirical tests, I find that, as originally hypothesized,
as the ideological range of the veto players increases, political globalization decreases.

Political Globalization Revisited
To reiterate, political globalization is defined as; the diffusion of government policy (Dreher 2006a,
1092). As these policies diffuse, how politically globalized a country is increases. However, a
successful instance of policy diffusion requires legislative action.69 When and how legislatures behave

While executives are frequently involved in the legislative process in a variety of ways, from veto’s to conditional
agenda setting, only a small subset of executives, under very specific circumstances, can initiate the legislative process.
For this reason, political globalization is not affected by executive institutions.
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is conditional on the size of the veto player problem (Tsebelis 2002). For change to occur, the policy
will need to overcome the status quo bias created by the veto players in the system. This can only
occur when all veto players agree the policy is preferable to the status quo. When this is the case, the
new policy is successfully implemented and becomes law.
When discussing the effect veto players have on political globalization, it is entirely possible
for diffusion to occur when policy is removed or added. For example, previous research indicates
that aggregate globalization can cause both welfare policy retreat and expansion (Rodrik 1997; Rodrik
1998; Garrett 1998; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002). In relation to political globalization, the
direction is less important than the outcome. Thus, diffusion of political globalization is both
positive and negative.70 When an existing policy is removed, and political globalization increases, this
is negative diffusion. Positive diffusion is when a new policy increases political globalization. Both
types of diffusion are subject to the impact of veto players. An example will be illustrative.
A textbook case of negative policy diffusion is the decriminalization of cannabis.71 This
example involves removing a policy to become more politically globalized.72 In 1968, the Dutch
government formed the Baan Commission to reform its drug laws (Laker 2003). The commission’s
goal was to identify problems with current laws and determine their effects on youth populations. In
1972, the Baan Commission issued its report, recommending the decriminalization of cannabis, as
criminalization facilitates other anti-social behavior in youths. The Baan report led to the reform of
the Opium Act in 1976, which decriminalized cannabis. When the Opium Act was revised, the size

This is not to be confused with the mechanisms of diffusion discussed previously (Elkins and Simmons 2005;
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).
71
The term cannabis is used here, as the more commonly employed term, ‘marijuana’ is a product of a xenophobic US
government propaganda campaign against minorities (D. Graham 2001).
72
To be clear, this is not a normative claim. Prior work on deviant globalization and morality policy shows that demand
for illegal goods and services is constant (Meier 1999; Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011). And, attempts to ban
these goods and services are generally ineffective (Gershuny 1979). Thus, rational governments should learn this over
time. This will result in the removal of cannabis regulation over time, via policy diffusion.
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of the veto player problem was 4.35. This is almost two standard deviations above the mean (2.46)
for the Netherlands.73 Despite the size of the veto player problem, the Netherlands still passed the
revised Opium Act. The significant veto player problem is indicative of how strongly the 5 Dutch
veto players agreed on reform. The revised Opium Act was clearly within the winset of the veto
players. This marked the first instance of a new cannabis policy arising in the OECD.74 While the
Dutch case is not an example of negative policy diffusion per se it does mark the origin point of a
new policy position on cannabis. What happens after this case is a chain of incidents of negative
policy diffusion, beginning with the United States in the late 1970’s.75
By 1978, ten US states followed the Netherlands and reduced cannabis possession charges to
civil violations (equivalent to a parking ticket) (Single 1989). In these cases, the logic is like the
Dutch one, but veto players impact the process differently. In the US case, the veto problem proved
to be too large to overcome nationally. Thus, the policy change was sub-national. This variation in
the Dutch and US cases can be attributed to veto players, as the policy diffused where it was within
the winset of the veto players. Thus, each policy outcome was dependent on the size of the veto
player problem (Tsebelis 2002).
For both cases, the primary institutional constraint was veto players. As the ideological range
of the parties in government increased, so too did the status quo bias. As the status quo bias
becomes increasingly severe, policy implementation also becomes increasingly difficult (but not
impossible as the Dutch case shows). This resulted in lower levels of policy diffusion in both
countries, which adversely affected political globalization. So, as the ideological range of the veto
players increased, political globalization decreased. In the Dutch case, despite appearances, the size

The standard deviation of ideological range of the veto players for the Netherlands is 1.05.
Aside from the obvious diffusion of criminalization that predated this period of legalization.
75 This culminated with the recent national legalization of cannabis in Canada (Sapara 2018).
73
74

76

of the veto player problem was not problematic due to the policies location in the issue space. In the
US case, the size of the federal veto player problem was problematic, which prevented a similar type
reform. Thus, how politically globalized a country is, is a function of the size of the veto player
problem. This leads to my hypothesis regarding veto players and political globalization;
Hypothesis: As the ideological range of the veto players increases, political globalization decreases.

Data and Methods
The dependent variable employed here is the Swiss Economic Institutes Globalization Index
of political globalization (KOF in German). This variable is operationalized as a 1-100 score, with 1
signifying low political globalization and 100 signifying high. The KOF political globalization index
is a composite indicator of six variables that get at the political conditions that underlie a politically
connected world.76 These components are summarized in Table 10, below.

The components of the KOF political globalization index are not an exhaustive list, but rather the most
comprehensive list that is currently available.
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Table 10. The Components of Political Globalization
Embassies (Absolute number of embassies in a country)
UN Peace Keeping Missions (Personnel contributed to U.N. Security Council Missions per capita)
International Organizations (Number of International Organizations in which the country is a member)
NGO’s (Number of internationally oriented Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) with members in that
country)
International Treaties (International treaties signed between two or more states and ratified by the highest
legislative body for each country since 1945)
Number of distinct bilateral investment treaty partners for a state
Source: (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018)

This operationalization was selected as it is the only composite variable of political
globalization that is available.77 Given the components in Table 1, noted above, this
operationalization precludes the inclusion of two variables discussed previously, the number of trade
and security agreements. To include either agreement controls (trade and/or security) would
introduce multicollinearity into the model. Therefore, both agreement controls cannot be included
in the political globalization model. However, the fact remains that the KOF index of political
globalization is still the only option available.
The main independent variable of interest is veto players. I operationalize veto players as the
ideological range of the partisan veto players in government. Each veto player is assigned a value on
a 1-10 scale of economic liberalism (Doring and Manow 2019). Ideological range is calculated by
subtracting the right most number is subtracted from the left most (right most – left most = range).
This range represents the size of the veto problem in that year. This operationalization is one of two
proposed in the literature (Tsebelis 2002). The other operationalization is a count of the number of
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See the Data and Methods Chapter for a more detailed discussion.
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veto players. As previously discussed, the count measure of veto players is subject to increased
measurement error via lack of precision. I employ it here as a robustness check. This is to ensure
that variable selection does not drive the results of the political globalization model. Both variables
are taken from the ParlGov cabinet dataset, which contains the necessary ideological position data
(Doring and Manow 2019).
While other sources of ideological position data are available, they suffer from data
restrictions. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) excludes non-European market liberal cases
(Bakker et al. 2015). This is problematic as it eliminates systematically different cases from the data.
For the political dimension, this is especially relevant, as the different political realities may impact
trends in political globalization. CHES also limits the length of the time series, as it excludes data
prior to 1999. This is problematic as the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) has a vastly different
slope than the era of global markets (1990-2015). With these different slopes being driven by
political forces (Garrett 1998; Potrafke 2009), to focus on one time period reduces the
generalizability of my results. The other alternative data source, the Comparative Manifesto Project
(CMP), is not a measure of position, but of salience, and thus is not appropriate here (Franzmann
and Kaiser 2006).
However, the ParlGov data comes with drawbacks. Of primary concern is the lack of
precision in assigning ideological position. To calculate the ideological position of a political party,
the ParlGov data averages several ideological scores and assigns that value to a given party each year.
This reduces precision year to year but enables a longer time series and more cases. Thus, the trade
off in ideological position data is one between precision and cases. Given previous arguments, I
elected for more cases over a longer time span. A conscious sacrifice was made to include more
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cases and years. Further details regarding the ParlGov data are discussed in the Data and Methods
chapter.
The first control variable is a Cold War/era of globalizing markets indicator variable. This
variable controls for the different trends in the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of
global markets (1990-2015) (Garrett 1998). This difference is due to the exogenous shock of the end
of the bi-polar world order. While not specific to political globalization, each time period has a
distinct political flavor. This could foreseeably affect my results if not included. Therefore, I control
for this effect. To do this, all era of globalizing markets years (1970-1989) are coded as 1, other years
are coded 0.78
The second control variable is an indicator for corporatism. Corporatism is a common
control in the globalization literature, as corporatist countries tend to be more globalized than
others. This is due to an electoral alliance that allows for continued aggregate globalization, when its
negative effects (such as job loss) are mitigated with domestic policy (Garrett 1998). While this effect
has not been explicitly linked to political globalization, it stands to reason that a similar effect could
be at play. I assume that as the opponents of globalization are bought off via policy concessions,
political globalization should increase. It is for this reason that corporatism is controlled for.79 To
control for this effect, all corporatist countries are coded 1, all others 0.
I also control for incoherent countries in the political globalization model. These countries
exhibit similar traits as corporatist countries, but to a lesser degree (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009).
Incoherent countries exhibit a Left/labor alliance for example, but the alliance is weaker politically.
Incoherent countries are likely to be slightly more politically globalized than market liberal countries,

This variable and the logic behind it are discussed at greater length in the data and methods chapter.
See the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion of which countries are considered corporatist in my data, as
well as why this operationalization is preferable to others.
78

79

80

but not as politically globalized as corporatist. This is due to less extensive policy concessions. To
control for this systematic difference in my data, I employ an indicator variable for incoherent
countries. All incoherent countries are coded as 1, others are coded 0.80 Market liberal countries
therefore make up the referent category in my analysis.
Exclusive to the political dimension of globalization, I also control for the systematic
difference between major powers and other countries in my data. Previous work on policy diffusion
argues that some actors policy choices are more high profile that others (c.f. Walker 1969; Boehmke
and Skinner 2012). Thus, when the United States, for example, adopts a new policy, the information
costs associated with learning about the policy are much lower than attempting to learn about a new
policy in Estonia. This increased salience regarding policy choices can be generalized to any major
powers, which make up a defined subset of the OECD. Extending this insight to political
globalization, it is entirely possible for major power status to impact political globalization levels,
which is an aggregate of multiple policy diffusion instances. To control for this, I employ the
Correlates of War dataset on state system membership (2017). The COW data designates a country
as a major power if it has significant material capabilities, economic influence, global interests, and
other countries recognize it as a major power (Small and Singer 1969).81 If a country is a major
power in a given year, they are coded as 1, a 0 otherwise. The following countries are considered
major powers in my data: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Austria.

See the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion of this variable, including who is considered incoherent in my
data.
81
This criteria for delineating who has major power status is not perfect but provides general guidelines. The COW
coding scheme becomes less useful post 1991. I employ it here as no measure currently available can better capture the
concept of major power.
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Also exclusive to political globalization, I control for the year-specific effect of 1991.
Statistical tests for unit (country) and temporal (year) specific effects in the political globalization
data indicate that 1991 is problematic. The summed residuals and variance ratios exceed the
recommended guidelines of two times larger than the mean of the dependent variable (Stimson
1985).82 This indicates that a temporal effect exists in the political globalization data that is not found
in other dimensional globalization data and merits a dimension specific control. This temporal effect
is due to the (re)entry of many countries into the international system with the end of the Cold War.
This variable controls for the effect of a sudden increase in the number of less politically globalized
countries in my data. All these countries are significantly less politically globalized than other OECD
countries (mean of 67.97 compared to 81.27).83 The district pattern in the data is further evidence
that a 1991 year-specific control is necessary in the political globalization model. The following
states (re)enter the international system in 1991; Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. The exact timeline for each countries reentry
into the international system varies based on the definition of reentry one employs.84 Regardless of
the definition, only the year 1991 is problematic in statistical tests. This indicates that all countries,
despite varying official reentry dates, de facto reenter the international system in 1991. This yearspecific variable is coded 1 for 1991, and 0 for all other years.
As suggested in the TSCS data literature (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001), I also
include a lagged political globalization variable. This variable is operationalized the same as the
dependent variable discussed above (1-100 score). However, the first year in each panel (1970) is

This test is displayed in the Appendix.
A means comparison test indicates that these two means are statistically different from each other.
84
Looking at the primary source data, reentry could officially take place at a variety of points, including; the date of
official independence, the date when the first independent elections are held, the date when the previous one-party
government is removed from office, and other dates (Keesing 1990; 1992d; 1992c; 1992e; 1992a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b).
Despite the possibility of differing reentry dates into the international system for the Eastern European countries,
statistically, they all reenter the international system in 1991.
82
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coded as missing, and the previous year’s value is included in the current year (1970 is controlled for
in 1971, etc.). This variable is included to deal with the autocorrelation present in my data. The logic
behind this variable is discussed in more detail in the Data and Methods Chapter.
The dependent and independent variables discussed in the above paragraphs are summarized
in Table 11. This table presents summary statistics for each variable in the political globalization
model. Table 11 is showcased below.85

Table 11. Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Variance

Minimum

Maximum

Political
Globalization

79.9825

14.42538

208.0915

25.22975

99.54428

Ideological Range

1.783273

1.783266

3.180038

0

7.5

Veto Player Count

2.344238

1.367571

1.870251

1

9

Cold War

.4347826

.4958782

.2458952

0

1

Corporatism

.1944444

.395892

.1567304

0

1

Incoherent

.1672705

.37333

.1393753

0

1

Major Power

.0435744

.2041784

.0416888

0

1

1991 Indicator

.0217391

.1458746

.0212794

0

1

Lagged Political
Globalization

79.76918

14.45947

209.0763

25.22975

99.54428
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Looking at Table 1, the dependent variable has a mean value of approximately 79.9, while the median is 83.9 (not
reported in Table 1). This indicates that the distribution of the dependent variable is negatively skewed, with a skewness
value of approximately -0.83. However, this problem is likely due to the countries in the data, which are OECD member
states, who tend to be more globalized on average. In addition, the interpretation of this skewness value is problematic,
as a zero value may indicate the data approximates the normal distribution, or it may be indicative of nothing (N. J. Cox
2010). Unfortunately, given the nature of data collection, it is often easier to gather information on more developed
states. Given this fact, any scholarly project using this globalization measure is likely to experience this same problem.
This project is no exception.
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To test my hypothesis outlined above, I employ PCSE regression as my chosen estimator.
While other estimators were entertained, the literature is clear that these alternatives are inferior to
PCSE. This is due to alternative estimators resulting in biased standard errors (N. Beck and Katz
1995; N. Beck 2001).86 The PCSE model employed here is also specified as suggested in the
literature, employing a lagged political globalization variable. This variable is discussed above, as well
as in the previous chapter. In addition, the PCSE model is specified to assume an autoregressive
factor of one (AR1) process. When a PCSE model is specified in this manner, it reports the most
accurate standard errors. The PCSE regression model is showcased below in Equation 1.87 Equation
1 includes all variables discussed above.

Equation 1. Political Globalization Model
𝐾𝑂𝐹 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑟2 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚3 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡4 + 𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟5
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛6 + 1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟7 + 𝜀

Model Results
The primary fear of scholars using quantitative methods is the robustness of their findings.
To ensure that my findings are robust, I employ to both operationalizations commonly used in veto
player scholarship; ideological range and a count of the veto players. I estimate two PCSE models
using both ideological range and count.88 However, I primarily discuss the ideological range model as
A more detailed discussion as to why this is the case is taken up in the Data and Methods Chapter.
For a detailed discussion of the procedure used to calculate the PCSE’s, I highly recommend Beck and Katz’s work
(1995), as well as work by the Stata Corporation (2012).
88
Findings that are robust to various model specifications are also preferable. I showcase FGLS and OLS models in the
chapter appendix. The results discussed here are also robust to model choice.
86
87
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it is less afflicted with measurement error.89 To reiterate, my hypothesis is that; as the ideological
range of the veto players increases, political globalization should decrease. This is caused by the
inability of a country to pass policy that would result in more political globalization when faced with
a veto player problem. The results of the PCSE estimator(s) are reported in Table 12 below. 90

See the Data and Methods Chapter for a more detailed discussion of this topic.
It is worth noting that the R squared value for both PCSE models is very high. This is indicative of autocorrelation in
the model, and has been dealt with as fully as possible (N. Beck and Katz 1995). In addition, two variables are left out of
this model for specific reasons. First, I do not control for regime type in the political globalization models, as the mean
Polity score for the OECD countries in my data is 8.27. This indicates that regime type is not an overly large concern for
these data (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2018). Second, there is no Gross Domestic Product (GDP) control as such a
variable is not intimately related to political globalization.
89
90
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Table 12. Political Globalization Model Results
Variable

PCSE w/ Ideological Range

PCSE w/ Count

Political Globalization
Ideological Range

-0.088*
(0.04)

Count

-0.069
(0.04)

Cold War

-1.026***

-0.962***

(0.21)

(0.20)

0.649***

0.584***

(0.14)

(0.13)

0.519**

0.511**

(0.19)

(0.17)

.474***

.489***

(0.13)

(0.11)

3.317***

3.361***

(0.49)

(0.46)

0.940***

0.942***

(0.01)

(0.01)

5.618***

5.412***

(0.79)

(0.78)

R Squared

0.972

0.973

N91

1246.0

1292.0

Corporatism

Incoherent

Major Power

1991 Indicator

Lagged Political Globalization

Constant

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

According to Table 12, veto players are significant and negatively related to political
globalization. This result confirms my argument and hypothesis. As the ideological range of the veto
players increases, political globalization decreases, holding all other variables constant. This
relationship is significant at the .05 level (this relationship is not significant in the count model). This

Due to the lack of ideological position data on the US, and conversion between DW nominate (J. B. Lewis et al. 2019)
and ParlGov (Doring and Manow 2019) proving impossible, the US case is only included in the count model.
91
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result showcases that as the veto player problem becomes larger, political globalization policy is less
likely to diffuse. The example discussed above, regarding cannabis decriminalization, is illustrative of
the relationship found in Table 3. In the US case, a veto player problem prevented national
decriminalization of cannabis in the 1970’s. In the case of the Netherlands, the opposite occurred.
The Baan Commission report set the agenda, facilitating the passage of the Opium Act of 1976
(Single 1989; Laker 2003). This allowed for decriminalization to occur. Thus, political globalization
increased in the Netherlands, while it remained constant in the US.
To explore the relationship between veto players and political globalization graphically,
Figure 3 is presented. Figure 3 graphs the fitted values of political globalization against the
ideological range of the veto players.92 This graph shows the same negative relationship between the
ideological range of the veto players and political globalization found in Table 12. As the ideological
range of the veto players increases from 0 to 7, the fitted values for the political globalization
equation decrease. This shows that, as the ideological range of the veto players increases, political
globalization tends to decrease. This, like the above model results, supports my hypothesis. Figure 3
is showcased below.

92

A similar graph for the count operationalization is displayed in the appendix.
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Figure 3. Plot of Ideological Range and Political Globalization

The other variables in the models all performed as expected. First, the Cold War/era of
globalizing markets variable shows that political globalization is lower during the Cold War. This
relationship is significant at the .001 level. This result comports with previous arguments made by
Geoffrey Garrett (1998). It also shows that political globalization, like aggregate globalization, can be
bifurcated into two distinct periods; the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of global
markets (1990-2015). After 1989, political globalization increased much more rapidly, as there were
many new countries in the international system.
Corporatism is also significant in the model. This shows that corporatist countries are more
politically globalized than market liberal countries. This relationship is significant at the .001 level.
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This finding verifies previous research that corporatist countries are more globalized (Katzenstein
1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). This result also shows that previous arguments about corporatist
can be extended down to the political dimension of globalization as well.
Incoherent countries are also significantly more politically globalized than market liberal
countries. This relationship is significant at the .01 level, and of the predicted sign. This supports
arguments in the literature that incoherent countries are systematically different from both
corporatist and market liberal countries. This finding is also important, in that it establishes the
effect of incoherentism is generalizable to the political dimension of globalization. This comports
with previous work (Garrett 1998), and showcases its continued relevance to political globalization.
Also significant in the political globalization model is the major power variable. This
relationship is significant at the .001 level (in both models). This result is consistent with previous
work on policy diffusion (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Boehmke and Skinner 2012). This indicates
that powerful countries are often focal points for diffusion, whether it is positive or negative. Thus,
political globalization increases when a country obtains major power status.
The last variable in the political globalization model is the 1991 year-specific indicator. This
variable is also significant and of the predicted sign. The 1991 variable indicates that political
globalization increased more in 1991 than in other years. This year specific effect is likely caused by
the (re)entry of many countries into the international system. Thus, a set of countries were able to
politically globalize for the first time in decades. This year specific effect showcases that political
globalization is systematically different from aggregate globalization, as no 1991 specific effect is
found in previous work.
The lagged political globalization variable is also significant. Thus, the previous year’s value
of political globalization is related to the current years value, causing autocorrelation in the data.
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Thus, including this variable is essential (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). For comparison,
when this variable is not included in the PCSE ideological range model the rho value is .835. This
indicates high autocorrelation in the model. When this variable is included in the model, the rho
value decreases to a modest 0.18. The same result in found in the PCSE count model. This indicates
that this variable is extremely successful in mitigating the effect of autocorrelation.
Given the results of Table 12, veto players play a critical role in how politically globalized a
country is. As the ideological range of the veto players increases, a country cannot become politically
globalized as easily. This finding shows that previous work on globalization (Crepaz 2001a; Crepaz
and Moser 2004; Ha 2008) was correct in concluding that veto players do significantly impact
globalization. I extend previous arguments by concluding that this relationship also applies to the
political dimension of globalization. The performance of the other variables in the model also
indicates that previous work on globalization was largely correct, as my findings corroborate
previous work (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). In addition, the performance of the
1991 variable also indicates that political globalization has unique qualities that merit its separation
from aggregate globalization. This lends credibility to the arguments regarding the disaggregation of
globalization (Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008).

Conclusion
Given my findings, it is possible to draw expectations of how politically globalized certain
countries are. On average, corporatist country with a narrow ideological range are the most
politically globalized in my data. By contrast, market liberal countries with a large ideological range
are the least politically globalized. And lastly, a market liberal country with a single veto player is
moderately politically globalized. This is indeed the case in my data. Sweden is a corporatist country
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with a narrow average ideological range (.7). in 1970, Sweden had a political globalization value of
85.7. In 2015, Sweden achieved one of the highest values of political globalization in my data
(97.16). Ireland, a market liberal country with a large mean ideological range (2.28) achieved a
political globalization value of 56.72 in 1970. By 2015, Ireland had only increased to 76.27, placing it
amongst the least politically globalized countries in my data. Canada, a single veto player (ideological
range of 0 and count of 1), market liberal country, should be moderately politically globalized. This
is indeed the case, as Canada is moderately politically globalized in 1970 with a value of 72.06. In
2015, Canada achieved a value of 93.52. While Canada was able to close the gap between Sweden at
the end of my data, its political globalization value still falls within the predictions of my model.
Thus, Sweden is always more politically globalized than Canada, who is always more politically
globalized than Ireland.
As of now, I have established that globalization is composed of three primary dimensions
(political, economic, and social). I have also argued that each dimension has a unique relationship
with veto players. The data and statistical method needed to test for these relationships has also
been explored. This current chapter adds to this discussion, by explicitly hypothesizing a relationship
between veto players and political globalization. I found that as the size of the veto player problem
increases, political globalization decreases. This is because the policies of political globalization
cannot diffuse as easily when a veto player problem is present.
The next chapter will explore the relationship between veto players and economic
globalization. I build upon previous chapters by employing the theoretical and statistical logic
already outlined. I argue that a unique relationship between veto players and economic globalization
exists. Empirical tests will be used to test if this relationship is as hypothesized.
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Chapter 5: Economic Globalization
Thus far, I have followed previous scholars (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002;
Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) in arguing that globalization is multidimensional. Specifically, it is
composed of three dimensions; political, economic, and social (Dreher 2006a). I have also posited a
unique relationship between each dimension and veto players. Then, I reviewed the data and
methods needed to test these relationships in the Data and Methods Chapter. In the Political
Globalization Chapter, the first of these relationships was explored and tested. I found that as the
ideological range of the veto players increases, political globalization tends to decrease.
This chapter continues testing the overall theoretical argument laid out in Chapter 2. Here I
focus on the economic dimension of globalization. In this chapter, I argue that economic
globalization is not hindered by the increased ideological range of veto players. But it is affected by
the presence of a liberal executive. I test this relationship empirically and confirm my predictions.
There is no relationship between veto players and economic globalization. The presence of a liberal
executive, however, is significant.

Economic Globalization Revisited
Economic globalization is defined as, “…long distance flows of goods, capital and services
as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges…” (Dreher 2006a, 1092).
I argue that veto players do not affect the continued increase of economic globalization. To
understand my argument, it is critical to understand the compromise of embedded liberalism. The
first half of the compromise consists of efforts to liberalize economic exchange globally (Ruggie
1982; 2003; 2009; Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005). This requires multilateral efforts to
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coordinate. This usually occurs through international institutions, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and has been relatively successful (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; Pelc
2013). The second half of the compromise of embedded liberalism requires domestic economic
intervention. This allows governments to respond to the negative effects of liberal markets, such as
job loss. Corporatist countries in Europe are the best example of domestic intervention, as they
often ease the pains of liberal market efficiency (Hays 2009). The twin goals of domestic economic
intervention and multilateral liberal efforts make up the ‘compromise’ of embedded liberalism.
However, voter preferences for embedded liberalism and those of veto players differ. Voters
have simplistic views of globalization (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2004; 2005), while veto players do
not. This is due to economic performance being tied to electoral fates (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini
1992). This incentivizes veto players to understand economic globalization, while voters have no
such incentive.93 This results in informational asymmetry, as veto players are more willing to pay the
associated costs than voters. This allows veto players to fool voters, by labeling policy ‘free trade’
which is viewed positively, instead of ‘globalization’ which is not (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005). By
exploiting this informational asymmetry, veto players can continue economic globalization by
invoking certain rhetoric (Kono 2006). Thus, veto players are freed from electoral constraints
(Mansfield and Milner 2012), which significantly alters their behavior (Rothenberg and Sanders
2000). They can then pursue economic globalization at will. Thus, the ideological range of the veto
players will not matter, as all strategic actors will desire continued economic globalization to ensure
reelection. This results in my first hypothesis;
Hypothesis #1: The ideological range of the veto players has no effect on economic globalization.

There is mixed evidence that income level may impact voter preferences (Ehrlich 2010). However, this finding is very
circumstantial as the author notes.
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Depending on the institutional structure, another actor may desire increased economic
globalization; the chief executive. Given that economic globalization is, “driven by a set of discrete
but intersecting logics…which operates simultaneously across several institutional domains” (Held
1997, 263–64) such an effect is likely. Given that US executives are delegated economic authority
(Haggard and McCubbins 2001) and similar delegation is found elsewhere (Huber 1992; Borghetto
2018), executives have the ability to singlehandedly impact economic globalization. However, the
exact nature of the effect will depend on the ideology of the executive.
I focus on liberalism, as it is central in previous globalization scholarship (Ruggie 1982;
Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009), as embracing liberalism often predisposes an actor to
increase globalization. I argue a similar effect can be found in when an executive embraces
liberalism. A liberal executive can ensure continued economic globalization by pursuing liberal
policy internationally, and he is generally successful (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; Pelc 2013).
This ensures a status quo of continued economic globalization, as economic performance is also
linked to executive electoral fate (Nordhaus 1975; Hibbs 2000; Heckelman 2001). This allows
economic globalization to increase, and certainly does not cause it to decrease.94 So, the rate of
change in economic globalization increases when a due to the status quo bias generated by the
liberal chief executive is in office. Given this, the presence of a liberal executive will affect the
growth rate of economic globalization positively. This leads to my second hypothesis regarding the
relationship between liberal executives and economic globalization;
Hypothesis #2: A liberal executive causes economic globalization to increase at a faster rate

The major exception here is protectionist policy that is justified on moral grounds (Meier 1999). This includes deviant
goods such as illegal drugs (Seddon 2008), and deviant services such as prostitution (Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber
2011). However, these policies tend to be highly ineffective (Gershuny 1979). Some antidotal evidence does suggest that
various countries are aware of this (Sapara 2018; Haak 2018; Hughes and Howard 2019).
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Data and Methods
The dataset employed here is the same one discussed in previous chapters. This dataset is a
TSCS dataset of OECD members from 1970 to 2015, excluding Chile, Mexico, and South Korea.95
The unit of analysis employed here is a country/year dyad (France in 1970 for example).96 For a
more detailed discussion of my data, please refer to the Data and Methods Chapter.
The first dependent variable in my analysis is the KOF economic globalization index.
This variable is a 1-100 scale of how economically globalized a country is each year. For example,
Canada had a score of 53.3 in 1970 and a score of 58.3 in 1980. The KOF economic globalization
index is composed of 14 indicators of economic globalization.97 These indicators are summarized in
Table 13, below.

These countries are excluded due to the lack of veto player data. The US is only included in count models, as no
compatible ideological range data exists, and conversion has proved impossible (J. B. Lewis et al. 2019).
96 Other units of analysis are not possible due to data restrictions.
97 A subset of these economic globalization indicators are sometimes referred to as ‘financial globalization’ (Tobin 2000;
Stulz 2005; Schmukler and Vesperoni 2006; Azzimonti, Francisco, and Quadrini 2014). The KOF data has a variable of
this type of globalization, but as this project is focused on the three theoretically agreed upon dimensions of
globalization (Keohane 2002; Dreher 2006a), the measure of economic globalization (which includes all financial
globalization indicators) was selected instead.
95
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Table 13. Components of Economic Globalization
Trade in Goods (Sum of exports and imports in goods as a share of GDP)
Trade in Services (Sum of exports and imports in services as share of GDP)
Trade partner diversification (Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index)
Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP)
Foreign Portfolio Investment (% of GDP)
International Debt (% of GDP)
International Reserves (% of GDP)
International income payments (% of GDP)
Trade Regulations (Average of prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers and compliance costs of importing and
exporting)
Trade Taxes (income from taxes on international trade as % of revenue)
Tariffs (Unweighted mean of tariff rates)
Prevalence of foreign ownership and regulations to international capital flows
Chinn-Ito index of financial openness
Jahan-Wang index of openness of the capital account
Source: (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018)

The indicators in Table 13 are oft employed. Two examples include trade in goods/services
(c.f. Garrett 1998; Ha 2008; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) 98 and capital account openness (c.f.
Hays 2009). By aggregating these variables together appropriately via factor analysis (Lockwood
2001; T. M. Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Heshmati 2003; Vujakovic 2009), the KOF economic
globalization index better reflects previous work on globalizations multidimensionality (Eichengreen
and Leblang 2008). This is why the KOF economic globalization index is viewed as the gold

It is important to keep in mind, that the two variables, trade in goods and trade in services, are equivalent to trade
openness. Both indicators are constructed as trade over Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and when added together,
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
become trade openness. This is simple addition with fractions, such that;
+
=
=
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 . This is because the denominator, GDP, is common across both fractions and one simply adds
together the numerators, then reduces the fraction to create a trade openness variable.
98
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standard (Dreher et al. 2010; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). For this reason and others discussed in
the Data and Methods Chapter, it is employed here.
The second dependent variable in my analysis is the lagged rate of change in economic
globalization. This variable is coded as the current year’s KOF economic globalization value minus
the previous year’s value (t2 - t1 = rate of change). This results in the rate of change from year to
year, for each country in my data. The first value of each country’s panel is treated as missing (1970),
as no rate can be calculated for that year. This variable is calculated using the KOF economic
globalization index.
The first independent variable of interest is the ideological range of the veto players. This
variable is operationalized as suggested by Tsebelis (2002). Each party in government is assigned an
ideological score. I then subtract the ideological scores of the parties from each other to create an
ideological range (right most – left most = range). The resulting number represents the size of the
veto player problem that year. The alternative operationalization of veto players, a count of the
number of parties in government, is employed as a robustness check.
I use the ParlGov dataset to obtain the needed ideological position data for each political
party (Doring and Manow 2019). While alternative data sources are available, these data would limit
my data to European countries after 1999 (Bakker et al. 2015). This excludes the bulk of market
liberal countries, which are different from corporatist European cases (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett
1998; Hays 2009). In addition, this is problematic, as the pace of economic globalization differs
between the era of globalizing markets (1960-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-2015)
(Garrett 1998). Thus, despite possible alternatives, it is essential to employ ParlGov over alternative
data sources. This is particularly relevant to the rate of change economic globalization models, as to
focus on only one period will bias these models.
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The second independent variable, and an economic globalization specific one, is the
presence of a liberal executive. In OECD democracies the executive retains some influence over
economic policy, due to the incentive to delegate (Huber 1992; Borghetto 2018; Epstein and
O’Halloran 1999) and informational asymmetry in foreign affairs. This provides defined institutional
advantage to executives whose liberal ideology mandates increased economic intervention. To
capture the presence of a liberal executive, I employ the Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
economic orientation variable (T. Beck et al. 2000). This variable provides information on the party
of the executive, and if they embrace economic liberalism each year. The parties that are considered
liberal are as follows; communist, socialist, social democratic, and left-wing parties.99 If the party of
the executive is liberal in that year, it is coded as 1, a 0 otherwise. This captures the effect of a liberal
executive.
Another variable included in the economic globalization models is an era of globalizing
markets indicator. This controls for the different growth rates found in the era of globalizing
markets (1960-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-2015) respectively (Garrett 1998). With the
growth rate of the era of global markets being much larger. This systematic difference between the
two periods is driven by an explosion of market activity after 1989.100 To control for this difference,
I have constructed an indicator variable. All era of globalizing market years in my data (1970-1989)
are coded 1, all other years are coded 0.

At first glance, the inclusion of communist parties seems incorrect. However, due to the influence of institutional and
electoral inceptives, it is within reason to argue that most communist parties moderated to ensure electoral viability
(Sitter 2002; Sokhey and Yildirim 2013; Berman 2008; Sánchez-Cuenca 2004).
100 To justify the inclusion of this control variable commonly employed in the literature, a comparison of means test was
conducted to ensure that the Cold War period and the Post-Cold War period were in fact statistically different from each
other. The mean amount of economic globalization in the Cold War period is 54.5, while the mean value of the postCold War period is 69.3. According to the statistical test, reported in the appendix, this difference between the two
periods is statistically different from each other at the .05 level.
99
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I also control for European Union (EU) membership. Looking at the countries in my data, a
subset joins the EU over time. In addition, EU membership has specified economic effects on its
members. EU membership prevents protectionism and result in more open economies (Hanson
1998; Hermann 2007; Young 2004; 2007).101 To control for this effect on economic globalization, an
EU membership indicator variable was constructed using the dates of entry from the EU’s
website.102 This variable is coded 1 for all years that a country is a member, a 0 otherwise.
According to the literature (Lupu 2015; Davis and Pratt 2017), cooperation has the ability to
effect a variety of outcomes. Countries learn across cooperative agreements (Koremenos 2001;
Cottrell 2017), which reduces uncertainty (Koremenos 2016). However, which type of cooperation
this effect originates from (security and/or economic) is disputed. There are two causal arguments in
this regard. First, that economic cooperation reduces the costs of later cooperation (Lupu 2015).
This effect could impact how economic globalization changes over time, by increasing it post
cooperation. To control for this effect, I control for the number of trade agreements signed each
year. To construct this variable, I use the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) dataset (Dur,
Baccini, and Elsig 2014). Second, others claim that security cooperation has a similar effect (Davis
and Pratt 2017) which would also increase economic globalization. To control for this effect, I
control for the number of security agreements signed in a given year.103 This data is drawn from the
Continent of International Law (COIL) dataset (Koremenos 2013).
Regardless of issue area, international agreements are subject to a time ordering problem. It
takes time for an agreement to enter into force (Fearon 1998; Von Stein 2005). To solve this time

This effect is uneven however, as social trade policy (welfare) (Young 2004; 2007) is unaffected.
The membership entry dates can be found at the following link; https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/countries_en#tab-0-1
103 Unlike economic agreements, security agreements are rather rare. Thus, there are less instances of security
cooperation in my data. However, there is significant variation in who the signatories of these agreements are.
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ordering problem, the average time between the signature date and the entry into force date was
calculated for each dataset. Then both variables were lagged by that amount of time. For both
datasets (DESTA and COIL), this was one year (Koremenos 2013; Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014).
Both variables are lagged by this interval to solve this time ordering problem.104 Thus, the number of
trade or security agreements signed in 1971 is controlled for in 1970, etc.
I control for corporatism, as it is consistently employed in the literature (Katzenstein 1985;
Garrett 1998; Hays 2009 are just a few examples). These countries tend to be more globalized than
others, and it stands to reason that this effect may also apply to the economic dimension.
Corporatism strengthens the compromise of embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982; 2003; Abdelal and
Ruggie 2009), enabling more open markets. To control for this effect, I employ an indicator variable
for corporatism. Corporatist countries are coded as 1, all others 0.105
Next I control for incoherent countries. These countries typically exhibit a moderate amount
of globalization, being more globalized than market liberal countries (my referent category).
Incoherent countries thus represent the compromise of embedded liberalism, but to a lesser degree
(Garrett 1998; Hays 2009).106 It stands to reason that this logic may be generalizable to the economic
dimension of globalization. If so, this effect will need to be controlled for in the economic
globalization model. To control for this difference, an indicator variable was created. Incoherent
countries are coded 1, a 0 otherwise.

The entry into force date was considered for use here. However, upon closer inspection, many of the entry into force
dates reported in both data sets were subject to variation. This variation is not reported in the dataset. Certain signatories
were already bound by the treaty, while others were not. The exact reason that these dates vary is unknown. This
inconsistency is not found in the signature date, where a state party either signs or does not. I therefore approximate the
entry into force date, by averaging the interval between the signature date and the entry into force date across the entire
dataset. Further research is warranted to delve into this inconsistency regarding the entry into force date.
105 Who exactly is considered corporatist is disputed. See the Data and Methods chapter for a more detailed discussion.
106 One group here that is noted in the literature is statist countries, with state-run economies. Examples often include
France and Japan. However, as this group is often dubbed incoherent, as they are not truly corporatist and not truly
market liberal, I treat these states as incoherent. This is due to the distinctiveness of statist countries has been less
emphasized in the literature over the last several decades (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998).
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According to Rosendorff and Sandler (2005), the global economy suffered a shock caused by
the September 11th terrorist attacks. This resulted in a worldwide economic downturn. This shock
poses a problem for economic globalization. Statistical tests for temporal (year) specific effects
reveal that the summed residuals and variance ratios are above the threshold that is acceptable (two
times the mean of the dependent variable) in 2002. Thus, 2002 is markedly different from other
years in my data (Stimson 1985).107 Intuitively, this makes sense, as the 9/11 attacks occurred late in
2001, and their impact would not become apparent until 2002 when new economic data was
published.108 Given the statistical test, a temporal effect exists in the economic globalization data that
is not found in other dimensions of globalization and merits a dimension specific control. Thus, the
9/11 attacks significantly impacted economic globalization. To control for this effect, a year specific
indicator variable was created. The year 2002, is coded 1, all other years are coded 0.
Specific to economic globalization, I also control for ‘peak oil’ (Curtis 2009). It is argued that
oil prices and economic globalization co-vary, with oil acting as a cap on economic globalization.
This dependency is referred to as peak oil. There is some evidence of this, as the price of oil has
increased alongside economic globalization for a significant portion of my data. Therefore, I control
for this possible effect on economic globalization. I include the average price of bent crude per year
to operationalize this effect. This variable is coded as a US dollar value (for example $37.89 in 1980).
The data used to construct this variable is taken from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
International Financial Statistics database, found on the IMF’s website.109 Due to data limitations,
the average price of crude oil is only available from 1980 onwards (International Monetary Fund
2019). All years prior to 1980 are coded as missing values.

The test that is referred to is showcased in the Appendix.
This particular example again showcases why annual measurement of data can be problematic (Stimson 1985), but as
already discussed, the data is not available in any other format (quarterly, monthly, weekly, etc.)
109 https://www.imf.org/en/Data
107
108
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Lastly, I include a lagged economic globalization variable. This variable is included to deal
with autocorrelation in my data (N. Beck and Katz 1995).110 This variable is coded the same as the
dependent variable, a 1-100 score of economic globalization in that year. However, the first year of
each countries panel coded as missing (1970) and that year’s value is controlled for in the subsequent
year (1970 is controlled for in 1971, etc.).
All variables discussed above are summarized below in Table 14. This table displays
summary statistics for all variables included in the economic globalization models.

Table 14. Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Variance

Minimum

Maximum

Economic Globalization

63.49044

15.26204

232.9298

24.04153

93.58852

Ideological Range

1.783273

1.783266

3.180038

0

7.5

Liberal Executive

.1827031

.3864953

.1493786

0

1

Cold War

.4347826

.4958782

.2458952

0

1

EU Membership

.3979469

.4896222

.2397299

0

1

Lag of the # of Trade
Agreements

1.423457

2.681291

7.18932

0

31

Lag of the # of Security
Agreements

.0922559

.3408023

.1161462

0

4

Corporatism

.1944444

.395892

.1567304

0

1

Incoherent

.1672705

.37333

.1393753

0

1

2002 Indicator Variable

.0217391

.1458746

.0212794

0

1

Average Price of Crude

41.74562

30.72082

943.7688

12.71917

111.9596

Lagged Economic
Globalization

63.22061

15.27933

233.458

24.04153

93.58852

Lagged Econ Globalization
Rate

.5906051

1.774542

3.149001

-9.88561

12.19201

110

For a more detailed discussion of why this variable is included, please refer to the Data and Methods Chapter.
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I employ PCSE regression as my chosen estimator. Other alternative estimators are inferior
to PCSE due to producing biased standard errors (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). The
PCSE model is specified as suggested. I include a lagged economic globalization variable (discussed
above). In addition, the model is specified to assume an autoregressive factor of one process (AR1)
is present in the data. When the PCSE estimator is specified in this manner, it reports the most
accurate standard errors. The PCSE regression model equations are showcased below in Equation 2
and 3.111 Equation 2 includes all variables in models 1 and 2. Equation 3 includes all variables in
models 3 and 4.

Equation 2. Economic Globalization Model 1 and 2
𝐾𝑂𝐹 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑟2 + 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝3 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠4
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠5 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚6 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡7 + 2002 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟8
+ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙9 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛10 + 𝜀

Equation 3. Economic Globalization Model 3 and 4
𝐾𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒1 + 𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟2 + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑟3 + 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝4
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠5 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠6 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚7
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡8 + 2002 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟9 + 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙10 + 𝜀

See the Data and Methods Chapter for a more detailed discussion of PCSE. For a detailed discussion of the
procedure used to calculate the PCSE’s, I highly recommend Beck and Katz’s work (1995), as well as work by the Stata
Corporation (2012).
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Model Results
This section will discuss the results of the PCSE estimator. I estimate four models. The first
two models include economic globalization and both operationalizations of veto players (ideological
range and count). These models test my first hypothesis regarding the effect of veto players on
economic globalization. Models 3 and 4 use a rate of change economic globalization dependent
variable and both veto player measures (ideological range and count respectively). Models 3 and 4
test my second hypothesis about the effect of a liberal executive on economic globalization’s rate of
change. I will discuss all models, but primarily focus on the ideological range model(s), as this
operationalization of veto players is more appropriate, due to decreased measurement error. To
reiterate, my hypotheses are; that veto players have no effect on economic globalization, and that a
liberal executive increases economic globalization. The results of the economic globalization models
are reported below in Table 15.
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Table 15. Economic Globalization Model Results (1-4)
Variable

Model 1:
Range

Model 2: Count

Economic
Globalization
Ideological Range

Model 3: Rate of
Change

Rate of Change
.005

-.10

(0.04)

(0.04)

Veto Player Count

.064

.211*

.056

(0.04)

(0.11)

(0.05)

.214*

.240**

(0.11)

(0.11)

Liberal Executive

Cold War

EU Membership

# of Trade
Agreements
# of Security
Agreements
Corporatism

Incoherent

2002 Indicator

Crude Oil Price

Lagged Dep. Var.

Constant

R Squared
N

Model 4:
Rate of
Change

-.616*

-.584*

-.41

-.39

(0.34)

(0.34)

(0.41)

(0.39)

0.307*

0.331**

-.054

-.024

(0.17)

(0.16)

(0.12)

(0.12)

.041

.042

.023

.024

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.04)

-.228

-.240

-.118

-.138

(0.29)

(0.29)

(0.33)

(0.33)

.122

.107

-.218**

-.252***

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.09)

(0.08)

-.162

-.150

.028

.043

(0.15)

(0.15)

(0.16)

(0.15)

-2.313**

-2.305**

-2.608**

-2.588**

(0.84)

(0.86)

(1.18)

(1.13)

-.009*

-.009*

-.014**

-.014**

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.01)

.965***

.964***

(0.01)

(0.01)

3.403***

3.248***

1.319***

1.119***

(0.68)

(0.68)

(0.39)

(0.36)

.981

.981

.117

.118

1053.0

1090.0

971

1008

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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Looking at Table 15, the ideological range (and count) of the veto players is not related to
economic globalization. This relationship is not significant at any level. Thus, my hypothesis
regarding veto players can be tentatively retained. The size of the veto player problem appears to
have no effect on economic globalization. This result is robust across both operationalizations of
economic globalization and veto players. This relationship can also be explored graphically. The
fitted values of economic globalization are plotted against the ideological range of the veto players.
This is presented below in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Plot of Ideological Range and Economic Globalization

Looking at Figure 4, it is apparent that there is no systematic relationship between the
ideological range of the veto players and economic globalization. The existence of a flat trend line
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and wide confidence intervals are indicative of this. The implications of this are quite important.
This is contrary to previous work that shows economic globalization is related to political
phenomena (Crepaz 2001a; Crepaz and Moser 2004; Ha 2008). However, I contend that this
findings is consistent with embedded liberalism (c.f. Hays 2009).
I argue that previous work that found a relationship between veto players (a political
variable) and economic globalization is the poster child for why globalization should be treated as a
complex and multidimensional concept. The reason my findings are so different from previous is
because past work is, in the words of Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang, “…a figment of the
particular aspect of globalization on which the investigators focus…” (Eichengreen and Leblang
2008, 319) and are attributable to the uni-dimensional globalization framework these authors
employed. If past work had employed a multidimensional globalization framework, their results would
have likely been more in line with my own. As they would have employed an entirely different
operationalization of globalization (political globalization) in their models, which would have been
more closely related to their political dependent variable (welfare).
Additionally, if embedded liberalism is to be believed (Ruggie 1982; Abdelal and Ruggie
2009), the fact that veto players and economic globalization are not related to each other is not
surprising. If liberalism is truly embedded, then it can be argued that all veto players in systems
where liberalism is embedded, share a common preference; liberal economic policy. When this
shared preference is combined with the delegation of economic policy authority in most systems
(Huber 1992; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Borghetto 2018), veto players are unlikely to affect
economic globalization. This is because they strategically delegated authority over it to another
institutional actor, so that they can concentrate on other matters that require their scarce cognitive
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resources. Thus, veto players do not affect economic globalization. This finding will be expanded
upon in the next section.
The second variable in the model is the presence of a liberal executive. According to Model
3, this result is statistically significant and of the predicted sign. Given this result, a liberal executive
has a significant impact, by increasing the rate of change in economic globalization. With a liberal
executive in power, economic globalization will continue to increase at a much faster rate than when
a non-liberal is in power. This appears to indicate that economic globalization is a plank of a liberal
agenda. This contextualizes previous arguments (Hays 2009 for example). And outlines predictions
of when protectionist policy should result (when the executive is illiberal).
The next variable in the model is the Cold War variable. This relationship is significant at the
.1 level, which is weaker than expected, but still of the predicted sign (negative).This finding is
consistent with previous work (Garrett 1998), and is evidence that there is a difference between the
Cold War/era of globalizing markets and later years for economic globalization. The weakness of
this finding, however, is striking. This lends credibility to my argument that separating globalization
into its dimensions is extremely important.
The third variable in the model is the EU membership variable. This variable is a significant
predictor of economic globalization in both models and of the predicted sign. This result is
consistent with previous work on the EU (Hanson 1998; Hermann 2007; Young 2004; 2007). When
a country joins the EU, many domestic controls over economic policy are removed, allowing
economic globalization to increase. This explains why EU members tend to be more economically
globalized than non-members.
The fourth variable in the model is the lagged number of trade agreements signed each year.
Despite arguments that this variable impacts economic globalization (Lupu 2015), there is little
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evidence in my models to support of this. The trade agreements variable is not significant and any
level. Thus, the signing of a trade agreement by a country has no effect on how economically
globalized it is. This is even when the effect is lagged to correct for the time ordering problem
(Fearon 1998; von Stein 2005). This is consistent with my theory, in that institutions do not impact
economic globalization. However, it also indicates that some actions favored by liberals may be
ineffective.
The fifth variable in the model is the lagged number of security agreements a country signed.
Like the trade agreements variable, it is also not statistically significant. Security cooperation, despite
contrary arguments (Davis and Pratt 2017) does not result in a country becoming more economically
globalized. The performance of this variable shows that economic globalization is not increased by a
security treaty providing less uncertainty. This finding indicates that economic globalization is not
affected by one form of power politics.
The next variable included in the economic globalization model is corporatism. Despite
claims to its relevance in previous work (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009), corporatism is
not significant in model 1 and 2, even at the .1 level. In model 3 and 4, it performs the opposite of
expectations, and decreases the rate of change to economic globalization. This is a rather large pill to
swallow, but, given the argument here, it is quite logical. With liberalism’s high popularity (Ruggie
2003; Ehrlich and Hearn 2014), the appeal of liberalism is constant, regardless of corporatist
structure. What corporatism does allow for is the adjustment to the implications of economic
globalization, it does not affect the phenomena itself. This finding regarding economic globalization
fits with opinion research on globalization (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005; Ehrlich 2010; Ehrlich and
Hearn 2014). Thus, strategic politicians select the policy label that suits their own needs (free trade
instead of globalization) (Kono 2006). The main difference between corporatist countries and
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others, is they pass policy to quiet discontent after becoming economically globalized, others do not.
This fits with scholarship on globalizations effect on the welfare state (Crepaz 2001b; Crepaz and
Moser 2004; Ha 2008), where the implication is welfare effects after globalization occurs.
The next variable in the model is an indicator variable for incoherentism. Much like the
corporatist variable, it is also not significant. Thus, incoherent countries are no more economically
globalized than market liberal ones. With incoherent countries having some corporatist tendencies,
this is further evidence that corporatism, and varying shades of it, do not affect economic
globalization. This is likely due to informational asymmetry and the power of the electoral incentive,
which forces democratic politicians to relentlessly pursue economic globalization, regardless of
domestic preferences (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992; Kono 2006).
The next variable included in the economic globalization model is an indicator for the 2002
year-specific effect. This variable is significant at the .05 level, and of the predicted sign. According
to the results, 2002 is on average less economically globalized than other years. Thus, the 9/11
attacks had a significant negative impact on economic globalization. This dimension specific
indicator also showcases that economic globalization is systematically different from the other
dimensions. As no other dimension of globalization has a 2002 year-specific effect.
Also included in the economic globalization model is the price of crude oil. The argument
that ‘peak oil’ and globalization covary (Curtis 2009), is marginally supported here. The price of
crude is significant at the .1 level, and of the predicted sign. However, substantively, the effect is
small. As crude oil price increases, economic globalization decreases only slightly. Thus,
substantively, I argue that this effect is not as significant as previous authors claim. This indicates
that peak oil’s effect is a weak statistical reality. How this relationship will change in the future is
uncertain.
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The last variable in model 1 and 2 is the lagged economic globalization variable.112 This
variable was included for statistical reasons (N. Beck and Katz 1995), and performs as expected. It
combats the autocorrelation present in the model, as its inclusion decreases the rho value of both
models.113 When this variable is included, the rho value decreases from .848 to .0189 (in the
ideological range model) with higher values indicative of autocorrelation.114
Given these results, the ideological range of the veto players does not affect economic
globalization. I contend that this result can be explained by the widespread acceptance of liberalism
by most of the veto players in democratic systems. This, combined with the electoral returns that
liberalism provides, seem to explain why veto players do not play their usual role of slowing change.
The presence of a liberal executive, however, affects the rate of change in economic globalization.
The presence of a liberal executive causes the pace of economic globalization to become more
furious, as a liberal ideology instructs the executive to push for more economic globalization. Given
the preponderance of power over economic affairs due to delegation (Epstein and O’Halloran
1999), a liberal executive having such an impact makes sense intuitively.

Conclusion
My findings suggest that, on average, a country with both EU membership and a liberal
executive would be the most economically globalized. A country with only EU membership, will be
the second most economically globalized. And, a country with only a liberal executive would be the
third most economically globalized. Lastly, a country without EU membership or a liberal executive

The inclusion of a similar variable in model 3 and 4 has no effect on the level of autocorrelation. This result is
corroborated by the Wooldridge test and a less formal rho comparison.
113 For a more detailed discussion of this, please refer to the Data and Methods Chapter.
114 See the Data and Methods chapter for further tests regarding autocorrelation in my data.
112
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will be the least economically globalized. This is exactly what my data shows. Looking at 2015,
Austria, a country with both EU membership and a liberal executive has an economic globalization
value of 81.36. Germany, an EU member without a liberal executive in 2015, has a value of 77.06.
The US, a country with only a liberal executive in 2015, has an economic globalization value of
63.83. And Australia, a country without EU membership or a liberal executive in 2015, has a value
of 63.53. Thus, the results of my economic globalization models can improve our understanding of
why certain countries exhibit certain amounts of economic globalization.
As of now, I have discussed why globalization must be disaggregated into its three primary
dimensions (political, economic, and social). I also sketched a theoretical relationship between veto
players and each dimension. In the Data and Methods chapter, I discussed the data and estimator
most appropriate to test for these theorized relationships. In the Political Globalization chapter, I
examined the first of these arguments. I found that as the veto player problem increases, political
globalization decreases. This result confirmed the first of my three theorized relationships. The
current chapter focuses on the second dimension of globalization; economic globalization.
In this chapter, I hypothesized two relationships, first that veto players and economic
globalization are not related and second that a liberal executive increases the rate of change for
economic globalization. Empirical tests reveal that these relationships are as expected; veto players
do not impact economic globalization and a liberal executive increases the rate at which economic
globalization increases. Also, EU membership is of critical import. When a country is a member of
the EU their economic globalization value increases when compared to non-members. Additionally,
corporatism does not behave as expected in several of my models, in fact returning the opposite of
what the literature would expect (a negative effect). These findings, taken together, show that
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economic globalization is a critical dimension of globalization and that to examine it separately is
critical.
The next chapter will discuss the social dimension of globalization. Much like this and the
previous chapter, I will test the relationship between veto players and social globalization, in addition
to the normative role played by liberal executives. To do this, I employ the data and methods
discussed in the Data and Methods Chapter. The social globalization chapter yields fascinating
results.
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Chapter 6: Social Globalization
Previously, I defined globalization and its dimensions (political, economic, and social). I
argued that each dimension has a different relationship with legislative veto players. I also argued
that the KOF globalization data and PCSE regression should be employed to test my argument. I
found, in the Political Globalization chapter, that veto players have a negative relationship with
political globalization. In the Economic Globalization chapter, I found that veto players and
economic globalization are not related, but the presence of a liberal executive is critical. This leaves
one final dimension of globalization to be examined; social globalization.
This chapter will analyze the relationship between veto players and social globalization. First,
I will briefly summarize by argument regarding how veto players impact social globalization. Then, I
will articulate my hypotheses regarding veto players and social globalization. Then, I will test these
hypotheses empirically, using the data and estimator discussed in the Data and Methods chapter.
Lastly, the results of the empirical investigation will be discussed in relation to my hypotheses.

Social Globalization Revisited
Social globalization is the, “…spread of ideas, people and images…” (Dreher 2006a, 1092).
As new ideas, people, and images interact, new norms emerge that ascribe meaning (Ruggie 1998).
These norms define the bounds of actors understanding (Ring 2014) and constitute social reality.
The resulting norms are maintained by collective agreement (Adler 1997), with a variety of actors
having a stake in the survival of certain norms. For example, the norm embedded liberalism (Ruggie
1982; Abdelal and Ruggie 2009) has defined stake holders in the form of elected officials who
benefit from economic growth (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992). I argue that some of the
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normative stake holders are veto players. Thus, a veto player may prefer the continuation of certain
norms (liberalism) and the erosion of others (protectionism). This is to ensure their preferred
outcome (economic growth) is achieved via normatively acceptable means (liberalism). Thus, veto
players seek to modify social reality to fit their own needs/understanding and influence how a given
norm develops or is modified.
However, the ideological range of the veto players is critical. According to Veto Player
Theory, as the distance between veto players increases, status quo bias also increases. This makes
veto players less able to act on a variety of levels (Hallerberg 2002; Witold J. Henisz and Mansfield
2006; Tsebelis 2002). Assuming this inaction extends into the ideational realm, this has profound
implications for social globalization. First, when veto players are distant, they are unable to promote
the spread of norms they agree with. This would for example, prevent the maintenance of
embedded liberalism. Second, as veto players become more distant, they are unable to prevent the
spread of norms they find disagreeable. When hamstrung by a veto player problem, a government
cannot intervene to derail norms, such as protectionism, which actively hurt veto players. Thus, the
spread of ideas and norms, a critical component of social globalization, is likely to be influenced by a
veto player problem. As the ideological range of the veto players increases, social globalization is
likely to benefit from less interference. This is due to the lack of a highly influential normative agent.
Thus, as social globalization increases, the ideological range of the veto players is likely to increase,
and certainly won’t decrease. This is restated formally as hypothesis one below.
Hypothesis #1: as the ideological range of the veto players increases, so does social globalization
However, social globalization does not operate in a vacuum. It is, “driven by a set of discrete
but intersecting logics…which operates simultaneously across several institutional domains” (Held
and McGrew 1993, 263–64). This is particularly relevant when discussing social globalization, as no
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institutional actor is precluded from interfering in normative space.115 However, certain actors are
likely to have a pronounced effect, due to their privileged institutional position. Of specific interest
to social globalization is the impact of the executive. Previous work points to the significance of
executive agenda controls (Tsebelis and Aleman 2005; Tsebelis and Rizova 2007) and normative
influence (Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008). I argue that executive normative agenda controls
influence social globalization. These agenda controls allow executives to begin a discussion about
social globalization and (in some systems) effect how it evolves over time. This is likely to influence
how social globalization evolves across time and space.116
Executive agenda controls come in two types; either informal or formal agenda powers.
Informal powers, such as going public (Kernell 2006) are available to all executives, providing a
potent tool to influence the agenda. By going public, the executive injects his policy position into the
normative discussion, which influences how the normative debate over social globalization evolves
over time. Previous work on going public supports this claim (D. Lewis 1997; Edwards and Wood
1999; Welch 2003; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008).117 Executives imbued with formal agenda
powers have greater agenda control. These formal powers give executives the ability to influence the
normative discussion as it develops over time. For example, an executive can reframe the discussion
by using an amendatory positive agenda power (Tsebelis and Aleman 2005). This influences the
evolution of social globalization over time, by reframing the discussion during the debate. This
provides defined formal institutional leverage over social globalization. When both informal and

Other dimensions, such as political globalization, are more isolated from the interference of other actors than social
globalization.
116 This line of reasoning is similar to the ones used by Tsebelis regarding the veto players concept (2002)
117 The effectiveness of going public does however vary based on issue area. I argue that social globalization issues are
affected when an executive goes public.
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formal powers are present, executives can both set the normative agenda initially and actively
influence a debate while still ongoing.
How these informal and formal agenda controls are used to effect social globalization
depends. I ague the ideology of the executive dictates if they impact social globalization positively or
negatively. I focus on one ideology, as it is of special interest in the social globalization context;
liberalism. Liberalism, loosely defined, is a cluster of ideologies that tend to be pro-market and/or
pro-free trade. Liberalism is central to previous globalization scholarship (Ruggie 1982; Katzenstein
1985; Garrett 1998; Hays 2009), as those who embrace it often want to increase aggregate
globalization. I argue a similar effect can be found in the social dimension, stemming from a liberal
executive.
Liberal executives tend to view social globalization as normatively ‘good.’ They seek to
promote it, by injecting norms into the ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Ballentine and Snyder 1996). They
also believe that this behavior is necessary, due to competition ensuring the ‘best’ idea prevails.
Thus, the way in which liberal executives impact social globalization is predictable given their
ideology. A liberal executive will attempt to increase social globalization, as this behavior is constructed
as both good and necessary. Thus, liberal executives will use their normative agenda powers to set an
agenda favorable to social globalization in the marketplace of ideas. Additionally, liberal executives
will (in some cases) influence the evolution of social globalization via formal agenda controls.
Together, these will cause an increase in normative activity, by igniting discussion. This discussion
will result in increased social globalization. Thus, a liberal executive should result in a noticeable
increase in social globalization. This is stated formally in hypothesis two;
Hypothesis #2: the presence of a liberal executive increases social globalization.
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Data and Methods
The dependent variable for the social globalization model is the KOF social globalization
index. This variable is constructed as a 1-100 index, with 1 indicating low social globalization, and
100 indicating high. This variable is currently the only composite measure of social globalization.118
This composite index is composed of 22 variables (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). These
component variables are summarized in Table 16, below.
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A more detailed discussion of this is found in the Data and Methods Chapter.
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Table 16. The Components of Social Globalization
International voice traffic (Sum of landline and mobile telephone traffic in minutes per capita)
Transfers (Sum of gross inflows and outflows of goods, services, income or financial items without a quid pro
quo per capita)
International tourism (Sum of arrivals and departures of international tourists as a % of the population)
Migration (Number of foreign or foreign-born residents as a % of the population)
Patent Applications (Patent applications by non-residents as a % of the population)
International students (Sum of inbound and outbound tertiary students as a % of the population)
High Technology Exports (Exports of products with a high R&D intensity as a % of total merchandise
exports)
Trade in Cultural Goods (Sum of exports and imports of cultural goods defined by UNESCO)
Trademark Applications (% of applications for trademarks by non-residents as a share of total applications)
Trade in Personal Services (Sum of exports and imports in personal services)
McDonald’s Restaurants per Capita
IKEA stores per capita
Telephone subscriptions (landline and mobile telephone subscriptions as a % of the population)
Freedom to Visit (% of states for which a state requires a visa from foreign visitors)
International airports (Number of airports that offer 1 or more international flights, per capita)
Television (% of households with a television)
Internet Users (% of the population)
Press Freedom (Numerical score evaluating press freedom)
Internet Bandwidth (Total capacity of international internet bandwidth in bits per second per capita)
Gender Parity (Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary education, including private schools)
Expenditure on Education (Government expenditures on education per capita)
Civil Freedom (Quantification of freedom of expression, belief, association, organization, rule of law, personal
autonomy, and individual rights)
Source: (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018)

The first independent variable of interest is veto players. This variable is operationalized as
the ideological range of the parties in government. Each party is assigned a value between 1 and 10
on a scale of liberalism (Doring and Manow 2019). Then, the right most party’s value is subtracted
from the left most (right most – left most = ideological range). This range proxies for the size of the
veto player problem (Tsebelis 2002). This range in calculated for each country/year dyad. The
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alternative operationalization of veto players, a count, is used as a robustness check. This is to
ensure my results are not driven by variable selection.
The data used to construct this variable is taken from the ParlGov cabinet dataset. This
dataset contains the needed ideological position/count data (Doring and Manow 2019). However,
the ParlGov data averages these scores from several sources to extend the time series. While this is a
weakness, I have chosen to forgo accuracy here to allow for the inclusion of more cases and years.
Alternative data sources exclude non-European market liberal cases and only contain data from one
period of globalization (1990-2015) (Bakker et al. 2015; “The Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems” 2020). This excludes systematically different cases (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009) and years.
These factors could significantly bias my results. Thus, the ParlGov data was selected to be used
here.
The second independent variable of interest is the presence of a liberal executive. A liberal
executive impacts the evolution of the norms that compose social globalization. Via agenda setting
powers, liberal executives cause increased normative competition and increase social globalization.
This normative influence is critical and should result in increased social globalization (regardless of
executive stance on the norm). To operationalize the presence of a liberal executive, I employ the
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) economic orientation variable (T. Beck et al. 2000). This
variable indicates if the party of the executive embrace’s liberalism each year. The parties that are
considered liberal are as follows; communist, socialist, social democratic, and left-wing parties.119 If
the party of the executive is liberal each year, it is coded as 1, a 0 otherwise.

At first glance, the inclusion of communist parties seems incorrect. However, due to the influence of institutional and
electoral incentives, it is within reason to argue that most communist parties moderated to ensure electoral viability
(Sitter 2002; Sokhey and Yildirim 2013; Berman 2008; Sánchez-Cuenca 2004).
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I also include an era of globalizing markets variable. Prior work on globalization has
identified the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of global markets (1990-2015) as
substantially different (Garrett 1998). Each era’s slope is markedly different, with the era of
globalizing markets having a much shallower slope. Controlling for this difference is of paramount
importance, as global norms were no longer restrained by the iron curtain. To control for the effect
of the era of globalizing markets on social globalization, I created an indicator variable using 1989 as
the cutoff point. Thus, 1970 to 1989 are coded as 1, all other years are coded 0.
Most OECD member states in my data are members of the European Union (EU). The
literature indicates that EU membership may affect how individuals interact with ideas (Checkel
2001; Manners 2002). This is shaped through a variety of processes, but most obviously by the
notion of ‘European citizenship’. Additional examples of EU membership social effects are found in
social trade policy, such as labor and environmental standards (Young 2007). In these areas, EU
members tend to be substantively different from non-members. Thus, EU membership will need to
be controlled for. To control for EU membership, I created an indicator variable. If a country is a
member of the EU in that year it is coded 1, otherwise 0.120
In the literature, certain types of agreements facilitate later cooperation (Lupu 2015; Davis
and Pratt 2017). This is due to cooperation becoming less costly in time B, due to cooperation in
time A. For example, a trade agreement might lead to increased cultural penetration via trade in
cultural goods. Or, a security agreement could facilitate the same process, as ideas are passed from
one country to another during negotiation and compliance (Fearon 1998; von Stein 2005). The

This variable was constructed using the membership entry dates on the EU’s website. See the Data and Methods
Chapter for a more detailed discussion.
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literature is divided however, on which type of agreement, economic or security, causes the decrease
in uncertainty. To be safe, I control for both effects.
First, I control for the number of trade agreements signed by a country each year. The data
used to construct this variable is drawn from the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) dataset
(Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). Second, I control for the number of security agreements signed by a
country each year. This variable is drawn from the Continent of International Law (COIL) dataset
(Koremenos 2013). This variable takes on the number of security agreements signed by a country
per year. However, to simply include both variables is problematic. Agreements take time to enter
into force (Fearon 1998). Therefore, I lag both variables by the average number of years it takes to
enter into force (one year). This coding scheme corrects for a time ordering problem.121
The longest standing variable in globalization research is corporatism (Katzenstein 1985).
Corporatist countries tend to be more globalized than other countries (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009).
This is due to corporatist countries epitomizing the compromise of embedded liberalism (Ruggie
1982; 2003; Abdelal and Ruggie 2009). This allows continued aggregate globalization, but the question
remains if this also affects social globalization. Therefore, I control for this effect. I operationalize
corporatism as an indicator variable. All corporatist countries are coded 1, others are coded 0.122
I also control for incoherent countries as well. These countries exhibit imperfect corporatist
tendencies (Garrett 1998), as the strength of the compromise of embedded liberalism is less. Thus,
like corporatist countries, incoherent states tend to be slightly more globalized than other countries.

The entry into force date was considered for use here. However, upon closer inspection, many of the entry into force
dates reported in both data sets were subject to variation. This variation is not reported in the dataset. Certain signatories
were already bound by the treaty, while others were not. The exact reason that these dates vary is unknown. This
inconsistency is not found in the signature date, where a state party either signs or does not. I therefore approximate the
entry into force date, by averaging the interval between the signature date and the entry into force date across the entire
dataset. Further research is warranted to delve into this inconsistency regarding the entry into force date.
122 See chapter 3 for a list of who is and is not considered corporatist in my data.
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To control for this possible effect, I employ an indicator variable for incoherent countries. I code all
incoherent countries 1, 0 otherwise. Market liberal countries are therefore the referent category for
the social globalization model.123
Another control variable is the major power variable. Previous work has argued that the
concept of hegemony (loosely defined) can extend to the normative realm (Manners 2002; Diez
2005; 2013). This hegemonic influence would allow a major power, such as the United States, to
have a disproportionate influence on how norms develop over time. This would in turn affect social
globalization. To control for this effect, I employ the Correlates of War dataset on state system
membership (2017). If a country is a major power each year, they are coded as 1, a 0 otherwise. The
following countries are considered major powers in my data: United States, United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Austria.
The final control in the social globalization model is the lagged social globalization variable.
This variable is coded the same as the dependent variable (1-100 index). The only difference is that
the first value of each panel (1970) is coded as missing. All subsequent values are the previous year’s
value. I therefore control for 1970’s social globalization in 1971, etc. This variable is included to deal
with the autocorrelation present in my data (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001).124
The dependent and independent variables are summarized below in Table 17, below. This
table provides summary statistics on each variable included in the social globalization model.
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For a more detailed discussion of incoherent countries, please refer to chapter 3.
For the results of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data, please refer to chapter 3.
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Table 17. Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Variance

Minimum

Maximum

Social Globalization

70.52212

12.54093

157.2748

34.94569

90.73035

Ideological Range

1.783273

1.783266

3.180038

0

7.5

Liberal Executive

.1827031

.3864953

.1493786

0

1

Cold War

.4347826

.4958782

.2458952

0

1

EU Membership

.3979469

.4896222

.2397299

0

1

Lag of the # of Trade
Agreements

1.423457

2.681291

7.18932

0

31

Lag of the # of Security
Agreements

.0922559

.3408023

.1161462

0

4

Corporatism

.1944444

.395892

.1567304

0

1

Incoherent

.1672705

.37333

.1393753

0

1

Major Power

.0435744

.2041784

.0416888

0

1

Lagged Social Globalization
Variable

70.25501

12.53564

157.1423

34.94569

90.73035

I employ PCSE regression here, as it is the only model that reports unbiased standard errors.
For example, comparable models standard errors tend to be 50% to 300% smaller (N. Beck and
Katz 1995). To deal with any autocorrelation in the PCSE model, I employ the two suggested
specifications in the TSCS literature. First, I include a lagged dependent variable (discussed above).
Second, PCSE models should be specified to assume an autoregressive factor 1 process (AR1) is
present in the data (Stata 2012). I employ both specifications in the social globalization model as
recommended. The PCSE model equation is showcased below in Equation 4.
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Equation 4. Social Globalization Model
𝐾𝑂𝐹 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑎𝑟2 + 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝3 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠4
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠5 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚6 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡7 + 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒8
+ 𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟9 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛10 + 𝜀

Model Results
The social globalization model tests my hypothesis noted previously, regarding the
relationship between veto players and social globalization. To reiterate, I argue that as the ideological
range of the veto players increases, so should social globalization. And, that the presence of a liberal
executive should also increase social globalization. The model results are reported in Table 18,
below. Table 18 showcases the PCSE model, using both operationalizations of veto players
(ideological range and count).
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Table 18. Social Globalization Model Results
Variable

PCSE w/ Ideological Range

PCSE w/ Count

Social Globalization
Ideological Range

.027+
(0.01)

Count

.017
(0.02)

Liberal Executive

.087+

.068

(0.05)

(0.05)

Cold War

-.503***

-.478***

(0.05)

(0.05)

EU Membership

-.119***

-.105***

(0.03)

(0.03)

# of Trade Agreements

.022+

.023**

(0.01)

(0.01)

# of Security Agreements

.154+

.116

(0.09)

(0.08)

.025

.032

Corporatism

(0.09)

(0.09)

-.147**

-.140**

(0.05)

(0.06)

Major Power

.172***

.057

(0.06)

(0.09)

Lagged Dep. Var.

.964***

.965***

(0.01)

(0.01)

3.286***

3.314***

Incoherent

Constant

(0.38)

(0.40)

R Squared125

0.989

0.989

N

1077

1119126

+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

This high value is indicative of autocorrelation, which the Wooldridge test identified (Wooldridge 2001; Drukker
2003). I have dealt with this problem as is common in the literature (N. Beck and Katz 1995).
126 Differences in the N size are due to the lack of compatible ideological position data on the US case. Despite my best
efforts, conversion to the 1-10 scale was not possible.
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Looking at Table 18, ideological range is marginally significant at the .1 level. It also has the
predicted sign (positive). This shows modest support for the hypothesized relationship between veto
players and social globalization. These results suggest that norms spread faster without veto player
interference. This relationship is likely driven by the underlying logic of veto player effects. When
the ideological range of the veto players increases, their ability to interfere in any policy area,
including those in the idea phase, which are contained within the social globalization concept, is
reduced. The relationship between veto players and social globalization can also be explored
graphically. Figure 5 showcases a graphical representation of the relationship between ideological
range and social globalization. This figure is presented below.

Figure 5. Plot of Ideological Range and Social Globalization
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Looking at Figure 5, a similar relationship as previously discussed is showcased. As the
ideological range of the veto players increases, so does social globalization. In addition, this
relationship holds at much the same power, until the ideological range of the veto players exceeds 4.
Past this point, the confidence intervals begin to widen rapidly. The caveat regarding the relationship
between veto players and social globalization, is that it is significant at the 90 percent level. This
indicates that the relationship should not be discounted, but also must be interpreted with a grain of
salt. Considering this finding in the context of my argument, the relationship between veto players
and social globalization is weak but present.
The presence of a liberal executive also effects social globalization. On average, as social
globalization increases, the likelihood that the executive embraces liberalism increases. This
relationship is marginally significant at the .1 level (it is insignificant in the count model). This shows
modest support for the idea that an executive can influence norms and ideas. This is consistent with
previous research (D. Lewis 1997; Welch 2003), however, it extends the argument to a broader set
of social policies than previously. This relationship can also be explored graphically. Figure 6
showcases the relationship between social globalization and the presence of a liberal executive. This
figure is presented below.
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Figure 6: Plot of Liberal Executive and Social Globalization

Looking at Figure 6, the relationship is indeed positive, as seen in Table 18. This indicates,
again, modest support for hypothesis two. When a country transitions from an executive who does
not embrace liberalism to one who does, there is a marginal increase in its social globalization.
However, this finding should be interpreted with care. The exact details of how a liberal chief
executive increases social globalization is something for future qualitative work to explore.
The next variable in the model is the Cold War/era of globalizing markets indicator. This
variable is highly significant, which is consistent with prior work by Geoffrey Garrett (1998). On
average, Cold War years tend to be less socially globalized than post-Cold War years. This
relationship is significant at the .01 level. Thus, social globalization, like aggregate globalization, can
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also be bifurcated into the era of globalizing markets (1970-1989) and the era of global markets
(1990-2015). This indicates that ideas and images spread more rapidly after the end of the bi-polar
world order. This lends credibility to the study of social globalization post-1990, as its relevance
appears to have grown.
The EU membership variable is also significant in the model. This relationship is significant
at the .01 level. It is also of the predicted sign, in line with previous work (Young 2004; 2007). This
indicates that the level of social globalization is affected by EU membership. This result supports the
idea that EU members have been successful at isolating themselves from global social influences.
This is consistent with the spirit of previous work (Checkel 2001), which argues that EU
membership has influenced the spread of ideas. My findings contextualize this argument and show
that EU membership decreases the spread of global ideas. This warrants further testing, as my
findings are important to understanding social globalization in relation to the EU and other
international institutions.
Trade agreements also affect social globalization. This relationship is significant at the .1
level (.05 in the count model). The direction of the relationship is also positive, indicating that
previous work on international agreements affects social globalization (Lupu 2015). This showcases
that economic cooperation does positively impact social globalization.127 When a trade agreement is
signed, in the following year, a signatory country will see a small increase in its social globalization
level. This effect is consistent across both models.

This is especially important given the high correlation between social globalization and economic globalization (above
.8). While the idea of controlling for economic globalization in the social globalization model was entertained, tests
showed that this was inappropriate. To include economic globalization in the model increases the collinearity to
unacceptable levels. Therefore, I elected to not include economic globalization as a control in the model.
127
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A similar result is also found for security agreements. This relationship is significant at the .1
level in the ideological range model (but not the count). It is also of the correct sign (positive) Thus,
security cooperation affects how socially globalized a country is. When a country signs a security
agreement, in the following year, it will experience an increase in its social globalization level. This is
consistent with previous arguments (Davis and Pratt 2017). Taken together, these two findings
indicate that various types of cooperation do affect social globalization. This does not rule out the
possible effects that other types of cooperation (human rights, etc.) may have on social globalization.
The next variable is corporatism. Regardless of model specification, corporatism is not a
significant predictor of social globalization. This is contrary to prior work, which argues that
corporatism is a significant predictor of aggregate globalization (Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998;
Hays 2009). I argue that previous work is not incorrect, but that their results were driven by
measuring globalization as unidimensional instead of multidimensional as is recommended (Held
and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002). This caused them to claim corporatist countries are more
globalized, when this finding is driven by an underlying dimension of globalization. My finding
regarding corporatism is consistent with recent work on globalization (Eichengreen and Leblang
2008), that stresses multidimensionality. This finding showcases why the argument that globalization
is multidimensional should be taken seriously in the literature.
Incoherent countries, according to both models, are less socially globalized. This relationship
is significant at the .05 level. It is however, of the opposite sign as conventional wisdom would
indicate (negative). The literature would argue that this finding should be the positive (Garrett 1998;
Hays 2009). An incoherent country should be more socially globalized than a market liberal country,
not less. This appears to be further evidence that measuring globalization correctly has profound
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implications. Further exploration of incoherent countries and their relationship to social
globalization is warranted.
As social globalization increases, the likelihood that a given country is a major power also
increases. This relationship is significant at the .05 level (it is not significant in the count model).
This result is consistent with previous work on normative hegemony (Manners 2002). This suggests
that the major powers in the international systems are also powerful normative hegemons. As the
relevance of social globalization is increasing over time, this is an interesting finding that merits
further work.
Lastly, the lagged social globalization variable is significant. This is to be expected based on
previous work (N. Beck and Katz 1995; N. Beck 2001). Previous chapters have discussed this
variable in more detail.128 However, the rho values of both models without this variable is
instructive. When the lagged social globalization variable is excluded, the rho value is .9 (for both
models). When this variable is included, this value drops to -.038 (in the ideological range model).
This is indicative of how well this variable mitigates autocorrelation.

Conclusion
Two overarching points can be taken away from my empirical examination of social
globalization. First, veto players attempt to influence social globalization, but are impeded by the
presence of a veto player problem. Second, when the executive embraces liberalism, social
globalization is furthered via the institutional powers of the office. Both findings paint a general
picture of social globalization.
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See the Data and Methods Chapter for a more detailed discussion of more sophisticated tests.
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Given that ideas and norms are fluid (Adler 1997) and ascribe meaning (Ruggie 1998), it is
rational that veto players would seek to influence global social norms. However, one glaring problem
hinders a veto player’s influence over social globalization; ideological distance. As the ideological
distance between the veto players in government increases, it becomes more difficult to successfully
intervene and trim the sails of social globalization. For example, a conservative veto player may
desire to reduce spending on education, which would expose children to new global ideas. However,
if another veto player is opposed to this idea, gridlock results. While the veto players engage in the
politics of gridlock, no single normative view is espoused. However, this does not stop the forces of
social globalization. In fact, this allows social globalization to flow more freely, unhindered by the
normative dam that is a single veto player.
When an executive embraces liberalism, they are ideologically directed to intervene in the
marketplace of ideas, as it is normatively ‘good’ to do so. In addition, their liberal ideology informs
them that social globalization is something to increase, as competition between ideas is perceived as
beneficial. In this case, the liberal executive speeds up the flow of ideas that constitute social
globalization. Thus, social globalization increases when a liberal executive is present.
Considering my findings, it is also possible to predict how socially globalized certain
countries are. A country with a larger ideological range should be more socially globalized than a
country with a narrow ideological range. France and Portugal fit this expectation well. France has on
average, a larger ideological range than Portugal (1.46 in France and .786 in Portugal). In 1970,
France had a social globalization value of 61.9 and Portugal a value of 53. In 2015, France had a
value of 85.3 (slightly above the OECD average of 81.6). In contrast, Portugal had a social
globalization value of 77.04 in 2015. This difference among the two countries can be partially
attributed to the effect of veto players on social globalization.
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Additional variation between the French and Portuguese cases can also be attributed to
variation in major power status and EU membership. Since 1970, France has been considered a
major power, while Portugal has not. This likely contributed to some of the difference between
France’s social globalization compared to Portugal’s across time. In addition, France was a founding
member of the EU. However, Portugal joined later in 1986. This likely inhibited the growth of
France’s social globalization across the entire time period, while Portugal was initially able to socially
globalize much faster until it became an EU member.
Also, of note, countries without a liberal executive should be less socially globalized than
those with liberal executives. This is indeed the case in my data. Two such examples are Japan and
Switzerland, which fit this expectation perfectly. For most years, Japan did not have a liberal
executive, while Switzerland did. In 1970, Japan had a social globalization value of 35, while
Switzerland has a value of 74.3 in 1970 (compared to the OECD average of 59.3 in 1970).129 In 2015
Japan had a value of 64, while Switzerland has a value of 89.5 (compared to the OECD average of
81.6). Even the status of Japan as a major power (which increases social globalization) was not
enough to overcome the lack of a liberal executive. Thus, Japan remains among the least socially
globalized countries in my data, far behind Switzerland.
As of now, I have introduced the topic of globalization. I then argued that globalization is
composed of three dimensions (political, economic, and social). And that each dimension has a
unique relationship with veto players. I then discussed the evidence and the estimator needed to test
these relationships. The Political Globalization Chapter found that as the ideological range of the
veto players increases, political globalization decreases. In the Economic Globalization Chapter I

It is worth noting that Switzerland has had a liberal executive since 1848 (Obinger 1998). This explains the vast
difference from where Switzerland starts in my data compared to Japan.
129
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found no relationship between veto players and economic globalization. However, the presence of a
liberal executive is critical, as they tend to increase economic globalization.
The current chapter examined the final dimension of globalization; social globalization. I
found that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, social globalization also increases.
This finding, while weaker than my previous two, is bolstered by the fact that social globalization is
more complex than previous dimensions. Cooperation, the presence of a liberal executive, and
major power status all effect how socially globalized a country is each year.
The next chapter will conclude my dissertation. In this chapter, I will review my overall
argument and compare it to my empirical results. This will allow for my theory to be refined based
on the evidence. This chapter will also note my unique contributions to the globalization literature.
Lastly, I will point to avenues for future research on globalization and its dimensions.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Globalization is a fact, because of technology, because of an integrated global supply chain, because of changes in
transportation. And we’re not going to be able to build a wall around that.
Former US President Barack Obama

I have introduced the topic of globalization and proposed a definition that more closely
maps onto theoretical scholarship (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and
Leblang 2008 and others). I then argued that globalization can be separated into three primary
dimensions; political, economic, and social. Next, I argued that each dimension of globalization has
a unique relationship with veto players and executive institutions. To test these relationships, I
employed the Swiss Economic Institute’s Globalization Index and PCSE regression. I found, in the
Political Globalization Chapter, that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, political
globalization tends to decrease. In the Economic Globalization Chapter, I found no relationship
between veto players and economic globalization. However, the presence of a liberal executive is
critical, as they increase the growth rate of economic globalization. Lastly, in the Social
Globalization Chapter, I found that as the ideological range of the veto players increases, social
globalization is marginally increased. In addition, the presence of a liberal executive increases social
globalization.
This chapter concludes my investigation of the relationship between institutions and the
dimensions of globalization. In this chapter I return to the theoretical argument laid out previously
and note its predictions. I then discuss the fate of each predicted relationship with the dimensions of
globalization. My findings show that previous work is correct, globalization is multidimensional
(Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) and that institutions effect
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the dimensions of globalization very differently. In addition, my results show that globalization,
regardless of dimension, appears to be a preference of liberal actors.
The number of different relationships in my findings begin to unravel why divergent results
exist in globalization research. These divergent results are caused by not modeling globalization as
multidimensional. Since veto players effect each dimension differently, it cannot be ruled out that
other concepts have dimension specific relationships as well. In addition, my findings show that,
liberal executives prefer increased globalization. My work expands previous arguments made by
other scholars (Ruggie 1982; 2009; Hays 2009) about liberalism and contextualizes their findings.
Regardless of where a liberal actor is situated in the institutional fabric of the state, they desire
increased globalization. Their ability to implement change, however, varies given institutional
constraints. I also point to avenues for future work to explore, considering my findings.

Results Restated
I defined globalization as; a complex multidimensional process of global interconnectedness, operating
simultaneously across several institutional domains. This definition allowed for globalization to retain two
key features overlooked in the literature; multidimensionality (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane
2002) and its numerous institutional effects. My definition allows for more contextual empirical
work while also ensuring parsimony. This is accomplished by limiting the scope of research to
specific institutional domains and to the dimensions of globalization. I employed both features to
examine the impact of veto players and executives on the dimensions of globalization. This is
possible thanks to significant advances in the measurement of globalization by Axel Dreher and
others at the Swiss Economic Institute (2006a; Dreher and Gaston 2008b; Dreher, Gassebner, and

137

Siemers 2012; Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). Whose KOF Globalization Index contains the most
advanced measures of each dimension of globalization.
I posited that, according to Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002), each dimension of
globalization has a unique relationship with veto players. Political globalization tends to decrease as
the veto player problem becomes more severe. This is due to the increased difficulty of passing new
policy. Economic globalization is generally unaffected by a veto player problem, due to liberalisms
tendency to be preferred by at least one veto player. This ensures a status quo favorable to economic
globalization. Additionally, when a liberal executive is present, the growth rate of economic
globalization increases. This is due to an executives privileged institutional position (Haggard and
McCubbins 2001) and their electoral incentive (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992; Hibbs 2000).
Social globalization tends to increase as the veto player problem becomes larger. When hamstrung
by a large ideological range, veto players cannot intervene in the market place of ideas (Ballentine
and Snyder 1996), and effect social globalization. This leaves norms free of influence allowing them
to grow more freely. Which results in increased social globalization. In addition, the presence of a
liberal executive is also key to understanding social globalization. Agenda setting powers, such as
going public, allow a liberal executive to increase social globalization. Thus, the presence of a liberal
executive is critical to understanding social globalization. Each of these theoretical relationships is
summarized in Table 19 below.
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Table 19. Summary of Findings
Dimension of Globalization

Predicted Relationship

Expectations Confirmed?

Political Globalization

As the ideological range of the
veto player increases, political
globalization decreases

Confirmed

Economic Globalization

1) Ideological range does not
affect economic globalization

1) Confirmed

2) The presence of a liberal
executive increases the growth
rate of economic globalization
Social Globalization

2) Confirmed

1) As the ideological range of the
veto players increases, so does
social globalization

1) Confirmed

2) The presence of a liberal
executive increases social
globalization

2) Confirmed

The results of the political, economic, and social globalization models confirm the theorized
relationships summarized in Table 19. First, I will briefly recap the political globalization model.
Next, I will review the economic globalization’s model. And lastly, I overview the findings from the
social globalization model.
The political globalization model confirms my argument. Political globalization is negatively
related to the ideological range of the veto players. Thus, for political globalization to increase, a
narrow ideological range is required. When the ideological range is narrow, this allows for policy
diffusion to occur more easily, which is how political globalization increases. The political
globalization model also found that corporatist countries with a small ideological range are the most
politically globalized. This is caused by the ease of policy implementation, as the veto player problem
is smaller. When combined with corporatism, which results in higher levels of globalization (Garrett
1998), this ensures higher than average political globalization. On the other hand, market liberal
139

countries with a large ideological range of the veto players are the least politically globalized. Both
findings are consistent with previous work on corporatism and market liberalism (Katzenstein 1985;
Garrett 1998; Hays 2009). However, my findings extend beyond the corporatist, market liberal,
incoherent typology. Veto players impact the ordering within each category of countries, allowing
for more precise predictions, instead of a simple trichotomy. Lastly, the year specific effect of 1991
in the political globalization model, which captures the effect of the reentry of several countries into
the international system, is significant. This provides further evidence regarding globalizations
multidimensionality, as this dimension specific effect is not found in other models.
The economic globalization model showcases two primary relationship. First, that economic
globalization is not affected by veto players. The ideological range and the count of the veto players
is not a significant predictor of a countries level of economic globalization. This is regardless of
model and variable specification. This lack of relationship may indicate that legislative institutions
have little impact on the economic dimension of globalization. With the overwhelming popularity of
liberalism, unless all veto players who prefer liberalism are removed, economic globalization will
remain unaffected by legislative institutions. And second, when a liberal executive is present
economic globalization’s growth rate tends to increase. Given previous arguments regarding the
delegation of economic policy (Haggard and McCubbins 2001), this finding is altogether not
unexpected. This is caused by the liberal preference for economic openness (a component of
economic globalization). The executive’s preferences become reality due to the institutional
advantage executives have in the realm of economic policy. This institutional advantage enables a
liberal executive to ratchet up economic globalization.
Additionally, economic globalization is also affected by three other variables; EU
membership, peak oil, and a 2002 year-specific effect. EU members tend to be marginally more
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economically globalized than non-EU members. This is consistent with prior work on the EU
(Young 2004; 2007), showcasing that economic connections tend to increase after joining.
Additionally, I found marginal evidence in support of peak oil (Curtis 2009). Which states that
globalization and oil prices co-vary, with oil prices acting as a cap on globalization. Thus, the price
of oil each year has a small negative effect on economic globalization. However, it is unclear if oil
prices function as a hard cap on economic globalization. Lastly, there is a year-specific effect for
2002 in my economic globalization data. This negative effect is due to the economic downturn
immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Rosendorff and Sandler 2005). This year specific effect
is not found in the other dimensions and is further evidence in support of globalizations
multidimensionality.
Social globalization is marginally related to veto players. As the ideological range of the veto
players increases, so does social globalization. This is caused by a veto player being unable to
intervene in the market place of ideas (Ballentine and Snyder 1996) to promote/erode the norms
they find agreeable/disagreeable. Thus, a veto player problem prevents legislative actors from
interfering in how norms evolve over time. Thus, when a veto player problem is large, norms are not
subject to legislative influences. This frees up norms and ideas to change more rapidly over time.
The main caveat to my finding regarding veto players and social globalization is that my results are
marginally significant. The relationship between social globalization and veto players is significant at
the 90 percent level, but still of the predicted sign. Given that all three dimensions of globalization
behave much as expected, this result is less concerning. My theory accurately predicted the
relationship of political, economic, and social globalization. Taken together, this is little cause to toss
out the results of my social globalization model.
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I also found that the presence of a liberal executive has a significant effect on social
globalization. Given that liberals construct ideational intervention as ‘good,’ and necessary, liberals
want to increase social globalization. This preference in the hands of an executive, which is imbued
with institutional advantage in the realm of ideas causes an increase in social globalization. Of
particular interest are agenda setting powers, such as ‘going public’ (Kernell 2006; Neto and Lobo
2009). These powers allow for the executive to dictate how social globalization changes over time.
This is accomplished by influencing the growth of norms (a component of social globalization). This
results in liberal executives increasing social globalization over time.
My findings regarding social globalization can also be further contextualized in three ways;
the role of cooperation, the significance of EU membership, and the role of major power status.
Beginning with cooperation, both security and trade agreements increase social globalization. This
result is consistent with previous work that has argued that both types of cooperation decrease
uncertainty (Lupu 2015; Davis and Pratt 2017). This enables more cooperation later. But, instead of
only one effect being impactful, as previously argued, I found evidence of both effects operating
simultaneously. Thus, cooperation of various stripes increases social globalization. In addition, EU
membership has a uniquely negative effect on social globalization. This finding is consistent with
prior work (Young 2004; 2007), in that EU membership has positive economic and negative social
effects. This finding is important to debates regarding the effect the EU has on identity formation,
as it indicates that the EU may preserve existing identities instead of eroding them (Checkel 2001).
Lastly, a major power in the international system tends to be more socially globalized. This insight
combined with other scholarship on hegemony (broadly defined) (Keohane 2005; Diez 2013) is
particularly interesting. It suggests that two forms of hegemony may exist, one material the other
normative. This insight merits further exploration.
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Implications
My findings show previous arguments to be largely correct. Globalization is indeed best
understood as multidimensional and operating across several institutional domains (Held and
McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Only by separating globalization
into political, economic, and social dimensions can its relationship with veto players be fully
understood. My findings on the three dimensions of globalization also provide analytical leverage to
resolve divergent findings in the literature (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002 are two
examples). I contend that many of the divergent findings are driven by theoretical missteps.
Assuming that globalization is a unified whole can lead to problematic variable selection. If a
multidimensional measure is not selected, the scholar runs the risk of accidentally measuring a single
dimension of globalization. Take for example the work of Geoffrey Garrett (1998). He employs
trade openness (imports + exports/GDP) to operationalize globalization. This variable, I would
argue is an operationalization of economic globalization. Indeed, the Swiss Economic Institute
determined much the same when crafting their economic globalization variable (Gygli, Haelg, and
Sturm 2018). Thus, while I do not discount Garrett’s work, I do contend that it must be
reinterpreted in the light that his argument is only about economic globalization. To generalize his
work to other dimensions is an empirical question that must be tested, not assumed. A similar
argument applies to work by Jude Hays (2009), who also employs capital account restrictions as a
measure of globalization. Again, this variable only captures economic globalization. By considering
the multidimensionality of globalization, and specifying which dimension is being studied, divergent
findings in the literature be reconciled. This requires careful examination of past scholars’ variable
choices given that globalization is multidimensional. Then separating them according to which
dimension they study (political, economic, or social). Without separating globalization into its three
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dimensions, it would not have been uncovered that three different relationships exist. This would
have prevented globalization scholars from understanding that legislative and executive institutions
have a more complex relationship with globalization. This valuable insight would have gone
undiscovered and confusion in the literature would have remained.
In addition, evidence from the political and economic models provide further evidence in
support of globalizations multidimensionality. In tests for unit and year-specific effects (Stimson
1985), both political and economic globalization contained year-specific effects. The political
globalization data contained a year-specific for 1991. This is caused by the reentry of several
countries into the international system. In the economic model, there was a year specific effect for
2002. This effect represents the economic impact of the 9/11 terror attacks. The performance of
both year specific effects is sound evidence to further support the claim that globalization should be
treated as multidimensional. This, clearly shows that globalization must be treated as
multidimensional in later work (Held and McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Eichengreen and Leblang
2008).
I also argue that my results corroborate previous work. Geoffrey Garrett’s argument that
globalization is subject to short-term domestic political fluctuations is indeed correct (1998). I would
add that these effects originate from veto players. Thus, Garrett’s overall point is correct, but
domestic political fluctuations vary across globalizations dimensions, based on their relationship
with veto players. Additionally, domestic political effects are partially due to executive institutions.
The presence of a liberal executive is a critical determinant of economic and social globalization.
When a liberal executive is present, the rate of growth of economic globalization is increased. A
similar effect is also found for social globalization: liberal executives directly impact social
globalization. The presence of a liberal executive, who seeks to promote normative competition,
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results in the increase of social globalization over time. Taken together, my findings indicate that
globalization is indeed subject to domestic political fluctuations. However, the direction of those
fluctuations depends on what dimension and which institutional domain is being considered.
The work of Jude Hays (2009) argues that liberalism is key to understanding globalization.
When liberalism is without corporatism, the externalities of globalization are not mitigated, and vice
versa. My findings echo much the same sentiment but refine Hay’s argument. My results point to the
main institutional actor that, when liberal, pushes for increased economic and social globalization;
the executive. My multidimensional treatment of globalization also shows that veto players also play
various roles. Thus, from my results, it does appear that liberals do want increased globalization.
However, the institutional position of the liberal actor is key. When a liberal actor controls the
executive branch, it becomes possible to increase economic and social globalization. Thus, I would
argue that liberals tend to be pro-globalization, but their effectiveness depends upon institutions.

Limitations
The dangers of a multidimensional globalization framework are not new. While a
multidimensional framework does bring powerful insight (Held and McGrew 1993; Eichengreen and
Leblang 2008), it also charges scholars to engage in careful theorizing. Without careful theorizing,
the tendency to disaggregate globalization can render the concept useless. For example, military
globalization, is a step too far down the disaggregation ladder (Keohane 2002). This concept, I
argue, is not useful as it is a theoretical equivalent of material capabilities measures, such as the
COW National Material Capabilities (NMC) data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1988).
By disaggregating globalization too much, globalization ceases to be both multidimensional and
complex interconnectedness. It becomes another concept entirely, in the case of military
globalization; material capabilities. To avoid peeling globalization apart too much, it is imperative
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that all dimensions of globalization be accompanied by methodical theorizing. Simply labeling new
dimensions off hand (c.f. Martens and Zywietz 2006; Martens and Raza 2009) is incredibly
dangerous. It poses the threat of undoing all current strides made in the literature and balkanizing
globalization scholarship into dimensional fiefdoms. No new knowledge can be gained from going
down this road. Globalization scholarship that accepts positivism then, must exercise caution when
arguing for new dimensions of globalization.
Empirically, there is one part of globalization that generally left out of the data. This is
deviant globalization (Gilman, GoldHammer, and Weber 2011). Illicit political, economic, and social
connections are unaccounted for in the KOF data. While there is notorious difficulty in estimating
the informal economy (Gershuny 1979), this does not however prevent adding it to a complex
multidimensional framework. What it does present is a data challenge similar to that confronted my
previous globalization scholars seeking to construct a robust composite data (Lockwood 2001; T. M.
Anderson and Herbertsson 2003; Heshmati 2003; Dreher 2006a; Martens and Zywietz 2006;
Martens and Raza 2009; Vujakovic 2009; Dreher et al. 2010). The question is not one of perfection,
but one of slowly creating better multidimensional globalization data over time. The next step is to
include deviant globalization indicators. Previous work indicates that this is possible, and particularly
relevant right now, as countries are experimenting with political, economic, and social reforms that
touch upon deviant globalization (Haak 2018; Sapara 2018). The Canadian case in particular has
interesting implications for the OECD as a whole, as they have aggressively incorporated deviant
globalization within the normal policy, economic, and social space. Aggregating these deviant
globalization indicators into established data will allow for a more complete picture than is presented
here. If my work is limited empirically, it is limited in that it only explores the formal aspects of
political, economic, and social globalization and their relationship to formal institutions.
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Additional minor empirical limitations also are applicable to each dimensional model. The
political globalization model attempts to account for the influence of higher policy salience but does
so imperfectly. More sophisticated methods do exist (Walker 1969; Boehmke and Skinner 2012), but
have yet to be applied to international policy diffusion. The economic globalization model shows
that national veto players do not impact economic globalization. However, it is possible that under
certain ideological configurations this may be incorrect. Particularly when all veto players share a
common preference for protectionism. While this instance does not occur in my data, given how
much of the ideological spectrum is considered liberal (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992;
Bakker et al. 2015), it does merit noting that such instances have been wildly important (Hays 2009).
My findings have little to say about how veto players impact economic globalization when they all
embrace protectionism. Lastly, the social globalization model indicates, in the performance of the
EU membership variable, that regional and possibly international institutions affect social
globalization. However, it says little about the specifics of this relationship. It demonstrates they
matter but provides no specifics as to why this is the case. These minor limitations in each
dimensional model should not diminish my findings. They should, however, be taken into account.

Future Work
The extensions of my work are quite logical. I have tested how each dimension of
globalization impacts legislative and executive institutional domains. Future work will need to
examine how other domestic institutions impact the dimensions of globalization. For example, it is
possible to explore how judicial and bureaucratic institutions impact the dimensions of globalization.
In particular, judicial institutions, depending on their strength and independence, may either increase
or decrease certain dimensions of globalization. For example, the “switch in time that saved nine,”
when the US Supreme Court shifted its interpretation of their economic role (McCloskey and
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Levinson 2016), likely increased economic globalization. This may indicate that judicial institutions,
more broadly, may impact one or more of globalization’s dimensions. Future scholars will need to
examine this link empirically.
Bureaucracies, depending on their independence, might affect the dimensions of
globalization as well. If a significant degree of independence exists, then bureaucratic agencies are
likely to use it. How exactly this might affect the dimensions of globalization, is an empirical
question. Additionally, when little bureaucratic discretion exists, it would be assumed that legislative
or executive preferences are closely followed. However, this assumption needs to be verified
empirically.
Additional work is also needed to unravel the effect of executive ideology on the dimensions
of globalization. My work clearly shows that one ideology, liberalism, has a positive effect on
economic and social globalization. However, other political ideologies exist. For example, some
scholars would argue that a conservative ideology should result in decreased globalization (Hays
2009). However, work by scholars of comparative partisanship (Castles and Mair 1984) needs to be
headed, as the effect of other ideologies may not be as clear cut as those of liberalism. This presents
scholars of globalization with an intriguing question; which ideologies positively or negatively impact
each dimension of globalization? It seems likely that Far Right political parties should seek to slow
social globalization, as global ideas may be perceived as threatening to national identities. However,
this assumption needs to be verified empirically. And, where this effect stops on the ideological scale
is an open question, as the Far-Right of the ideological scale becomes more complex than a simple
scale of economic liberalism would estimate. Additional ideological scales based on other criteria will
also need to be investigated. This line of reasoning merits exploration, as it may explain why
globalization retreated in the Inter-War Period.
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International institutions might also affect the dimensions of globalization. Given that
international institutions have agency (Guzman 2013), a wide variety of effects are possible. Some
institutions may seek to increase a particular dimension. Likely examples of this might be the
WTO/GATT, who promote international economic outcomes. However, they may also have
surprising effects on political or social globalization. Given that the EU membership has a negative
effect on social globalization, it is entirely possible that the WTO/GATT could also have a similar
effect. This effect will need to be estimated and tested empirically.
Certain international institutional types may also affect globalization in different ways. For
example, the difference between state created institutions and emanations (institutions created by
other international institutions) (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996). It is entirely possible that
institutions created by states may have larger positive or negative impacts on certain dimensions of
globalization. This may be due to these institutions mirroring its creators’ preferences. Or, it may be
that institutions created by other institutions (such as the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, created by the United Nations in the 1980’s) might impact globalizations
dimensions independent of state preferences. If this is true, then international institutionalization
could perpetuate globalization.
Or, the presence or lack of binding decision powers might be critical (Pelc 2013). If an
international institution lacks binding decision powers (like the Arctic Council) it is likely that its
effect on any of the dimensions of globalization could be muted. However, this claim merits
empirical examination. Conversely, international institutions with binding powers, such as the
United Nations, could be expected to increase the dimensions of globalization more than soft power
institutions. The major dimension of interest here is social globalization, which could buck these
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predictions. These empirical questions merit exploration. This leaves many research possibilities on
how various institutional domains impact the dimensions of globalization.

Conclusion
In this dissertation, I unpacked globalization’s relationship to institutions. I argued that
globalization needs to be separated into three dimensions, given past scholarly work (Held and
McGrew 1993; Keohane 2002; Dreher 2006a; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). I then argued that
each of these dimensions has a different relationship with veto players and executive institutions.
Political globalization has a negative relationship with veto players. Economic globalization is
unaffected by veto players. I argued that this is because only when all veto players with a liberal
preference are removed can economic globalization be affected. But economic globalization’s
growth rate is significantly increased when a liberal executive is present. This is due to executive
dominance in economic policy. Social globalization has a positive relationship with veto players.
This is because as the larger the veto player problem, they are less able to interfere in the
marketplace of ideas. Additionally, social globalization is also increased when a liberal executive is in
power. This is because liberals see normative competition as beneficial, and actively promote it,
which causes social globalization to increase. Overall, my findings indicate that globalization is
indeed best separated into its three primary dimensions, as each has a different relationship with
legislative and executive institutions.
If globalization is not unpacked into its component dimensions, there is a risk that any
aggregate findings could be driven by one dimension. This forces scholars to conceptualize
globalization not as one complex process, but as several that are subject to a variety of institutional
effects. Legislative institutions have differing directional relationships with each dimension of
globalization. In addition, executive institutions tend to have another set of relationships with a
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subset of globalization’s dimensions. This theoretical insight may explain why, for example, scholars
examining welfare expansion/shrinkage and globalization cannot come to agreement (Garrett and
Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002 are examples). This may be because both sets of findings are correct
about a different dimension of globalization. This gives future scholars the ability to progress our
understanding of globalization, by employing a dimensional framework to capture its complexity.
My findings regarding the dimensions of globalization and veto players suggest that a shift in
globalization research is warranted. Scholars need to explore the various relationships between the
dimensions of globalization and other phenomena. Future work on institutional domains and
globalization’s dimensions will need to control for the effect of veto players and executive
institutions. But other institutions, both domestic and international are likely to be shown as
impactful across the three dimensions. Beginning from this starting point, research on
globalization’s dimensions has an exciting future ahead.
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Appendix

Table 20. List of States and Years in the Data
State (in Alphabetical Order)

Years there is Veto Player Data

Australia

1970-2015

Austria

1970-2015

Belgium

1970-2015

Canada

1970-2015

Czech Republic

1993-2015

Denmark

1970-2015

Estonia

1991-2015

Finland

1970-2015

France

1970-2015

Germany

1970-2015

Greece

1970-2015

Hungary

1970-2015

Iceland

1970-2015

Ireland

1970-2015

Israel

1970-2015

Italy

1970-2015

Japan

1970-2015

Latvia

1990-2015

Lithuania

1990-2015

Luxembourg

1970-2015

Netherlands

1970-2015

New Zealand

1970-2015

Norway

1970-2015

Poland

1970-2015

Portugal

1976-2015

Slovak Republic

1993-2015

Slovenia

1991-2015

Spain

1977-2015

Sweden

1970-2015

Switzerland

1970-2015

Turkey

1983-2015

United Kingdom

1970-2015

United States

1970-2015
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Below is the test for year specific effects in the political globalization data. The sum value
cannot exceed twice to five times the mean of the dependent variable. The mean of the dependent
variable (political globalization) is 79.9. Certain years are omitted for spatial considerations.

Table 21. Year Specific Effects - Political Globalization
Year

Sum

Variance

1970

0

.

1980

13.13363

.6869195

1989

-38.78772

12.51226

1990

-26.51636

1.3597

1991

96.66368

15.16315

2000

.1035728

.8599202

2010

-12.34526

.5080818

2015

-11.59133

3.423827
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Additional political globalization models specified using FLGS and OLS.

Table 22. FGLS and OLS Political Globalization Models
Variable

FGLS w/ Ideological
Range

FGLS w/
Count

OLS w/ Ideological
Range130

OLS w/
Count

Political Globalization
Ideological Range

-.090**

-.072**

(0.04)

(0.03)

Count

Cold War

-.079*

-.065*

(0.04)

(0.04)

-.986***

-.904***

-.884***

-.823***

(0.15)

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.14)

.565***

.457***

.438***

.360***

(0.18)

(0.17)

(0.13)

(0.12)

.522***

.473***

.429***

.396***

(0.18)

(0.17)

(0.16)

(0.15)

Lagged Political
Globalization

.943***

.947***

.950***

.952***

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

1991

3.354***

3.411***

3.691***

3.720***

(0.36)

(0.35)

(0.72)

(0.70)

5.401***

5.129***

4.834***

4.656***

(0.47)

(0.45)

(0.64)

(0.65)

0.982

0.982

1246.0

1292.0

Corporatism

Incoherent

Constant

R Squared
N

1246.0

1292.0

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01

The results of all OLS models in the appendix are presented for reference purposes only. Any divergence between the
OLS models and the other models (FGLS and PCSE) is likely to be driven by the myriad of violated assumptions of the
OLS model due to the nature of TSCS data. The reader is strongly cautioned to not infer that differing variable
performance is due to patterns in the data. Any and all differences are due to violated assumptions.
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The below figure is a plot of the fitted values of political globalization against the count of the veto
players

Figure 7. Plot of Count and Political Globalization
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Test for year specific effects in the economic globalization data. The sum value cannot
exceed twice to five times the mean of the dependent variable. The mean of the dependent variable
(economic globalization) is 63.49. Certain years are omitted for spatial considerations.

Table 23. Year Specific Effects - Economic Globalization
Year

Sum

Variance

1970

0

.

1980

3.06855

.7522892

1990

-17.47308

.7566

2000

63.59042

3.52548

2002

-69.05186

5.452834

2015

-16.62881

1.974489
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Table 24. FGLS and OLS Economic Globalization Models 1 of 2
Variable

FGLS w/Ideological
Range

FGLS w/
Count

OLS w/ Ideological
Range

OLS w/
Count

Economic Globalization
Ideological Range

.005

.004

(0.03)

(0.03)

Veto Player Count

Cold War

.064*

.063

(0.04)

(0.04)

-.616***

-.584***

-.618***

-.586***

(0.15)

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.14)

.307**

.332**

.296**

.319**

(0.15)

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.14)

Lagged # of Trade
Agreements

.041**

.042**

.042

.042

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.04)

(0.04)

Lagged # of Security
Agreements

-.228

-.240

-.223*

-.234*

(0.18)

(0.18)

(0.13)

(0.13)

Corporatism

.123

.107

.114

.097

(0.15)

(0.14)

(0.12)

(0.12)

-.162

-.150

-.157

-.144

(0.15)

(0.15)

(0.14)

(0.14)

-.009***

-.009***

-.009***

-.009***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Lagged Economic
Globalization

.965***

.964***

.965***

.965***

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

2002 Indicator

-2.313***

-2.305***

-2.322***

-2.315***

(0.31)

(0.30)

(0.43)

(0.41)

3.405***

3.249***

3.363***

3.199***

(0.40)

(0.40)

(0.48)

(0.46)

0.982

0.982

1053.0

1090.0

1053.0

1090.0

EU Membership

Incoherent

Crude oil price

Constant

R Squared
N
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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Table 25. FGLS and OLS Economic Globalization Models 2 of 2
Variable

FGLS w/Ideological
Range and Liberal
Executive

FGLS
w/Count and
Liberal
Executive

OLS w/Ideological
Range and Liberal
Executive

OLS w/Count
and Liberal
Executive

Rate of Change in
Economic
Globalization
Ideological Range

-0.009

-0.010

(0.03)
Count

Liberal Executive

Cold War

EU Membership

(0.03)
0.057

0.057

(0.04)

(0.04)

0.214*

0.240**

0.214*

0.240**

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.11)

-0.436***

-0.387***

-0.439***

-0.391***

(0.14)

(0.13)

(0.14)

(0.13)

-0.060

-0.028

-0.060

-0.028

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.12)

Lagged # of Trade
Agreements

0.024

0.024

0.024

0.024

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Lagged # of
Security
Agreements

-0.119

-0.138

-0.118

-0.136

(0.18)

(0.18)

(0.19)

(0.18)

Corporatism

-0.214

-0.250*

-0.214

-0.250*

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.13)

0.031

0.045

0.031

0.045

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.14)

Average Price of
Crude Oil

-0.014***

-0.014***

-0.014***

-0.014***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

2002 Indicator

-2.606***

-2.587***

-2.611***

-2.597***

(0.31)

(0.30)

(0.31)

(0.30)

1.310***

1.111***

1.312***

1.115***

(0.15)

(0.16)

(0.15)

(0.16)

0.118

0.119

Incoherent

Constant

R Squared
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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The below figure is the fitted values for economic globalization plotted against the count of the veto
players.

Figure 8. Plot of Count and Economic Globalization
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Table 26. FGLS and OLS Social Globalization Count Models
Variable

FGLS w/
Ideological
Range

OLS w/
Ideological
Range

0.027

0.027

(0.02)

(0.02)

FGLS w/ Count

OLS w/ Count

0.017

0.016

(0.02)

(0.02)

Social Globalization
Ideological Range

Count

Cold War

-0.503***

-0.505***

-0.478***

-0.480***

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

-0.118*

-0.116

-0.105

-0.102

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.07)

Lagged # of Trade
Agreements

0.022*

0.021*

0.023**

0.022**

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Lagged # of Security
Agreements

0.155

0.139*

0.117

0.107

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.10)

Corporatism

0.025

0.03

0.032

0.036

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

-0.147*

-0.152*

-0.140*

-0.148*

(0.08)

(0.09)

(0.08)

(0.09)

.088

.086

.068

0.067

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.06)

(0.06)

.172

.176

.057

.058

(0.12)

(0.13)

(0.10)

(0.10)

Lagged Social
Globalization

0.966***

0.965***

0.967***

0.966***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Constant

3.169***

3.228***

3.106***

3.154***

(0.31)

(0.32)

(0.31)

(0.32)

EU Membership

Incoherent

Liberal Executive

Major Power

R Squared
N

0.988
1077.0

1077.0

0.988
1119.0

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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1119.0

The below figure is the fitted social globalization values plotted against the count of the veto players.

Figure 9. Plot of Count and Social Globalization

161

Table 27. Aggregate Globalization Models
Variable

PCSE
w/Range

PCSE
w/Count

FGLS w/
Range

FGLS
w/Count

OLS w/
Range

OLS w/
Count

Aggregate
Globalization
Ideological Range

-0.008

-0.008

-0.008

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Count

Liberal Executive

Major Power

Cold War

Lagged # of Trade
Agreements
Lagged # of Security
Agreements

-0.001

-0.001

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.118**

0.109**

0.118+

0.109+

0.118+

0.108+

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

0.261***

0.197+

0.261**

0.198+

0.262**

0.198+

(0.09)

(0.11)

(0.13)

(0.10)

(0.13)

(0.10)

-1.052***

1.020***

-1.052***

-1.020***

-1.052***

-1.020***

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.18)
EU Membership

-0.001

(0.17)

0.217***

0.237***

0.217***

0.237***

0.218***

0.238***

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.07)

(0.08)

(0.08)

0.005

0.006

0.005

0.006

0.005

0.006

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.002

-0.001

0.001

-0.001

-0.000

-0.004

(0.17)

(0.17)

(0.11)

(0.10)

(0.11)

(0.10)

0.406***

0.401***

0.407***

0.401***

0.408***

0.403***

(0.14)

(0.13)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.10)

(0.09)

Incoherent

-0.025

-0.015

-0.025

-0.015

-0.025

-0.015

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

Crude Oil

-0.004

-0.004+

-0.004***

-0.004***

-0.004***

-0.004***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Lagged DV

0.936***

0.936***

0.936***

0.936***

0.936***

0.936***

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Constant

5.539***

5.506***

5.542***

5.509***

5.547***

5.518***

(0.78)

(0.77)

(0.37)

(0.37)

(0.37)

(0.37)

R2

0.990

0.990

0.989

0.989

N

974

1011

974

1011

Corporatism

974

1011

*p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01
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